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As we watch the dramatic images of Georgian citizens demonstrating against the “foreign agent” law in the capital, Tbilisi, it would be mistaken to see the case of Georgia as an isolated incident. A concerning trend has recently emerged across various Eurasian regions, driven by the shadow of Russian influence.

The introduction of so-called “foreign agent” laws, reminiscent of Russia’s own restrictive measures, has not been limited to Moscow alone, but extends to countries like Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and territories such as Abkhazia. Even in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, similar legislative efforts have been proposed, indicating a broader, possibly coordinated strategy by Russia’s proxies to undermine civil society and democratic norms across its sphere of influence.

Georgia’s foreign agent law, a precedent for repression which closely mirrors Russia’s infamous legislation, aims to label and restrict the activities of organisations receiving foreign funding. Introduced in early 2023, this move has sparked significant backlash from civil society groups, who view it as a direct threat to freedom of expression and association.

The law’s introduction in Georgia can be seen as a critical component of Russia’s broader strategy to stifle dissent and maintain control over its neighbours​. The law, not yet even fully approved, is already used by the government to suppress opposition and civil society groups. Though people at large are very critical of the government and development, there are serious concerns about the fairness of the upcoming elections in the autumn of 2024.

Kyrgyzstan is following suit. In April 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov signed into law a similar bill requiring NGOs receiving foreign funds to register as foreign agents. This law imposes stringent reporting requirements and exposes these organisations to public suspicion and governmental scrutiny, effectively curtailing their ability to operate independently. The move aligns Kyrgyzstan closer to Moscow’s authoritarian playbook, undermining the country’s democratic institutions and civil society​.

In Abkhazia, the Russian-occupied province of Georgia, the de facto authorities introduced a foreign agents law in October 2023 as a tool to further occupation. This legislation is part of Russia’s broader strategy to consolidate its control over the territory, which it has recognised as an independent state despite international condemnation. The law further isolates Abkhazian civil society from external support, deepening its dependence on Russian political and financial backing​.

Similarly, In April 2024, the Ministry of Justice in the Republic of Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina published a draft law similar to the one in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, ruling that civil organisations that receive funding or support from foreign entities would be required to register in a special registry. The law was announced in 2022 by Milorad Dodik, the President of the Republic of  Srpska, with the timing of the adoption being unclear. The draft has been criticised for violating Bosnia and Herzegovina’s human rights commitments and goes against its EU accession aspirations.

Serbia is also witnessing a debate on the introduction of a foreign agent law. Announced in April 2024 by Serbia’s small Movement of Socialists party, this proposal aims to restrict the activities of foreign non-governmental organisations operating in the Balkan country. This legislation would delegitimise and restrict NGOs that challenge the government or receive Western support. From the EU perspective, the intent is clear: The legislation, if ever approved, would reinforce Serbia’s alignment with Russian interests in the Balkans, further complicating the region’s fragile political landscape.

A Pattern of Influence

The synchronisation, timing and similarity of these legal initiatives suggest a coordinated effort by Russia to export its repressive tactics to neighbouring countries and territories. It should therefore not go unnoticed by the EU and the West. The introduction of foreign agent laws in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Abkhazia, as well as similar proposals in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, highlight a disturbing trend of authoritarianism spreading under Russian influence.

By promoting foreign agent laws through its proxies and like-minded actors, Russia seeks to weaken civil society and reduce Western influence and support for democratic movements in these regions. This strategy is part of a broader geopolitical manoeuvre to solidify its sphere of influence and resist Western liberal democratic norms.

Recognising and countering this pattern is crucial for supporting democratic resilience and human rights in these regions. The EU, the West and the international community must stand in solidarity with those affected, ensuring that the voices advocating for democracy and freedom are not silenced.

Tomi Huhtanen EU-Russia Foreign Policy Values

Travelling to Kyiv in 2024 requires a 24 hour trip through 3 different means of transportation. Only 2 and a half years ago, this would’ve been dismissed as pure fiction. But here I was, with a delegation of 30 people from different parts of Europe and the US flying to Warsaw, followed by a 4 hour drive to the Ukrainian border and finally a 12-hour sleeper train that would take of us to the Kyiv Security Forum.

Among the first recommended things to do when going to Ukraine is downloading an air alert app on your phone, which blasts alerts of potential shelling and shows the closest shelter where one can find safety. Sure enough, on the early morning of our arrival to Kyiv on 21st March, 31 missiles were launched on the capital in the biggest attack seen in 44 days, debris of which caused significant damage to roads and civilian buildings.

During the night of 22 March we were awoken, alongside all those living in Ukraine, by a massive attack on the country’s energy infrastructure. A total of 60 drones and 90 missiles were fired, causing major damage to the huge Dnipro hydroelectric power plant. This is Ukraine’s largest, and the one that supplies power to the nuclear plant in Zaporizhzhia. In Kharkiv, almost 1 million people were left without electricity as a result of the attack.

As the Russian Federation was intensifying its attacks on Ukraine, the Kyiv Security Forum was unfolding with local and international guests leading discussions on Ukraine’s prospects of joining the EU and NATO, the country’s internal political dimension, the situation on the frontline and the West’s support to Kyiv.

The loudest message resonating in the room was the need for more military aid – of every type and in every form, from ammunition to air defence. As Admiral Rob Bauer, Chair of NATO’s Military Committee, rightfully pointed out, Ukrainian soldiers are fighting a war combining WWI methods of trenches and artillery barrages with 21st century drones and artificial intelligence. Ukrainian troops are pioneering innovation by using Soviet-style equipment in combination with modern Western material. But they can only continue doing so if more helps comes quickly.

Every passing week, the Kremlin is able to produce more ammunition and missiles than the West thought possible. Somehow, North Korea and Iran can provide military aid to Russia more efficiently than the wealthy and powerful collective West can to Ukraine. Western countries should set clear priorities and ramp up military production by creating partnerships with the private sector to invest in the defence industry.

Today, Ukraine is underarmed and undermanned. During the battle of Avdiivka, the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian soldiers was 7 to 1 according to Colonel Andriy Biletskyi, Commmander of the Third Separate Assault Brigade of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. However, victory could’ve been achieved with proper and modern air defence and enough ammunition. The deficit in weaponry leads to difficulties in mobilising troops, therefore leading to even more disparity in the number of soldiers on the frontline.

To successfully continue their task of defending against Russian occupation, the main expectations of the Ukrainian military for 2024 are a viable law on mobilisation from their own government and delivery of necessary military supplies from their allies. Warfare is complicated and multifaceted, and so too is the necessary hardware and weaponry. Air defence systems remain a priority as Russians hold a decisive supremacy in the skies.

However, despite words of support and encouragement from Ukraine’s allies, the situation remains grim. Expressions of condemnation and condolences are not enough. At the moment the world is failing to mobilise the support Ukraine needs, while Russia tries to degrade the resources Kyiv does have.

Some nations do however set a positive example, like Denmark, the first country committing to transfer its entire artillery to Ukraine and urging others to follow. The Baltic states’ bilateral aid to Ukraine from Jan 24, 2022 to Jan 15, 2024 is respectively of 3.6% of GDP for Estonia, 1.5% for Lithuania and 1.2% for Latvia, while the biggest EU Member States are at 0.6%.

With EU and American elections coming up in a few months, 2024 could be a make or break year for Ukraine, and all eyes are on the upcoming Washington Summit. The Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, Olha Stefanyshyna, states that Ukraine has expectations but no illusions, as the only commitment from NATO allies is a recurrent message of “Ukraine will become a member of NATO, it’s not a question of if but of when”.

One thing is clear, neutrality does not guarantee peace and grey zones are a danger for international security. While writing this piece, two more air strikes were carried out by Russia on Kyiv and Lviv on 24 and 25 March.

Ukraine is fighting for its rightful place in the EU and NATO as a full-fledged member among democracies in the collective West, but its chance of survival depends on the timely delivery of military aid from its allies.

Anna Nalyvayko Defence EU-Russia Ukraine

Slovakia seems resolutely embarked on a path that Hungary, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, has already taken. A path of isolationism. Worse still, the Slovak government is going down this path at an alarming speed.

Robert Fico, the winner of last year’s parliamentary elections, promised a return to a sovereign form of foreign policy. This policy is already bearing its first unflattering fruits. The actions of his government, especially a pivot towards Russia, are weakening ties with the EU and NATO and undermining the country’s credibility.

Fico’s statements on the second anniversary of the war in Ukraine, that the war began in 2014 with the “rampage of Ukrainian neo-Nazis”, sparked controversy as he clearly sided with the aggressor, Russia. This statement did not stop him from rushing to Paris for a conference on Ukraine initiated by President Macron. His actions point to a personal effort to improve his international image, which was damaged by the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Kuciak and his fiancée and corruption scandals involving his government, which forced him to resign as Prime Minister in 2018, ending his second stint in office.

Despite differing stances on the war in Ukraine, the V4 Prime Ministers met in Prague. While the Czech government actively supports Ukraine with ammunition supplies and funding, Slovakia refuses to provide any military assistance. These differences were further highlighted when Polish PM Donald Tusk, Czech PM Petr Fiala and Czech President Petr Pavel convened for a meeting, while Robert Fico and Viktor Orbán met with former Czech President Miloš Zeman. Zeman is known for his sympathies for Russia, while Petr Pavel is a critic of the Kremlin and comes from NATO ranks. Despite the controversial meeting, Fico still pretends everything is fine and the V4 makes sense.

The tables have turned since last week. The prestigious GLOBSEC Security Conference will take place in Prague, not Bratislava, for the first time in 18 years, due to constant criticism from the government. Part of the conference will take place directly at Prague Castle, the seat of President Petr Pavel. He will be hosting and welcoming foreign dignitaries, a role habitually reserved to Slovak constitutional officials.

GLOBSEC has quickly realised that given current Slovak foreign policy, which clearly supports Russia, it has no chance of presenting a constructive stance on security threats from a Slovak perspective. The country is thus losing a well-established and well-known brand. And of course, it is losing respect. One could easily conceive GLOBSEC taking the Conference to Warsaw or one of the Baltic states next year.

In addition to all this, last  Wednesday Prime Minister Fiala announced he was cancelling the meeting of the Czech and Slovak governments. This tradition has existed since 2012 and serves as a testament to the close bond between the two countries. Fiala justified his decision with the words: “We do not consider it appropriate to hold intergovernmental consultations with the government of the Slovak Republic in the coming weeks and months. In addition to differing views on foreign policy, the cancellation was also caused by the meeting of the Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Blanár with Russia’s Lavrov in Turkey.

There is no doubt that Fico’s government will survive even without GLOBSEC and without friendly talks with the Czech government. These decisions, which some consider merely symbolic, still carry considerable weight in politics, where symbols wield enormous power. However, it is Slovakia’s “sovereign” foreign policy that is leading the country to isolation. After twenty years in the EU and NATO, there is a fundamental change in the country’s political and security direction.

Fico’s “sovereign” foreign policy raises questions about his motivation. It is hard to believe that his actions are just a manifestation of his admiration for Orbán, Putin or Russia.

Fico badly needs time for his current and possibly future government to clear all those connected to his political party who have been accused and prosecuted of corruption. Fico needs time to clear his people, to cover his tracks and to subvert judicial authorities. That is why his first step was to abolish the Special Prosecutor’s Office, which dealt with such corruption cases linked to politicians.

Fico is also undoubtedly helped by the propaganda and limited critical thinking among many Slovaks. About 51% of Slovaks believe that the war in Ukraine was caused by Ukraine or the West, compared to only 4% in Poland. Fico’s government intention to dismantle the anti-disinformation fund and weaken media literacy programs will only worsen this alarming situation.

Slovakia is polarised and frustrated after the pandemic, the unabated war in Ukraine and economic uncertainty. The country is facing the outflow of the prestigious conference, and renowned antivirus company ESET is also re-evaluating its presence in the country. Most concerningly, young people and talented individuals are losing faith in the possibility of change and seeking opportunities abroad.

Even the approaching presidential elections, in which Fico’s candidate, Peter Pellegrini, is likely to win, no longer evoke great emotions. After taking control of the presidential palace, Fico will have absolute control over the country and its international performance. The European Commission closely monitors potential limitations on press freedom, particularly concerning the government’s prepared influence over public broadcasting, and we should all do the same in efforts to make sure Slovakia doesn’t reach the same destination as Hungary.

Viktória Jančošeková Central and Eastern Europe EU-Russia Populism

One can only be deeply moved by the sight of exhausted Armenians, fleeing Nagorno-Karabakh in droves. Over a hundred years after the Armenian genocide (perpetrated by the Young Turks in 1915-1917, though still not officially acknowledged by Türkiye), and the establishment of the first Armenian state in 1918, the lightning Azeri offensive forced the so-called “Republic of Artsakh” to capitulate to Baku. The 30-year-old republic will officially cease to exist on January 1, 2024.

Up until this point, more than 100,000 of its 120,000 residents have crossed the border into the Republic of Armenia through the Lachin corridor, the only passage connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has characterised this humanitarian crisis as an ethnic cleansing orchestrated by Baku. Azeris vehemently deny these allegations, emphasising the humanitarian aid provided to the remaining Armenians, while promising them the same rights as other Azerbaijani citizens.

The fear of living under Ilham Aliyev’s authoritarian regime, coupled with the deep-seated historical enmity between the two nations, has left Karabakh Armenians with very few options. All of this appears to be a natural progression following the ten-month blockade of the Lachin corridor, which deprived Nagorno-Karabakh and its people of essential supplies. The international community has not only failed to reverse the course of this siege but, worse yet, has fallen short in reassuring its population about its future.

The usually vocal and justly assertive EU in defending human rights and opposing any form of violence has, this time, chosen to remain silent. Only the European Parliament managed to raise a strong voice and condemn Azerbaijan. The crucial energy partnership, though, between Brussels and Baku diminishes the possibility of taking harsh measures against Azerbaijan’s aggression. On the other side of the Atlantic, Washington does not appear willing or able to risk direct involvement in the region, offering only general statements about “restraining further hostilities and engaging both parties in finding a lasting and sustainable peace agreement.”

Meanwhile, Russia, the most significant third-party actor in the region with troops on the ground, has done little to halt the Azeris. Moscow, deeply embroiled in its own war in Ukraine, was unwilling to support a country whose leadership repeatedly displayed signs of “disobedience”. Yerevan’s decision to condemn Russia’s attack on Kyiv and its recent alignment with the International Criminal Court in prosecuting Putin has outraged the Kremlin. Even if the Russians aim to appear as peace brokers in the Caucasus, their inaction has clearly undermined their role and presence there.

But who truly benefits from the current situation in the South Caucasus? Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan, capitalising on its rapid economic growth and geopolitical position, has built a robust military and, by forging the right alliances, launched an attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. Their strategic goal of erasing the Armenian presence in the enclave was achieved with the second operation on September 19. However, this may not be the end of this long-standing conflict. Aliyev openly shares Turkish President Erdoğan’s grandiose idea of “one nation, two states” and envisions Türkiye as the mother and protector of all Turkic peoples.

Ankara has established a foothold in the Caucasus, and Turkish aspirations for an expanded sphere of influence from the Balkans to Central Asia seem promising. One of the last obstacles to this is southeastern Armenia, a narrow strip of land dividing Nakhichevan (West Azerbaijan) from the eastern part of the country. Azerbaijan has already threatened Armenia with the use of force if the “Angezur/Meghri corridor” does not open, disregarding Western appeals and Iranian warnings not to challenge the latter’s sovereignty.

It is concerning that the West appears comfortable with the two Turkic states acting as a bulwark against Russian expansion in the region. However, unchecked Turkish influence in the wider region may be difficult to restrain later, especially given Erdoğan’s unreliable relationship with the West over the past decade.

Israel, especially in light of the recent terrorist attacks within its territory, is poised to leverage its longstanding support for Azerbaijan. The latitude granted to its intelligence services to operate near the Iranian borders could potentially prove crucial in the event of a confrontation with Iran. In contrast, Tehran’s vocal support for the Armenians has proven to be ineffective. The situation may worsen for the Islamic Republic if Baku follows through with its corridor threats, cutting off Iranians not only from Armenia, but subsequently from their closest ally, Russia.

However, no matter how painful the situation is for the Armenians, the party due to receive the most blame for the current, dire situation of the “Artsakh” is the shortsighted leadership in Yerevan over the years. They proved incapable of keeping up with the developments and dynamics in their own neighbourhood and the wider world over the past three decades. Their heavy reliance on Russia, who has cleverly cultivated the myth of being the protector of Caucasus Christians, was revealed to be fragile. After the 2018 Armenian Revolution, the shift towards the West was sudden, unprepared, and without a deep assessment of the risks involved.

The Armenian exodus does not mark the end of the conflict. The complexity of Armenian-Azeri relations and the involvement of additional actors compared to the past create an explosive mix. The West, in general, needs to determine whether the protection of human rights and liberal democracy outweighs the allure of cheap natural gas prices. Armenia’s accession to NATO would have been a good first step in stabilising the region. Otherwise, it is only a matter of time before a new spark ignites the entire region once again.

Panos Tasiopoulos Eastern Partnership EU-Russia Foreign Policy

In light of European efforts to find alternatives to natural gas supplies from Russia, one major potential alternative source is often overlooked in policy debates. Namely, indigenous natural gas production from offshore fields.

In recent years, many EU member states have snubbed offshore gas production development, driven mostly by climate concerns. Many Western European nations have either introduced a legal ban on offshore drilling, or de facto ceased licensing offshore activities. However, the current crisis leaves Europe with little choice but to reconsider that approach.

Yes, resuming offshore natural gas development presents a painful deviation from the general policy pattern of ending reliance on fossil fuels and achieving decarbonisation goals. However, it is not nearly as bad as resuming coal-fired power generation, and it offers future opportunities for convergence with the green energy transition, as offshore wind installations can replace the natural gas production platforms after gas production is terminated.

Countries like Romania or Turkey have greatly benefited from pursuing policies aimed at increasing offshore gas exploration and production. In 2022, Romania received the first quantities of natural gas produced from the Midia Gas Development (Ana and Doina gas fields in the Black Sea). This is the first new offshore gas development in the country in more than three decades and will produce up to 1 bcm of gas at peak. Romania, with its relaxed approach to offshore gas drilling, is not only set to become fully energy independent, but also the biggest natural gas producer in the EU. Currently, Romania holds estimated untapped Black Sea gas reserves of between 170 and 200 bcm – these figures can increase with further exploration.

Turkey has also enjoyed success in this domain, and recently began construction of the underwater pipeline network that will connect the offshore Sakarya gas field with the onshore gas processing facility in the northern Black Sea province of Zonguldak. Gas production is expected to begin in the first quarter of 2023, with peak production over 3,5 bcm per year.

Their shared neighbour of Bulgaria, on the other hand, has been comparatively much slower in licensing its offshore gas reserves for exploration, although it has been picking up the speed recently.

Unleashing the Black Sea’s offshore gas potential may help create a sizeable natural gas production hub that would resolve the problem of vulnerability experienced by South Eastern European nations; who, until recently, were the most dependent on Russian gas – Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, and the Western Balkan nations. This could also have profound implications for achieving the energy independence of Moldova, which can benefit from access to this rapidly developing Black Sea gas production hub – and even Ukraine. Ukraine has its own untapped Black Sea offshore gas production potential, and realising it will be quite helpful for the country’s post-war reconstruction. Moreover, Ukraine can also contribute to a potential Black Sea gas market hub.

Further linking this potential regional gas hub with new centres of gas production in the Eastern Mediterranean – Cyprus, Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt – may create a powerful South Eastern European gas hub, which will be a net exporter of gas further to the rest of Europe, and will eliminate the region’s need for gas dependence on Russia once and for all. As mentioned above, this would be a very important step towards achieving energy independence for Moldova, and decoupling the country from Russian energy supplies.

Other countries in Southern Europe which have been moving towards drilling offshore gas to enhance security of energy supply are Greece and Italy. Before Putin’s war against Ukraine, these countries were some of the most dependent on Russian gas supplies – but now they are making steps towards achieving a greater extent of energy independence by tapping their offshore gas reserves potential. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has promised to expand the country’s gas exploration program in response to rising oil and gas prices.

The new Italian government plans to double its national gas production to 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year from the current 3 bcm, as per Minister of Economic Development Adolfo Urso. Earlier this year, several gas prospects off the Sicilian coast were identified under the exploration license granted to ADX Energy.

Even Germany has reversed years of scepticism towards offshore gas drilling in light of the Russian war against Ukraine, granting a permit for exploration of gas reserves near the Wadden island of Borkum in Lower Saxony. However, certain Western European countries – France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands – remain sceptical towards offshore drilling as part of a general policy approach aimed at ending the use of fossil fuels. In some of these countries, there are legislative or governmental bans on offshore drilling in place (Spain, France, Portugal). In the Netherlands, the licensing and development of offshore gas exploration and production has de facto stopped.

These policies may have seemed adequate before the war and the current confrontation with Russia, but now, a reversal is clearly needed. Taking into account all the understandable scepticism about developing fossil fuels, producing more offshore gas is a much better solution to meet Europe’s energy needs, compared to the revival of coal or heavy fuel oil power and heat generation.

Those opposed to offshore gas drilling due to climate concerns should remember that Europe had previously contracted the purchase of Russian gas for decades to come – much longer than the anticipated lifespan of small EU offshore gas fields. This would have generated much more carbon emissions. New EU offshore gas drilling is simply a better alternative to the previous reliance on Russian gas, from a climate standpoint.

Yet another important factor related to the green transition is that offshore gas platforms at small fields can be later transformed into offshore wind platforms, after their lifespan is expired. For instance, in Croatia, oil and gas company INA is planning to install offshore wind farms in the northern part of the Adriatic Sea after closing its natural gas platforms in 2025.

WindEurope reports that the European Union is severely underperforming on its plans to develop offshore wind, not least due to bureaucratic permitting bottlenecks. According to the Global Wind Energy Council, offshore wind capacity in Europe has reached 18 GW in 2021, but it is simply not enough volume, considering that the EU needs 32 GW of new wind capacity each year until 2030 to reach its carbon neutrality target by 2050.

According to WindEurope, in 2021, new offshore wind installations in Europe amounted to just 3,4 GW, while at the same time the continent would need to install more than 8 GW of offshore wind capacity on average per year over the period of 2023-2026 to reach its energy and climate targets.

Drilling more offshore gas and later transforming the gas platforms into offshore wind farms after the gas fields become depleted is a potentially rewarding plan for securing Europe’s independence from the Russian gas, security of energy supply, and minimising the damage caused by Russia’s war against Ukraine to Europe’s energy transition and its climate and decarbonisation goals. If the EU can reach peak levels of production for its currently frozen and under-explored offshore natural gas fields at the level of at least 20-30 bcm per year, that would be a significant contribution to the EU’s energy security. It is possible that the actual offshore gas potential is much larger – on that, more exploration is needed.

In the extraordinary circumstances when the EU is forced to solve many challenging tasks at once – decoupling from dependence on Russian energy while still moving ahead with decarbonisation goals – realising Europe’s offshore gas potential may be an important step for enhancing security of energy supply, while at the same time providing a way forward for the development of offshore wind, in which the EU is clearly lagging behind the announced goals. Swift EU-capital decisions are needed, specifically aimed at relaxing the rules for the licensing of offshore natural gas exploration and production, as well as cutting the red tape and easing procedures to receive permits for offshore wind installations at decommissioned gas platforms.

Vladimir Milov Energy Environment EU Member States EU-Russia

It is easy to get lost in all the recent developments on the energy front. After a full month of formal, informal, and emergency meetings, EU leaders have adopted a set of measures that address some challenges, while remaining divided on other thorny issues.

Taxes and Caps

What has been agreed so far is the introduction of a ‘windfall tax’ on energy companies’ excessive profits and a collective push (albeit voluntary) from all countries to reduce their electricity consumption. The additional levy on the extra profits raked by energy companies will be implemented nationally by the end of the year with the expectation that the generated sums can be redistributed to consumers and businesses.

Even though such a tax finds support among mainstream EU politicians, it is uncertain whether it will provide the expected relief in the months to come. It will take some time for national capitals to implement these measures and for the projected €140bn to be collected, let alone distributed. The biggest risk here is that the agreed extra tax on fossil fuel companies and price cap on revenue by non-gas companies (wind, solar, nuclear) will further distort the market and reduce even more the EU domestic energy supply. It is also unclear how this extra tax will affect both fossil and non-fossil fuel companies’ plans for future investment in improving their services and further deployment of much-needed renewable capacities.

The jury is still out if (and when) the energy ‘windfall tax’ will provide its expected benefits. However, it is little wonder that national capitals want to get additional tax revenue in their coffers. In the last 12 months, EU governments have spent more than €300bn on national subsidies in order to rein in the skyrocketing price of gas and electricity. Expect this figure to continue to grow.

What EU leaders vehemently disagree on is whether the block should implement a cap on natural gas prices. The different geographies, economies and national interests of the EU-27 tie up a complex knot, which the European Commission is struggling to untangle. Some worry that such a price limit on gas prices might drive off future supply, complicate LNG deliveries or further stress domestic markets. Alternatives include capping the price for deliveries of a certain origin (like Russia) or limiting the scope of the measure so it doesn’t affect LNG supply.

All these concerns on taxes and caps are valid; EU leaders rightfully want to limit the pain for households and industry. However, even if all these market interventions and levies artificially stabilise prices, this won’t solve the energy crisis, which is far from its closing act. The elephant in the room is that the EU might simply not have enough power supply this winter. Energy rationing and frozen industrial production could become a grim reality in some EU countries.

Demand Reduction and Security of Supply

The current problem is that every country is essentially subsidising gas and electricity prices at a level which doesn’t propel neither households nor businesses to drastically reduce their power usage. Be it the infamous German 200 billion euro package, or France directly nationalising a private energy champion, governments across the board are subsidising a sector which is too big to fail. The risk of social unrest and economic meltdown (and loss of electoral support) has convinced every national leader that heavy market intervention is justified. Justified, but ultimately unsustainable and dangerously inflammatory during rampant inflation and a cost of living crisis. Lowering the price of energy is important, but so is ensuring that your citizens and industry use at least 10-15 % less energy overall. Many European governments are not clearly communicating the urgency of the situation to their citizens and the need to save as much energy as possible.

The huge gap of missing Russian gas is currently filled by a combination of urgent (and costly) shipments of LNG deliveries, together with traditional gas pipeline flows from Norway and Algeria. The problem with LNG shipments is that they are expensive, rely on building additional European regasification terminals, and lead to competition with international (mostly Asian) markets for the limited amount of LNG production. This emergency patchwork might work in the weeks ahead but is not a stable foundation for ensuring Europe’s energy supply in the long run.

True, the EU managed to ensure its gas storages were 90+% full in October, which is a feat on its own. However, most of this storage gas came in the spring and summer from Gazprom deliveries, which simply won’t be there in early 2023. Not to mention the fact that storage facilities are there for stabilising peak demands or emergency situations for certain days or weeks. No country can run its economy on gas storage alone.

A True European Energy Union

To reiterate, high gas prices are half of the problem. European member states need to act fast to ensure our collective energy security. In parallel to all current initiatives to stabilise energy prices, all European governments should increase their efforts on ambitious national campaigns for decisive demand reduction. More importantly, it is urgent that the EU-27 coordinates on a number of measures that ensure a collective energy response that is bigger than the sum of its parts.

First, the EU needs to pioneer joint gas purchases by groups of member states in order to lower negotiated prices with external providers and ensure security of supply. This measure will be extremely important next spring/summer, when the EU will need to refill gas storages again, but this time with potentially zero volumes coming from Russia. European member states should not be in competition with each other for securing the best price and the necessary volumes.

Second, certain national capitals should come to grips with the gravity of the situation and overcome internal domestic constraints. Germany and Belgium should wake up to the fact that their countries and the whole continent needs more power and should prolong the lifespans of their nuclear reactors beyond 2023 and as long as possible. Not to speak of France’s selfish decision to block a new Pyrenean gas pipeline, which could foster the transfer of energy from the Iberian Peninsula to the rest of the continent.

Additionally, the Netherlands should also reconsider their stance on producing just the minimal quantities of natural gas from their fields of Groningen, which is the largest natural gas field in the EU. Pumping additional domestic volumes in 2023 and 2024 could provide an important lifeline for the country and European partners in partially replacing Russian natural gas. After the energy storm has receded, the Netherlands could continue the planned phase-out.

The silver lining in this crisis is that the pledge to ‘improve interconnectivity between member states’ will hopefully finally come to fruition and graduate from the pages of defunct policy papers. Joint gas storage between European neighbours or better connecting infrastructure will bring the EU one step closer to a true common energy market.

Lastly, the current energy emergency needs to convince European governments that any future bilateral deal with Gazprom on gas is cursed. Putin has hinted that one pipeline of Nord Stream 2 remains operational and that some of the volumes to Europe can be also redirected through TurkStream. Russia’s thinking is to make national capitals resort back to Russian gas as an energy lifeline in the coming winter as a tool to break European unity and continue Moscow’s energy blackmail.

It is clear that Russia does not have sufficient gas infrastructure to Asia, so it cannot easily pivot its European deliveries elsewhere. Gazprom is forced to burn the gas in the air right now or liquefy it for LNG. The longer the EU abstains from Russian gas purchases, the bigger the squeeze on the Russian federal budget and the bigger the pressure on their energy sector to struggle due to lower investment. Gazprom is already crumbling in terms of share price and overall market standing.

The European Union is de facto in an energy war of attrition with the Russian Federation. An open hand shouldn’t be extended to the barbarians in the Kremlin once again. Europe must stand united with a determined, clenched fist.

Dimitar Lilkov Crisis Energy EU-Russia

On 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops to invade Ukraine. In the televised address he gave justifying his actions, Putin stated the “operation” had the purpose of protecting people facing humiliation and discrimination due to their Russian origins.

This rhetoric lies at the core of the concept of “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World). This worldview holds that Russia is not simply a state, but in fact the protector of Russian civilisation both at home and abroad. One can trace the roots of this idea to the post-Soviet era, when it was conceived as an ideological, political and geopolitical basis to legitimise Russia’s new domestic and foreign policy.

A bit further South, in Ankara, a similar and equally antagonistic concept which helps keep boundaries unclear was created by Turkish Navy officers and endorsed by Turkish elites and the wider public. “Mavi Vatan” (Blue Homeland) has, since 2019, become the spearhead of Turkish revisionism in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, mainly targeting Greece and Cyprus; and therefore, the European Union’s vital interests and security.

One could wonder what the connection is between these two doctrines. First and foremost, both consider Russia and Turkey respectively as the focal points of the international system, while defying their neighbours alongside any notion of international law. They take as fact that history treated Russia and Turkey unfairly and their borders should be re-examined. On that basis, Russia annexed Crimea in 2014; today, Erdoğan is taking aim at the 1923 Lausanne Treaty that defined Turkey’s modern borders. But the similarities do not end here; let’s run through a few of them.

Fear of encirclement: Both countries fear external enemies are trying to restrict them to their current borders. They also interpret the West as using proxy states such as Ukraine and Greece in order to complete their encirclement. It is difficult for the Kremlin and Aksaray to understand how smaller countries can act outside their sphere of influence. 

Imperial past and hegemonic ambitions: Moscow and Ankara perceive themselves as the heirs to an imperial past, which they contrast to their current status. Sovereign countries, formerly part of their respective empires, are only seen as territories of their vital space. They try to play a hegemonic role that almost always exceeds their actual military, economic and geopolitical strength.

Manipulation of religion: The Russian Orthodox Church has always been one of the most essential foreign policy tools for “Russkiy Mir”, particularly in the Balkans and neighbouring Slavic states. The Czarist dream of Moscow as the “Third Rome” is also a very convenient concept for Erdoğan’s regime, who would enjoy seeing the Ecumenical Patriarchate losing its historical influence among the global Orthodox community.

Similarly, Erdoğan’s attempt to present himself as the protector of all Muslims has found fertile ground in the Balkans and the Middle East, while it has garnered strong reactions from states such as Egypt, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia.

Demilitarisation: Russia’s denial of Ukraine’s NATO perspective and a possible Western military presence was one of the reasons that led Moscow to attack Kyiv.

Similarly, Turkey alleges that the Eastern Greek islands should be demilitarised, otherwise, Greek sovereignty over the islands might be called into question. However, there is no connection between both issues in the Treaties (Lausanne 1923, Paris 1947). In addition, it is hard to see how a few islands with a population of 400.000 people pose any kind of threat to Turkey, a state which has invaded and occupied part of Cyprus since 1974, maintains one of the strongest formations of the Turkish Army (the second largest in NATO) immediately across Greece’s waters, has invoked an automatic “casus belli” against Greece if it exercises its sovereign rights in the Aegean and whose leadership recently unleashed direct military threats against an EU member.

Minorities/Human rights: Russkiy Mir perceives Russians as a territorially divided peoples which Russia should unite, making the protection of all Russian-speakers and their rights of utmost priority to the Russian state. This perception has been at the heart of Russia’s aggressive behaviour since 2008. Obviously, the widespread violation of human rights, discrimination against ethnic and other minorities, as well as the torture and prosecution of opposition figures through sham trials do not bother Russian leadership.

Similar trends have emerged in Turkey, especially after the failed coup d’état in 2016. Although Turkey condemns Greek authorities for allegedly mistreating the Muslim minority protected by the Lausanne Treaty, it is worth mentioning that Greek Muslims have doubled their numbers since 1923 while actively participating in the country’s political, economic and social life. Conversely, the Greeks of Istanbul, Gokceada/Imvros and Bozcaada/Tenedos (also protected by the Lausanne Treaty) have regularly fallen victim to prosecution and deportation, resulting in the reduction of their number from 200.000 a century ago to 3.000 today.

Hybrid war/Fake News: Both regimes have extensively used means of hybrid warfare and disinformation. From Russia’s interference in the 2016 US election and President Erdoğan’s “advice” to Turkish voters living in the Netherlands and Germany, to the weaponisation of refugees and immigrants in Evros (2020) and at the Belarus-Poland border (2021-2022), the aim never changes. To distort reality, and penetrate and destabilise neighbouring countries and the West.

Undoubtedly, both countries are very important for the stability of the international system and channels of communication should always remain open. However, it seems that especially in the case of Turkey, there has been a clear foreign policy shift. Hardly anyone believes Turkey is part of the Western security system anymore. Its Eurasian preference is evident in the statements not only of the government, but of the entire political class.

Europe and the West turned a blind eye to Russian aggression and revisionism for many years, with dreadful consequences; it would be catastrophic to allow this to happen once again in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Panos Tasiopoulos EU-Russia Foreign Policy Greece Mediterranean

Amid much fanfare, in February 2015, the EU launched its flagship proposal for an EU Energy Union. Occurring less than a year after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the EU’s response was a sweeping vista of energy diversification based on a unifying internal energy market and greater energy efficiency. Spooked by the fear of being cut off from Russian gas supplies and a spike in the oil price to over $110 a barrel, the EU proposed speedy, resolute action.

Indeed, in 2014 the then Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk argued that ‘regardless of how the stand-off over Ukraine develops, one lesson is clear: excessive dependence on Russian energy makes Europe weak.’

2022, unfortunately, is telling a similarly sorry story.

Remarkably, seven years and one ongoing Russian military invasion later, the EU’s Energy Union remains a pipe dream. Europe is still addicted to Russian gas and has not appreciably reduced its dependency since 2015. And this addiction (45% of total gas imports in 2021) is crippling the EU’s ability to conclusively weaken Putin’s energy-resourced war machine.

In 2015, the Juncker Commission pushed energy diversification high on the institutional agenda, but this prescience wasn’t shared by national capitals. And given the scale of Gazprom’s current gas grip on Europe – 12 European countries are dependent on Russia for at least 80% of their gas supplies– it’s clear that the EU’s proposals have failed miserably.

In truth, this was a political failure driven by two factors. First, the collapse in energy prices from late 2014 (largely driven by global oversupply). This easing of price pressures lulled European leaders into a false sense of energy security aided by the rapidness of Russia’s Crimea takeover.

For all the official protests at Russian expansionism, most national governments focused solely on business as usual with their Russian suppliers. Germany’s embrace of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is the worst kind of example.

The second was the emergence of climate change ambition as the sole driver of national and European energy policy. The race to cut carbon emissions and place the EU as the world’s leading environmental bloc resulted in Brussels overlooking important strategic concerns. Risks such as security of supply and overdependence on Russia as an energy producer were blithely ignored as Europe’s climate ambitions expanded.

The result is an EU that – incredibly – continues to send billions of euros to Russia for gas and oil supplies notwithstanding the ongoing devastation of Ukraine. Energy supplies remain exempt from EU sanctions. Germany, as Chancellor Scholz recently noted, has no intention of quenching its thirst for its energy imports from the Kremlin.

So while the EU has reheated its 2015 proposals and waxes lyrical about diversifying gas supplies from everywhere but Russia, expanding gas storage facilities, increasing energy efficiency, and being a climate change champion – its poorest members in Eastern Europe remain hopelessly exposed to Russia’s whims.

This is an exposure that will persist for many more winters to come.

In this context, member states like Poland, Latvia, and Bulgaria should actively seek two key revisions to Europe’s climate change agenda. Revisions that reflect post-Ukraine realities. 

First, the countries that are most dependent on Russian energy supplies should be granted derogations to continue operating coal powerplants as they build up their renewable energy capabilities. Even Europe’s Green Deal Tsar, Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans, acknowledges this prospect. This will help them reduce their existing dependencies, thus ensuring political autonomy and collective security.

Second, the EU as a whole needs to give states in central and eastern Europe more flexibility in deciding their short-term energy mix. This is the only solution to helping them keep their lights on (and factories powered) while simultaneously reducing dependencies on Russian gas.

And this mix will, for many countries, include significant dollops of nuclear power. Consistent with the EU’s recent taxonomy on sustainable activities, nuclear can provide a generational transition to achieving zero carbon economies. When it comes to gas, the cornerstone of the old Energy Union proposals – greater cross border interconnection – can help link up countries with excess power supply to their needy neighbours.

Back in the heady days of 2015, Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič argued that the Energy Union was the “only way to transcend the so-called contradiction between ‘competitiveness’ and ‘decarbonisation’”. But Šefčovič and the EU fatally misdiagnosed the problem.

The real contradiction isn’t between economic growth and combatting climate change. As the ongoing horrors in Ukraine illustrate, the real dilemma is about the EU having the political courage to implement an energy policy that serves and protects all its members equally. 

Decarbonisation will remain a key priority for the EU in the long-term. However, it is time to concede that you can’t accomplish a successful European Green Deal without first achieving security of supply and price predictability.

Climate change cannot be the only driver of Europe’s energy policy.

Eoin Drea Dimitar Lilkov Climate Change Energy EU-Russia

The recent downgrades of the Russian economy have increased the prospect of the Kremlin defaulting on its foreign debts. Tied to international sanctions and the retreat of foreign investment from Russia, there is much speculation about the prospects of a reeling Russian economy.

But although President Putin is a self-proclaimed scholar of economics, the economic implications of invading Ukraine for the Kremlin will have little in common with the chaos of the 1990s (or Russia’s last default in 1998). In fact, prolonged conflict in Ukraine resulting in a continuation of sanctions against Russia by key global economies makes 1918 a more relevant comparator.

Then, as now, Russia was experiencing soaring interest rates, a collapsing currency, foreign exchange controls, roaring inflation, military conflict and increasing international isolation. The overall economic consequences for the Russian population at large was uniformly devastating, a factor exacerbated dramatically by the domestic policies undertaken by the newly established Communist authorities (who had seized power in November 1917).

It is sometimes incorrectly assumed that Russia’s participation in the First World War (fighting alongside Britain and France) directly contributed to its economic collapse beginning in 1918. But this is only partially true. In fact, up to 1917, Russia had financed its enormous war efforts without radically compromising the living standards of its population. The decline of average incomes in Russia between 1914 and 1917 (about 20%) was less than that evident in the German and Habsburg Empires.

The decades up to 1918 also witnessed Russia becoming a viable investment location for capital from Western Europe, particularly France. By the time Russia exited the war (through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918) the Kremlin’s debt to its war allies totalled over $3.5 billion, or well in excess of 125% of its GDP. By 1917, Russia was very much part of the global trading economy.

Yet, it wasn’t even the Communist seizure of power in November 1917 that ultimately ensured Russia’s isolation from the international financial community. Rather, it was the Communist decision in February 1918 to repudiate all international debts contracted by both the previous Tsarist regime (up to March 1917) and the Provisional Government of March-October 1917. Not only were debts defaulted on, but all assets of foreign investors in Russia were also seized by the state.

For Russian leaders like Lenin and Trotsky, the 1918 repudiation was the long held realisation of their 1905 Financial Manifesto which declared that:

“Foreign capital is going back home. ‘Purely Russian’ capital is also seeping away into foreign banks. The rich are selling their property and going abroad in search of safety. The birds of prey are fleeing the country and taking the people’s property with them”.

The economic impact arising from the debt default of 1918 cannot be underestimated. It convinced western economies of the unreliability of Communism as an economic model (notwithstanding French disbelief at the loss of their investments), encouraged Western support for anti-Kremlin “White” forces in the Russian Civil War, led to a blockage of the Russian economy, and resulted in the isolation of Russia from the world’s markets for much of the following decade.

For the Russian population, the debt default contributed to a downward economic spiral of almost unimaginable proportions. From 1917 to 1919, output per head in Russia halved. The Kremlin’s attempts to centralise industrial and agricultural assets resulted in famine-like conditions appearing in some regions in 1920, and again during the early 1930s. All the while, the Russian government was still engaged in expensive, large-scale military campaigns against its many foes, including in Ukraine.

The events of over a century ago provide important lessons for the prospects of the Russian economy in 2022. 

Firstly, Russia defaulting on its foreign debt will only serve to increase its international isolation. It will presage a wider move towards nationalising all foreign-held assets in Russia, as the Kremlin will seek to centralise many more key sectors of the Russian economy to sustain the war effort.

Second, living standards in Russia will decline as long as Russia remains internationally isolated. Although not approaching the levels of decline evident in 1919–20, it is likely that 2022 will bring a double digit contraction of the Russian economy. However, it must be noted that even with only limited support from states like China, the Kremlin will likely be able to continue to operate on a more enclosed, war-like footing for the medium term.  A footing which prioritises the “war effort” over the production and availability of many consumer goods.

Third, a Russian debt default in 2022, as in 1918, will not have any direct systemic impact upon the global financial system, due to the relatively limited size of Russia’s foreign debt. With a debt to GDP level of less than 30% in 2021, and a limited exposure to foreign currencies (a policy implemented by Russia after its invasion of Crimea in 2014), the Russian economy can continue to operate in greater autarkic conditions for a considerable period; albeit with a continuous decline in its population’s living standards.

The danger is not in the direct impact of a Russian default, but rather in its potential contagion to exposed sectors, like banking and aviation. The exposure of French and Italian banks to Russian default is estimated at $50 billion. Irish aviation companies’ exposure to Russian airlines exceeds $4 billion alone. Like in 1918, international investors in Russia face a very uncertain future, allied to huge disconnection from existing business models.

In 1905, the Communist Financial Manifesto began with the words “the government is on the brink of bankruptcy. It has reduced the country to ruins and scattered it with corpses”. More than a century later, President Putin seems intent on bringing those terrible words to life.

Eoin Drea Crisis Economy EU-Russia

What does the completion of Nord Stream 2 signify for Europe? When will the pipeline become operational? What opportunities does it bring for the Kremlin’s geopolitical intentions?

Destabilising Europe’s security remains Vladimir Putin’s central goal and the main concern of the pipeline’s opponents. Nord Stream 2 has yet to reveal its dangerous potential and the many ways it can unbalance and divide the European region.

The tide of outrage, indignation, and apprehension from both sides of the Atlantic has not subsided with the completion of the pipeline’s construction. The frustration of many political actors in Ukraine, other Eastern European countries, Germany, the United States, and within Russian opposition circles is understandable: many have fought for years to prevent the pipeline from coming into effect. The completion of the pipeline on Sept. 9, 2021 is a point of frustration.

Some pundits seem confused, above all, by Germany’s actions on the “last meters” of the pipeline project. They still make assumptions about Angela Merkel’s motives for reaching a compromise with the U.S. that made the completion possible. Some express helplessness, while others hope for a future transition to new technologies such as hydrogen. One would think that if Ukraine were to turn into a hydrogen exporter overnight, it could magically solve current gas (and money) supply problems.

Going back to reality, let’s take a quick check:

– It is no longer possible for Germany, Europe, or the U.S. to prevent gas flowing through the pipeline someday. The question is at which point will Europe have a strong position. Nord Stream 2 has now become a legal battle that will be fought out in Europe – mostly in German courts.

– The so-called compromise between the United States and Germany on Nord Stream 2 means the US State Department has shifted the main centre of influence and responsibility on the pipeline issue to Europe. There are primarily German and European (legal) actions that are to be invoked in case of Russian attempts to use the pipeline as a geopolitical tool. U.S. sanctions are no longer a decisive factor; that function belongs to the European legislature. Gazprom, in its incarnation as Nord Stream AG, will have to accept it.

– The side effect of a delay to actual gas flow is being felt by all European gas end consumers in the fall of 2021, due to the huge gas price increases, surpasses over $1900 per 1 000 cubic meters in early October 2021. It’s likely this is caused by artificial supply shortages from Gazprom. Gazprom is trying to solve its access problem to the European gas market by pressuring and blackmailing the end consumer, underestimating European consumer protection mechanisms. The more aggravated the situation regarding gas prices becomes, the more decisively the EU’s response in its forthcoming statements regarding Nord Stream AG may be formulated.

– Europe makes use of its legal mechanisms in this confrontation. The fear that Gazprom would gain a strong stance in Europe, equal to its monopoly position on the gas market in Russia, has been dispelled by a recent German court decision. It granted Gazprom no exemption rule from the EU Gas Directive. The key term Gazprom must now learn is ‘fair competition’.

–  The pipeline’s completion will not be followed by the rapid granting of an operating license, but by months or even years of legal wrangling, going in parallel to or following the process of its certification. Currently, Gazprom is involved in several European lawsuits. In the meantime, the pipeline‘s capacity will be significantly limited for transit flows, as is the case with OPAL. The share by which Gazprom sought to increase the volume of gas transported to Europe through the new pipeline will thus remain unfulfilled for the time being.

The project, once emphatically described by Angela Merkel as “purely economic”, is developing into a long-term legal-political dispute. Gazprom will initially probably maintain pressure and allow gas prices to skyrocket, in order to obtain a fast and unconditional operating permit for the pipeline.  With winter approaching and European gas storage facilities – surprise, surprise! – almost empty, this affects European end consumers. Nordstream AG also tries to create a fait accompli by filling the first stretch of the pipeline with gas before the completion of all the necessary procedures. This Russian strategy may, however, backfire. The European legislature has already proven itself stronger than some grieving analysts give it credit for. In a few months, the European Commission will deliver its decisive opinion on whether the pipeline is a threat to European energy security. Thus, in the Nord Stream AG versus the EU constellation battle, the last word has yet to be spoken. Kremlin geopolitics still have a lot to learn about the power of European laws.

Oxana Schmies Energy EU-Russia

It is by now conventional wisdom that the question of relations with Russia is a major obstacle to the unification of the ‘democratic Right’ that Viktor Orbán, Matteo Salvini, and Mateusz Morawiecki like to talk about as of late. Indeed, Russia is one of the main issues making Germany’s AfD, Austria’s FPÖ, and France’s Rassemblement National unlikely partners for a larger right-wing formation. Moreover, even the tripartite alliance between Italy’s Lega, Hungary’s Fidesz, and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS), which might soon end up in a joint group in the European Parliament, has already experienced stormy conflicts over Russia. And although the previously notoriously pro-Putin Lega has made efforts to distance themselves from the Kremlin, the varying responses from Warsaw and Budapest to recent Kremlin aggression is certainly one of the stumbling blocks.

But those differences may well pale next to the foreseeable infighting over China. This has several roots. For one thing, Russia in its current state is obviously on the losing side of history, and is hopelessly lagging behind the West and China, both economically and technologically. China, in contrast, is set to become the world’s premier economic power within the current decade. Technologically, it will likely overtake the West in a number of fields, such as artificial intelligence. As its power has grown, so have its interests across the globe, so much so that there is now a ‘China angle’ to most policy questions worldwide, and an imperative for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to support or obstruct domestic forces in most countries around the world, depending on whether they are considered helpful or not to its interests.

In fact, the stances of the European illiberal right on China are even more amorphous and fickle than those on Russia. Their differing attitudes towards Moscow can at least be traced to their respective nation-state’s historical experiences and strategic culture towards Russia. Put simply, it is as normal for a Polish or an Estonian nationalist to oppose Russia as it is for a French or a German one to court it.

China is both a much more important long-term issue than Russia and a topic that populists have few existing cues to draw on to make sense of. Contrary to Russia, with China, the economic dimension complicates political and ideological calculations. Should China be seen as a welcome Eurasian partner in creating an illiberal counterweight to Euro-Atlantic liberalism, as Viktor Orbán seems to bet on? Or does it represent the mortal danger of de-industrialisation of the nation’s ‘heartlands’, as Marine Le Pen seems to think, following Trump’s ideas? Is Beijing an alternative partner that can be a leverage against Brussels, an idea PiS appeared to entertain in its first months in office? Or is it a Soviet-style adversary to a Christian West, which is the Polish government’s current stance?

No one has faced these dilemmas more than Matteo Salvini. The populist coalition of his Lega party with the Five Star Movement created waves when it decided to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, making Italy the first European country to do so. Yet Salvini declined to attend his government’s meeting with Xi Jinping, knowing that Lega’s core electorate of Northern Italian small businesses is very suspicious of Chinese ‘state capitalist’ competition.

We know that, in their foreign policy thinking, populists value sovereignty first and foremost, even more so those on the right, who are also strongly nationalistic. Yet the lack of a deeper ideological bond between them means that this basic agreement is the source of division rather than unity. Without a deeper elaboration of what ‘sovereignty’ means in the modern world, beyond knee-jerk Euroscepticism, anti-Americanism, and fear of globalisation, it is impossible to come up with a common, fairly consistent position on a strategic challenge like China.

To be sure, the established European party families such as the centre-right EPP have their own share of internal divisions over Russia and, now, China. But the EPP knows that these different viewpoints can only be reconciled, and European citizens can only enjoy the right balance of economic gains through engagement with China and protection from Beijing’s increasingly hostile practices, within a partly supranational EU and in the framework of liberal democracy.

The pro-European, rule-of-law based centre-right departs from a positive vision of European unity, which helps it make sense of the Chinese problem in all its complexity. The illiberal sovereignist right embarks from a negative vision of national sovereignty that does not resolve, but instead strengthens, the contradictions which the Chinese question poses to Europe.

Roland Freudenstein Angelos Chryssogelos China EU-Russia Values

As the loss of sea ice accelerates throughout the Arctic, as a direct result of the global climate emergency, so too does the opportunity for harnessing its potential. Although its fluctuation is well documented, each decade the ice further recedes by an average of 13.1%, making its riches increasingly accessible.

According to estimates, the Arctic Circle is home to roughly 90 billion barrels of untapped oil – an enormous 13% of Earth’s total reserves – and roughly one quarter of global gas reserves, in addition to vast deposits of minerals. So far, extraction has transpired only on land, due to obvious logistical obstacles and associated high costs. But the push for offshore development is accelerating, effectively firing a proverbial starting pistol for Arctic nations to mark their territory.

Comprised of eight states (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, the United States via Alaska, Canada, Denmark via Greenland, and Iceland), the race for geopolitical dominance in the Arctic region is being driven predominantly by one country, Russia. Although territorial disputes among the five coastal nations (Norway, Denmark, the US, Canada and Russia) are largely settled by UNCLOS or ad hoc via other fora, Russia has been fast-tracking its Arctic agenda as of late, framing the Northern arena as one of its primary great-power ambitions.

In contrast, however, the EU appears to be struggling to find its footing. Since its 2016 Joint Communication laying out its Arctic policy, notwithstanding a few sporadic declarations, it has paid insufficient attention to the region and its fast-paced developments. Although the Commission is scheduled to deliver an updated policy later this year, questions loom as to how assertive and tangible its objectives will be.

In line with the very real challenges posed by developments in the region, the EU’s updated Arctic policy needs to avoid the typical EU folly of being as convoluted as the challenges themselves.

Meanwhile, as the EU remains in the planning phase, Russia is constructing and refitting military bases at an alarming rate, developing new high-tech weapons (like the Tsirkon hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile) and holding regular drills in the region to strengthen its grip. Satellite images over the past five years confirm this steady build-up along its Arctic coastline. This includes new facilities on the Kola Peninsula, air bases on the islands of Novaya Zemlya, Alexandra Land and Kotelny, each equipped with their own array of bombers and/or fighter jets, as well as new radar systems and quick-reaction forces off the Alaskan coast.

Experts have expressed particular concern about one Russian development, the Poseidon 2M39 torpedo, believed to be stored at its Kola site as it awaits further testing and deployment in the region. This new super-weapon is no joke, having the potential to sneak past the most advanced radar systems and launch “radioactive tsunamis” of contaminated water that could devastate large coastal cities and their surrounding environment for decades.

For Russia, the Arctic has always been of strategic importance. Hydrocarbon Arctic resources have played an essential economic role since the fall of the Soviet Union. As such, Russia’s heavy-handed Arctic strategy is keeping it afloat not only economically and thus facilitating Vladimir Putin’s stranglehold over the country, but it has helped preserve Russia’s position as a major player on the world stage for decades.

Another integral component of the Arctic puzzle is the potential for new global shipping lanes, namely Russia’s fabled Northern Sea Route, which has the potential to circumvent the Suez canal and cut shipping times from Asia to Europe by 10-32%. Although serious doubts have been raised about its viability, due predominately to high costs associated with climactic obstacles, it is rather a matter of when these routes will become viable, not if, giving Russia a monopoly on the management of a significant proportion of global shipping.

The exact cause of Russia’s recent sabre-rattling in the Arctic is debatable. Flexing its might in the region has, since the Cold War, been a key component of its nuclear deterrence strategy. It could therefore be an effort to further buttress its Northern Fleet, both conventional and nuclear. Its accelerated testing of its super-weapons in the region this year could be part of a larger Kremlin strategy to test the Biden administration, bolstering support for Putin as he grapples with domestic unrest. Conversely, the multifaceted build-up could simply be an attempt to stake its claim ever-closer to the North Pole and its many opportunities, coinciding with the melting ice. Ultimately, its rationale is likely a combination of some or all of the above-mentioned factors.

In line with the very real challenges posed by developments in the region, the EU’s updated Arctic policy needs to avoid the typical EU folly of being as convoluted as the challenges themselves. It needs to be direct, action-oriented and account for each of the developing challenges, from environmental and economic to addressing the Arctic ambitions of Russia and even China, who in 2018 announced itself to be a “near-Arctic state” and “an important stakeholder in Arctic affairs.” The EU must additionally consolidate its revised Arctic policy with pre-existing agreements, like the Green Deal and EU defence initiatives. It should also lay out how it intends to work with its three Arctic member states (plus Norway and Iceland) to pursue mutually inclusive objectives.

Importantly, the Commission should dedicate part of its Arctic policy to strengthening multilateral co-operation with its allies for security and strategic deterrence against Russia, balancing resolve and restraint, through NATO but also on a bilateral basis with other Arctic states, especially the US. Both could serve as a much needed stepping stone to reinforcing the strained transatlantic relationship and show Russia that it’s not the only player in the region.

After all, this so-called “geopolitical” Commission needs to assert itself and, in practical terms, lay out the roadmap for becoming a legitimate Arctic player. Otherwise, the EU risks letting another significant international event play out while it watches helplessly from the sidelines.

Gavin Synnott Energy EU-Russia Trade

“Vaccines, oil, or investments are commodities that are used as tools of influence and power. Those who say that they do not pose any risk deny the obvious reality.” This is how Czech General Petr Pavel commented on the use of the Russian Sputnik vaccine in the EU without its registration. He said this as the first vaccine doses were arriving in Slovakia, nearly causing the government to collapse. After a turbulent month on the Slovak political scene, Prime Minister Igor Matovič, who procured the Russian vaccine without the agreement of his coalition partners, stepped down trying to calm down the situation and preventing early elections. Just one week after the appointment of the new government, Slovakia is facing a new crisis. And again, the reason is the Russian vaccine and Igor Matovič.

It was only last week that the scientific journal Lancet published information that the batches of the Sputnik vaccine delivered to Slovakia differed from those that were declared as safe on the basis of clinical trials conducted at the beginning of February. Moreover, the Slovak drug regulatory agency cannot recommend the use of the vaccine, since the producer did not supply around 80% of the documentation. Russia’s Direct Investment Fund, probably offended by that review, officially requested that Slovakia return the vaccines. It labelled the conclusions of Slovak scientists fake news, and accused them of wanting to damage the reputation of their vaccine, perceiving them as pure provocation.

If Igor Matovič, while still prime minister, would have focused more on governing and less on provoking fights, his rivalries with coalition partners, and building his saviour image, Slovakia would not have lost about 3 million doses of the Pfizer vaccine.

All this was a signal for former PM Matovič to fly to Moscow last week, allegedly for “technical negotiations”, to salvage what he could. But there was a clear political message – to save the Sputnik vaccine for Slovakia, despite “the dirty game being played with Russia’s hybrid weapon”. The hybrid weapon terminology comes from Slovak foreign affairs minister Ivan Korčok, who labelled the vaccine “a hybrid war tool”. This unfolded as Matovič was kow-towing to the Kremlin while Russian troops were moving towards the Ukrainian border. Ukraine has just last month emerged from a minor diplomatic crisis with Slovakia. When asked what he promised Russia for Sputnik deliveries, Matovič “jokingly” replied – Transcarpathia (a formerly Slovak region in Western Ukraine). Anyone with an even elementary knowledge of foreign policy knows how sensitive the topic of territorial integrity is for Ukraine. Slovak diplomats had to apologise for his words.

To make matters even worse, his “diplomatic mission” went from Moscow directly to Budapest.  There, he personally asked prime minister Viktor Orbán to help test the Russian vaccine for Slovakia, because Hungary was the first EU country to roll out vaccination with Sputnik, without it obtaining EMA registration. While in Budapest, he did not forget to praise prime minister Orbán for not limiting vaccination to EU-procured vaccines, but also turning to the East, namely to Russia and China. He challenged the reputation of Slovak scientists who dared not to give a cheap and swift stamp of approval to the Sputnik vaccine. And he did not forget to add that all those who agitate against the Russian vaccine are idiots. It is true that there is demand in Slovakia for Sputnik vaccination, but only subject to its approval by the national or the European drug regulatory agency.

If Igor Matovič, while still prime minister, would have focused more on governing and less on provoking fights, his rivalries with coalition partners, and building his saviour image, Slovakia would not have lost about 3 million doses of the Pfizer vaccine. Only thanks to EU solidarity will Slovakia receive another 700,000 vaccine doses by late June to enable the vaccination process to continue at all.

His lightning visits to Moscow and Budapest, as finance minister, which the new Slovak Prime Minister Eduard Heger learned about at the last minute, and the foreign affairs minister only through his ambassadors, confirmed that Igor Matovič does not understand the basic principles of democratic governance of the state, and continues to feel like a de facto prime minister. His brinkmanship risks reigniting the just recently deflated coalition crisis, damaging the reputation of Slovakia, and confounding its partners in the EU. But, most importantly, they provide grist to the Kremlin’s mill, which is naturally very happy to embrace EU countries begging for help because “Brussels has failed again”.

The former Slovak prime minister bought the fallacy that his genius would rescue Slovakia from the pandemic and resolve the European problem of vaccine shortages through strange legalisation and publicity for the use of the Russian vaccine, whatever the costs. Thus far, he has only sparked diplomatic scandals. With his political naïveté and inexperience, he has splendidly served the politics of Viktor Orbán, who has an additional ally in his “anti-Brussels game”. Russia, in turn, has gained a useful strawman through whom it can successfully pursue its politics of division of the EU.

The reality of the political scene of Slovakia today perfectly illustrates what happens when boundless populism wins elections. Only a year ago, Slovak citizens believed in a change for the better, in the return of decency to public life. Igor Matovič trampled that hope in just one year. The year of his rule is already now considered to be the most chaotic year in Slovak politics. Besides tarnished relations with neighbours, the president, and coalition partners, Slovak scientists and diplomats are now also publicly distancing themselves from him and demanding apologies. If he really had Slovakia´s future on his mind, he would mend his ways – or step aside.

Viktória Jančošeková COVID-19 Eastern Europe EU-Russia

In early 2020, the EU was criticised for lagging behind in providing COVID-related support, while China and Russia were delivering medical aid equipment and masks to EU Member States. We still remember the “From Russia with Love” COVID aid operation to Italy in March 2020, or the plane full of medical supplies from China. A year later, both countries are promoting their vaccines in the Eastern Partnership region (EaP). This time however, the EU is part of the action as well. Through its contributions to the World Health Organization’s COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) and extra financial support earmarked for deployment of COVID-19 vaccines to the region, it is important for the EU to show its support and reliability to its Eastern neighbours and position itself as a respectable player in the Russian and Chinese game of bilateral vaccine diplomacy. In the age of disinformation and fake news, it is also extremely important for Europe to better communicate its work and not allow its efforts to go unnoticed.

Unlike with the distribution of Russian and Chinese vaccines, there are no airport press conferences, nor flashy inauguration events to promote the European contribution.

Besides their shared Soviet past, there’s another characteristic that unites the six Eastern Partnership countries at the moment – the high level of scepticism among the population towards COVID-19 vaccines. Many citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova state they do not trust the vaccine, with apprehension towards the jab reaching 41% in Georgia and 53%, one of the highest percentages, in Ukraine.

Despite the third wave of infections hitting most of the EaP counties and forcing their governments to impose lockdowns of varying strictness, the respect for anti-COVID measures remains low, leading to a rise in positive cases. Adding this to a general mistrust towards vaccines does not look promising for achieving herd immunity anytime soon.

The reasons for scepticism are multifold. Populations in many post-Soviet republics are traditionally wary of vaccines, fearing side effects from poor quality drugs. The mistrust has also been  amplified by allegations from politicians about low-quality vaccines, corruption scandals, and misinformation spread through social media. Even worse, in some countries like Ukraine, the reluctance to get vaccinated appears even among medical workers.

The low levels of confidence in vaccination campaigns have been fuelled by political struggles and information wars. Conspiracy theories and misinformation over social media have also contributed to creating a massive distrust within society. However, the principal cause of scepticism remains distrust towards state institutions and the quality of purchased vaccines.

Most of the six countries started the vaccine rollout between January and March 2021, unfortunately with quite scarce results. Azerbaijan kicked off its vaccination program on January 18, making it the first country in the Caucasus or Central Asia to do so. Belarus began its vaccination drive by distributing the country’s first round of the Sputnik jab already in December 2020. Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova caught up with the first vaccines in February and March. But where are the vaccines coming from?

All of the EaP States, besides Belarus, joined the COVAX scheme, which aims to ensure parity in distribution and access to the vaccine for all interested countries. However, the waiting list is quite a long one. Belarus took a different path, becoming the first country outside Russia to approve Sputnik V and has recently received a batch of vaccines from China, providing a gesture of good strategic partnership between the two countries.

On the contrary, when offered Sputnik V, Ukrainian president Zelensky refused it. The country received its first shipment of AstraZeneca doses produced by India’s Serum Institute and signed a contract with the Chinese Sinovac. Azerbaijan has also been relying on the Chinese CoronaVac vaccine and, similarly to Georgia and Armenia, is on the list to receive the British-Swedish AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine through COVAX.

On 11 February, the European Union, in partnership with the WHO, launched a new regional programme of over €40 million, aimed at providing critical assistance to ensure local readiness and preparedness for safe and effective vaccination of the population in each of the six Eastern Partnership countries. Commissioner OlivérVárhelyi, responsible for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, stated, “With this new programme that we launch today in partnership with the WHO, the EU shows that it delivers on its commitment to support our Eastern Partners to fight the health crisis.” This extra support could not be more timely.

Let’s not forget that vaccination campaigns in these countries are being carried out amidst internal political instabilities, such as anti-government protests in Belarus, slow-paced reforms in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Donbass, a crackdown on the opposition in Georgia, a recent armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and a fierce but difficult fight against corruption in Moldova led by its President Maia Sandu.  

Through its contribution to the COVAX programme and the recent approval of over €40 million of aid, the EU has been providing much support and assistance to deliver the vaccines. However, unlike with the distribution of Russian and Chinese vaccines, there are no airport press conferences, nor flashy inauguration events to promote the European contribution. A better communication of the EU’s support to supplying vaccines to the region along with firm commitments to the EaP countries are strongly needed, as especially now, the EU’s assistance is, quite literally, vital.

Anna Nalyvayko China COVID-19 Eastern Europe EU-Russia

The EU needs to rethink its Russia policy. Instead of chasing after Vladimir Putin’s confrontational regime, European leaders, who are meeting on 25 March, should throw their support behind those who work for social change and promote democracy in Russia.    

Europeans must rid themselves of any expectations or hope for constructive engagement with Putin. The Russian leader’s famous social contract—co-opting citizens into accepting authoritarian rule in exchange for economic security, social stability, and Crimea —is bankrupt.  

After unprecedented state violence against nationwide protests in January, the regime has embarked on what activists call a “new era of repression.” The picture of a masked riot police officer sitting under a portrait of Vladimir Putin has become a symbol of the confrontation between the state and the people. Russian philosopher Oksana Timofeeva speaks of a “declaration of terror” against society. 

But Putin does not represent Russia as a whole. Young, energetic Russians have emerged, working towards a freer, more open society. Local protests have been flaring up all over the country, with citizens rallying against unpaid wages, toxic industrial plants, unwanted landfills, and corrupt officials. Well-documented protests in support of jailed opposition leader Alexey Navalny are the first to show that support can be mobilised on a nationwide scale. 

And it’s not only protests. Russian civil society is more active, resilient, and dynamic than EU policymakers recognise. After ten years of repression, it is more creative and diverse than ever. Many groups reach larger audiences, fundraise successfully, and experiment with new business models. Independent online media have joined civic activism, uncovering corruption, reporting on abuses and informing citizens on their rights. Professional groups (journalists, doctors, and scientists) are coming out in solidarity with repressed colleagues. Volunteerism and philanthropy are on the rise.

For the Putin regime, this active civil society is an enemy. In addition to authorising police violence, the regime has pushed some 100 new laws through the Duma since December that attempt to strangle NGOs, civil rights, protests, education, media, and the Internet. Civic experts speak of the beginning of “quasi-totalitarian control of all citizens and international contacts.”  

The 2012 “foreign agent” law, which affected only registered NGOs, has been expanded to target individual citizens or unregistered initiatives receiving international funds. It imposes penalties of up to five years in prison for those who fail to register and report on activities. Pressure is rising on the media, who have their own “foreign agent media” register, while new criminal defamation laws make it an offence to criticise groups like the police or security forces. Despite protests from scientists and academics, new laws aim at cutting the educational sector from international cooperation.

At their March summit, European leaders must confront this repressive Russia. “It’s a tsunami,” a veteran Russian civil society representative said recently, calling for more attention and support from Western policymakers.  

Beyond imposing further sanctions against Russian officials, it’s time for Europe to actively engage with the “other Russia”. Individuals and groups working for social change and development in Russia are Europe’s best partners. Many of them support Western values and are keen to cooperate with EU partners, share know-how, and connect to cross-border networks, despite laws aimed at stopping them. 

Instead of illusions of partnership with Putin and his officials, European policymakers should side with Russians who want their country “to be democratic, modern, dynamically developing, and free from a personalist Putin regime”, a petition signed by Russian supporters abroad states.

EU leaders must finally develop an attractive agenda for its ‘fifth principle’ guiding relations with Russia. This action plan must go far beyond aiding registered NGOs, to address the broad eco-system of activists engaged on the problems Russia’s regime has failed to address: ecology, corruption, domestic violence, torture, HIV/AIDS, election monitoring, migration, and prison reform.

The annual 11 million euros earmarked by the EU for Russian civil society support need to be increased, given the country’s size and its 145 million citizens.  To reach new, informal groups, active in remote regions of Russia, the EU needs to develop smaller, more flexible funding instruments. Activists, students, scientists, and artists should be put at the head of the EU visa queue. An EU coordinator for civil society relations with Russia needs to be appointed.

For the Putin regime, the EU is an adversary. Europe’s best chance to support a better future for Russia is to connect to the country’s civic activists and wider Russian society.

Barbara von Ow-Freytag Democracy EU-Russia Foreign Policy Leadership

Among those who remember their experience under communist, totalitarian regimes who imprisoned and sometimes killed freedom fighters, some are now asking: why did Navalny return to Russia? Doesn’t he know what happened to Kasparov, Khodorkovsky and other exiles? The fate of Nemtsov and Politkovskaya? Or has he already forgotten what he recently experienced while returning from Siberia? Moreover, Russian authorities had already stated that should Navalny return to Russia, he would be immediately detained.

Navalny’s return to Russia after his medical treatment in Germany is such a courageous act that it immediately gave rise to various conspiracy scenarios and ‘theories’. Some question his sanity or suspect he seeks martyrdom, while others search for broader geopolitical patterns or various power games.

The vocation of ‘politician’ is undoubtedly a very complex discipline, as is a decathlon in athletics. Like athletics, politics is a competition. And what determines the outcome of every competition is the heart which generates the will, along with the brain which draws up the strategy and the tactics.

To me, it seems that Navalny has the passion for politics. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have, for years, acted in Russia the way he did and does. Today, Navalny feels first and foremost that he has entered a contest, in the top political ‘league’ playable in Russia. Navalny is aware of having embarked on a real struggle. He is aware that he has no other choice. In his heart, he is absolutely clear about that. A fighter would never quit the marathon, mid-race, with slouched shoulders.

Navalny’s brain and intellect have confirmed to him that he has no choice, barring simply giving up. Navalny realises that he cannot achieve anything fighting from beyond Russian borders, the same as Kasparov, Khodorkovsky, and other exiles. But Navalny also knows that by being in Russia, he can potentially achieve something. Just like Wałęsa, Havel, Landsbergis, and many other jailed dissidents or church leaders who suffered and often died in communist prisons because they did not abandon their struggle for freedom. What Navalny does not know is the price he will have to pay for his struggle and victory. He does not even know if he will live to see his victory.

He is fighting for what we, living in the free West, also need: faith in ideals, values, and principles, along with the resolve to defend these principles every day.

In a time where the West has experienced unprecedented prosperity, consumerism, and consequently, selfishness and cynicism, Navalny’s act is morally and ethically revitalising. It reminds us of something much more valuable, and at the same time much more promising than money, villas, yachts, or other possessions: Navalny’s act is the manifestation of ideals. True, Navalny certainly hopes that the regime will not dare to remove him. He certainly believes also in the solidarity of the international democratic community and its impact. He is, however, plainly aware of the extreme risks associated with his return to Russia for himself and his family. That is why he deserves our respect and esteem. He is fighting for what we, living in the free West, also need: faith in ideals, values, and principles, along with the resolve to defend these principles every day. And, where necessary, even at the price of personal discomfort or risk. Those to whom these words seem like platitudes or clichés need only to look at the US Capitol these days.

Mikuláš Dzurinda Democracy EU-Russia Leadership Values

Unresolved problems continue to haunt you no matter how hard you try to ignore them. Germany is painfully reminded of this after yet another turn in the never-ending Nord Stream 2 saga. The horrid poisoning of Russian opposition activist Alexei Navalny has put pressure on the German government (both at home and internationally) to rethink its commitment to the pipeline project, should the Kremlin refuse to cooperate in the investigation. There is little chance for Berlin to unilaterally cancel such a large infrastructure project, which is nearing completion. Any diplomatic hints that it might do so may be a well-calibrated attempt to test Vladimir Putin’s resolve. However, one thing is certain – the latest developments have shown again that the Gazprom-led pipeline is nothing more than a political project with grave implications for Europe’s energy security and uncertain economic gains.

For several years, the construction of Nord Stream 2 (NS 2) irked different European capitals and put a strain on Washington and Berlin’s relationship. The project is planned to double the volume of the existing Nord Stream 1 pipeline, with the total volume of both ventures being a maximum of 110 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Gazprom has pledged to guarantee 50% of the project funding and will be the sole shareholder in the project, which is backed by five other European companies. Although technically a private corporation, Gazprom remains owned by the Russian government and is used as an important tool in advancing the Kremlin’s economic and geopolitical interests outside Russia’s borders. The new extension of the pipeline will fortify the Russian Federation as the EU’s top supplier of natural gas – a position Moscow has exploited in the past through unfair price setting and partitioning gas markets in Central, Eastern, and Baltic EU member states. Regrettably, if the pipeline becomes operational, it will go against one of the European Energy Union’s main objectives – diversification of energy suppliers and reduced dependence on only a handful of third-country exporters. 

Several European leaders have already objected to the project and its destabilising geopolitical consequences for energy security in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as its clear attempt to circumvent Ukraine as a transit country for natural gas to Europe. A recent European Parliament resolution, adopted with an overwhelming majority, called for the official halt of the project. There is little rationale for such costly infrastructure, given that it will not transport new volumes of gas, but will instead redistribute existing quantities flowing through Ukraine. The European Union has an abundance of existing gas infrastructure and has pledged to reduce fossil fuel dependence in the coming decades. There is a real possibility that NS 2 would become a stranded asset buried below the Baltic Sea in the near future.

For the time being, Gazprom looks set to complete the project, albeit with a significant delay due to regulatory hurdles and changes in the applicable European legislation. Irrespective of Russia’s military aggression in Crimea, foreign interference in elections, and energy blackmail of smaller EU-member states, it seems as if it will be business as usual for Germany when it comes to pipelines. There are at least two main reasons for Berlin’s dogged determination to see the project completed. First, Germany’s pledge to phase out nuclear energy by 2022 and reduce its reliance on coal means that households and industry will register a growing demand for natural gas as a transitionary resource throughout the 2020s. Second, the country is still path dependent on the dubious legacy of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), and its steadfast belief in a ‘modernisation partnership’, meaning a warmer attitude towards Russia. Prominent political figures from the SPD in the last two decades have committed Germany to the whole Nord Stream energy venture, regardless of the split it causes between Eastern and Western EU member states, and also the betrayal towards Ukraine.

One of the few plausible scenarios for preventing the completion of the pipeline would be additional pressure from the US – more expansive sanctions from the US State Department might prove painful for current and future investors. Even if the President changes after the November elections, the White House will likely keep its determination to prevent further tightening of Gazprom’s energy grip on Europe.

It is most likely that Germany will not unilaterally cancel the completion of Nord Stream 2 in the upcoming months. The path dependency of Berlin’s energy policy requires that the country remain committed to the pipeline, even at the cost of going against the interests of many European member states and the European Energy Union’s overarching goals. Only an external occurrence can tip the scale against NS 2 – strengthened political and economic pressure from Washington, or an extreme deterioration of EU-Russia relations in the next several months. It is more likely that the wedlock between Berlin and Gazprom will be reaffirmed, and the promise for Europe to speak with one voice on its energy policy will remain nothing more than a pipe dream.

Dimitar Lilkov Energy EU-Russia Renewable Energy

Revolution is unfolding in Belarus. We just witnessed its first phase – Alyaksandr Lukashenka has been struck by a landslide defeat, with 60-80 percent of voters choosing Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Lukashenka is trying to steal this victory from Belarusians, so the revolution continues in the streets and with strikes. People are going to the streets to defend their victory.

Some views can be heard in Lithuania and elsewhere in the West, that this revolution is useful for the Kremlin, that it may even have been orchestrated by the Kremlin’s secret service itself. Some believe that Lukashenka is the sole guarantor of the sovereignty of Belarus and that the alternative candidates are the Kremlin’s project. This way, the Kremlin wanted to weaken Lukashenka and drive him to beg for the Kremlin’s assistance, they say.

These are quite absurd conspiracy insinuations. The driving force of the Belarusian revolution is not one or another candidate, but the radical change within Belarusian society itself. A new civic nation has been born in Belarus. This civic nation is the true leader of the revolution, and Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya is its symbol.

The unconscious, and totally wrong willingness to accept the continuation of Lukashenka’s rule in Belarus reminds me of the Sąjūdis era, more than 30 years ago. Back then some in the West would call on Lithuanians to “slow down” our pro-independence revolution, as it was harmful to Gorbachev. They would say to us ‘we have to preserve Gorbachev because he is the guarantor of perestroika, your revolution is damaging him’. It is only normal that we did not listen to such insinuations. It is good that today, Belarusians are not so keen either to listen to similar “advice”.

And now on to the main question – why, in my firm belief, is the Belarusian revolution nothing but a big headache and a nightmare for the Kremlin?

First, because the birth of the civic nation in Belarus is “contagious” for Russia. We see persistent protests in Khabarovsk, which are very similar to the ones in Belarus – without clear leadership or organisation, but still continuing. Important elections are approaching in Russia – regional elections this September and Duma elections next year. Vladimir Putin understands very well these processes in Belarus, and how they constitute a signal that the authoritarian regimes in the whole post-Soviet hemisphere are approaching their “expiry date”.

Second, Putin must be aware that he is entrapped: he cannot support the revolution in Belarus (because a similar revolution may start in Russia), which is why he congratulates Lukashenka. However, Lukashenka is as toxic for Belarusians as Yanukovych was for Ukrainians in 2013. Back then, Putin supported Yanukovych, occupied Crimea and part of the Donbas, and became the No. 1 enemy of the Ukrainian nation (“Putin – chuilo”). He actually “helped” Ukrainians to unite and choose the Western path of development.                                   

The same may happen to Putin with regard to Belarus – he cannot support the revolution, but by supporting Lukashenka he would alienate all those who voted against Lukashenka, making them eager to look for friendship elsewhere, not in Moscow.

Putin “helped” to consolidate the pro-Western Ukraine. Ukraine has finally left the post-imperial realm of the Kremlin with Putin’s “help” in 2014. Now it’s Belarus’ turn.

It’s a zugzwang for the Kremlin – whatever it does, it’s bad:  if it supports Lukashenka, it will alienate the Belarusian nation; if it supports the revolution in Belarus, a similar fate awaits in Russia. 

Bad times for autocrats: in Minsk and in Moscow!

Zhyve Belarus!

Andrius Kubilius Democracy EU-Russia Foreign Policy

The role of small member states in EU foreign policy is increasingly being challenged, especially in view of the reforms being proposed to make the EU more effective as an international actor. These reforms, if adopted, will require the small Central and Eastern European member states, such as Bulgaria, to rethink their old foreign-policy strategies and practices. Instead of band-wagoning and balancing conflicting interests, these small member states will have to learn to be more proactive, to build their reputations and to form alliances if they want to continue to have any influence on EU foreign policy. These issues are discussed in the light of the EU sanctions adopted against Russia in the aftermath of the Ukrainian–Russian conflict of 2014.

Read the full article of the June 2020 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Jean F. Crombois EU Member States EU-Russia Foreign Policy

This article discusses hybrid threats and the steps that Europe, through various national, EU and NATO initiatives, has taken in recent years to address them. Although these threats do not constitute a new challenge for states and international actors, they became a major concern for European countries following Russia’s conventional and unconventional war in Ukraine in 2014. The article argues that addressing hybrid threats is a constant, never-ending process that requires the development of societal and governmental resilience. Hybrid threats are constantly changing and evolving, which means that our response to them also needs to be constantly evolving in order to keep up. The article also provides some recommendations for European policymakers on the next steps that Europe, especially the EU, should take when addressing hybrid threats.

Read the full article of the June 2020 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Eitvydas Bajarūnas Defence EU-Russia European Union Security

Russia’s situation regarding Covid-19 does not look good, by any definition. According to Worldometers, the country is currently ranked #2 by new cases (being surpassed only by the United States) and #7 by active cases. That said, one should bear in mind the extremely low reliability of Russian testing data. First, there are numerous recorded cases of people who fell ill with Covid-19 symptoms, receive negative test results, and are then tested repeatedly, and only after several tests do the results turn to be positive. The most outrageous cases include posthumous positive tests for people who died from coronavirus after having tested negative while they were still alive. Second, Russia only tests people who have returned from abroad, have clear symptoms or have contacted coronavirus-positive patients, while private testing of a broader (unlimited) range of people suggests that the number of infected is much higher than the official figures. Third, there are constant limitations with testing capacity – although Russia claims to have reached 150,000 tests per day, at times it is unable to operate at full capacity. Just recently, Moscow – the best-equipped region in the country – has reported a 25% drop in daily testing, due to a lack of auxiliary material (pipettes). Fourth, most tests are done in Moscow, and we don’t even know what the real picture is in the Russian regions.

Russian coronavirus mortality rates are relatively low (within the 1% range), but one should be warned against trusting them, due to multiple reports of corona-suspicious deaths being reclassified as ‘the flu’ or other diseases. I would advise against speculation on that topic until we are able to see the official mortality statistics for March-April by cause of death, which will allow us to track clear numerical anomalies.

In short, Russia is paying a heavy price for the authorities’ indecisiveness in introducing quarantine measures, the ambiguous nature of those measures, a poorly equipped health care system, and the extremely ineffective implementation of already introduced restrictions. For instance, the Russian web is flooded with videos of long lines, with thousands of people standing together – without any social distancing whatsoever – just to be checked by police for electronic passes before boarding subway trains. Or similarly, massive lines of people waiting to receive physical passes in regions where authorities didn’t really go digital in their restrictive measures. Or huge crowds of workers at factories, who are brought together after a working day for ‘sanitising’ measures. Ineffective bureaucracy doubles down on already severe infection risks. Russian hospitals are totally unequipped to handle Covid-19 patients in all regards – many reports on this from across the country can also be found on the web.

More serious are the economic motives for people to disobey quarantine rules. Vladimir Putin has declared five ‘non-working weeks’ until the end of April, but has never introduced any formal emergency, nor has he provided entrepreneurs with any compensation for this massive ‘paid leave’. According to a poll by the Center for Strategic Research, 30% of Russian employers have directly disobeyed Putin’s order and forced people to work; most of the others offered either reduced or no pay, or began firing people. A Higher School of Economics poll suggests that, as early as the beginning of April, 70% of Russians already felt declining incomes, of which 24% reported ‘total loss’ of income. The Government has been systemically refusing to provide meaningful and direct aid to ordinary citizens and SMEs – they have only pledged limited measures, about 70% of which are exemptions from payments due much later, and the remaining assistance is very hard to obtain due to administrative barriers.

In this situation, Russians are literally forced to get back to work as soon as possible – and two-thirds of the Russian regions have begun to partially reopen businesses and ease restrictions as early as the first days of April. This may have a catastrophic effect on the further spread of the Covid-19 pandemic in Russia. The latest news (April 23rd) is that Moscow has recorded a new spike in Covid-19 cases, by almost 30% in just four days.

It looks like Putin’s ineffective system of governance is taking a major toll on Russians in the midst of an unprecedented crisis, such as the one we are facing now. Political implications for Putin will be enormous: Russia is already tired of almost thirteen years of slacking economic growth, and six years of decline and stagnation of real incomes. Putin’s popularity was already worn out when Russia entered this crisis – now many people in the country are appalled by Putin’s lack of decisiveness and unwillingness to aid people and a collapsing economy. Consequences will inevitably follow.

Vladimir Milov COVID-19 EU-Russia

On January 15th, Vladimir Putin delivered a landmark address to the Russian Parliament, announcing changes to the Russian Constitution paving the way to shaping the post-2024 system of power, and dismissed Dmitry Medvedev’s cabinet, suggesting the new candidate for the position of Prime Minister for the first time since 2012. What happened and why did it happen now?

Why Putin made such major steps so early?

It is quite unusual for Putin to make such radical election-oriented steps four years before the expiration of his current Presidential term. Normally, his tactics were to keep his plan secret until about 2-3 months before the elections, to be able to catch his opponents off-guard and push his agenda through voters’ approval quickly, before its potential wears out. This happened in 2000, when Boris Yeltsin announced his early resignation to pave way for Putin’s Presidency; then in 2007, when Medvedev was announced Putin’s nominal seat-keeper successor three months before the March 2008 election; and further in 2011, when Putin’s comeback to power was announced two months before the State Duma elections. Why make such major steps now, when Putin still has a lot of time ahead? 

One explanation is that Constitutional changes will take time to be adopted – but that still isn’t enough, because the current Constitutional majority of the ruling party and total control over the media allow Putin to adopt whatever changes he wants rather swiftly. The other odd thing is that there are no immediate reasons – neither economic nor political – to sack Dmitry Medvedev’s cabinet right now. Russia’s economy is not doing too well, but there’s nothing catastrophic happening either. The situation is hardly different from where it was months ago and where it is expected to be further into 2020: full-bodied stagnation, as described in economics books.

It may have made sense if only Putin had appointed a decisive reformist Prime Minister to reshuffle things and move the economy forward – but the candidacy suggested to replace Medvedev, the head of the Tax Revenue Service Mikhail Mishustin, is anything but that (a few more words on him below).

Politically, one would also expect that such an advantageous move as the sacking of the quite unpopular Medvedev would be tied to some kind of upcoming elections, but these are not on the immediate horizon (State Duma elections are only scheduled for September 2021, and there are no plans yet to move them earlier). The political effect of Medvedev’s sacking (which would most likely be approved by the majority of Russians) will rather quickly expire. So why throw everything at the table at once – Constitutional changes, sacking the Prime Minister, plus also announcing a major social spending package worth around $6,5-7,5 billion a year – while elections are quite far away?

The obvious answer is that Putin grows extremely worried about his plunging approval ratings and weakening political positions, and his nerve somehow shows up

It should also be noted that Putin’s moves came as a complete surprise to many top Russian officials. Russian media has even cited unnamed federal Ministers who admitted that Medvedev’s resignation came as a complete surprise to them. This corresponds to my own knowledge – I used to work in the Russian government and have a lot of contacts there, who confirmed to me the completely surprising nature of Putin’s decision on the cabinet’s fate.

The obvious answer is that Putin grows extremely worried about his plunging approval ratings and weakening political positions, and his nerve somehow shows up. An eye-opener was his annual December 2019 press conference, which was intended to be the usual show of popular support, but instead demonstrated the severe extent of society’s fatigue with Putin: even most of the questions from loyal media were about the country’s serious troubles instead of praising Putin’s leadership, and the commentary on social media was so overwhelmingly negative that Russian TV channels were forced to turn off comments and hide dislikes on Youtube broadcasts under pressure from Putin (the same thing happened with Youtube videos of his New Year’s address).

Looking at the broader context, another process which is happening in the background are the Kremlin’s preparations for the 2021 Duma elections, which shows a lot of panicking and desperation on the Presidential administration’s part. They seem to be in a desperate search for any fresh ideas and non-political celebrity recruits for the election campaign, ending up with such ridiculous moves as the recent announcement about the creation of a new political party led by the founder of the World of Tanks online game.

A solid, self-assured leader would definitely be rationing all the major steps that Putin made on Wednesday, gradually announcing them piece by piece on the pathway to 2024: Constitutional changes, Government reshuffle, major social aid packages. To throw them out all at once, way ahead of any elections, looks a bit like panic and desperation to me.

Act fast to prevent the disastrous political consequences

There are constant rumours circulating among the Russian power circles that the fresh “classified” opinion polling constantly done by the Kremlin shows that things are much too bad for Putin in terms of public opinion, such that he needs to somehow act fast to prevent the disastrous political consequences. It is also worth saying that the openly published polls also do not paint too bright a picture of him: his popularity is way down, and Russians are clearly unhappy about the situation in the country and disapprove most of the official policies.

Another sign that Putin may be getting nervous is the candidate for the new Prime Minister. Mikhail Mishustin is the anti-hero of the modern-day Russian economy, a true incarnation of The Beatles’ “Taxman” – he was essentially in the tax collection business for most of the past 20 years, and recent months were filled with headlines of him bragging about tax revenue collection growing by 10-12% year on year, despite a lack of economic growth (which essentially meant a dramatic increase of the tax burden on the economy through toughening tax collection administration).

Russians are clearly unhappy about the situation in the country and disapprove most of the official policies

FNS, or Tax Revenue Service headed by Mishustin, is arguably the most hated Government agency by Russian entrepreneurs, and high taxes and burdensome tax collection administration were always occupying the top positions in many recent surveys of business as key factors constraining economic growth. Mishustin was never known for any involvement in the forward-looking and reform-drafting business. He was always fully in the tax collection business. Most definitely, this appointment is not reassuring news for the Russian economy; it rather means further fiscal pressure.

So why appoint such a man? Arguably, the explanation is similar as to why the Government has been raising taxes and thus killing the economic growth, while at the same time the budget runs huge surpluses and has no immediate need for extra money. Putin is uncertain about the economic future and prefers to entrust Government to a man who guarantees him cash at hand – even at the expense of growth.

Essentially, the aura of Putin’s Wednesday speech was all about cash redistribution, not growth. He doesn’t seem to care about growth as such. Putin and the new Prime Minister-designate Mishustin are blood brothers in this regard.

Uncertainty and nervousness behind Putin’s actions

Uncertainty and nervousness. These are probably the keywords describing the whole set of Putin’s initiatives yesterday. The same goes for proposed Constitutional changes: despite many details announced, it is totally uncertain how the new system of power will work.

One thing is clear though: there will be no union with Belarus or any full-powered Putin successor as President, as Putin has deemed these scenarios too risky and challenging for his supremacy. He would prefer to stay in power beyond 2024 in a good old-fashioned Central Asian way, a replica of what his buddy Nursultan Nazarbayev did in 2019 – leaving the Presidential post, but retaining power in many ways. Putin has suggested various options to make that happen: we’ll see increased powers of the State Council (Gossovet, which he probably will chair beyond 2024), and more powers on forming the Government devolved to the State Duma.

Again, it is too early to see how all this will play out – we’re yet to see the draft Constitutional changes – but one thing is clear: Putin has proposed a shift from the current system, which is too centred on the powers of the President, to a more complicated system of checks and balances, which would allow him to retain power beyond 2024 in some new capacity (most likely as the Chair of Gossovet).

Which means he’s not going anywhere – at least by free will. We will have to get rid of him through political means – shifting the public opinion towards the support of the opposition, and participation in the parliamentary and presidential elections. More on that to follow – but Putin has just unveiled a plan to stay in power as lifetime leader.

Vladimir Milov Democracy EU-Russia Foreign Policy

After a prolonged political and legal skirmish, EU officials finally reached an informal compromise last week on the reform of the Union`s Gas Directive. Hailed as an important achievement, the compromise mostly aimed to rein in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and ensure that the EU keeps Gazprom in check when it comes to gas supply and competition rules.

Who Calls the Shots

These changes were hastily proposed in 2017 by the European Commission in the desperate attempt to get some say over the construction of the Nord Stream 2 project which would substantially boost the direct gas flow between Russia and Germany. The construction of the pipeline has been the Apple of Discord between Germany and many Central European and Baltic countries. Berlin has faced growing criticism for allowing a pipeline project which will further increase Russia`s energy dominance and directly endangers the energy security of CEE countries.

The amendment of the Gas Directive didn`t intend to cancel Nord Stream 2 altogether but to make sure that the Gazprom-led project would comply with European energy legislation for ownership unbundling, third-party access and non-discrimination in tariff setting. Compliance with these provisions would require Gazprom to adapt their approach and be bound by a new set of rules which may hurt their business model.

The adopted compromise (text still not officially voted) make such rules applicable to new pipelines, but also grants the member state which is the first point of entry of the pipeline the right to ask for an exemption of these rules. This places Germany in a favourable position to push for such an exemption and ensure not only that the project goes through but that it also secures a lax regulatory treatment. Even though the Commission is the one which gives the final decision, it is unlikely that the freshly sworn-in EU executive will confront Merkel head on in late 2019.

German Solidarity?

The seemingly successful compromise on the Gas Directive manages to brush aside the most relevant question – why is Nord Stream 2 allowed to be constructed in the first place? This project has little rationale as it will not bring new gas to Europe but mostly redirect the current supply transmitted through Ukraine. The ultimate aim of Moscow is to completely circumvent Ukraine and redirect most of the energy resource directly through the Baltic sea.

Germany is going ahead with the construction of a project which has been condemned by several heads of state and the majority of the European Parliament as going against Europe`s interest. Moreover, Berlin is opening an additional avenue for further systemic corruption and political influence for Gazprom which is a direct conduit of the interests of the Kremlin.    

For Angela Merkel, the current developments under the umbrella of a ‘European solution’ to Nord Stream 2 bring a sigh of relief. For several years she has been locked in this project mostly due to pressures from her coalition partner the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The infamous legacy of Gerhard Schröder and Sigmar Gabriel has committed Germany to this pipeline, regardless of the split it causes between Eastern and Western EU member states and also the betrayal towards Ukraine.

Irrespective of Russia`s military aggression, foreign interference in elections and energy blackmail of smaller EU-member states, for Germany it seems as if it will be business as usual when it comes to pipelines.

A Humiliation for Europe

Ensuring the diversification of energy supply and speaking with one voice on energy affairs have been top priorities for the European Commission and the still incomplete EU Energy Union. Regardless, the institution has struggled to play any meaningful role with respect to Nord Stream 2. The Commission even found itself in the embarrassing position of reminding journalists that the amendment of the Gas Directive was her proposal and not only the product of a Franco-German compromise.

The only upside is that this situation might potentially give the EU additional leverage in brokering a parallel favourable deal for Ukraine in her attempt to continue to provide a transit route to several CEE member states. The revision of the Gas Directive might improve the chances of incorporating the interests of Kiev in securing future transit fees from Russia and keep Ukraine`s infrastructure operational to some extent. All in exchange for an exemption on Nord Stream 2, of course.

And here lies the biggest problem. Instead of preventing the construction of the pipeline altogether, the member states have just managed to produce a lowest common denominator solution. Germany will get its cheap gas and even try to save face by promoting the importance of the achieved Franco-German compromise under European rules. In reality, this compromise is nothing more than a fig leaf for Germany.

Dimitar Lilkov Energy EU Member States EU-Russia

The Eastern Orthodox Church is on the verge of a schism after the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (PoC) to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) ‘autocephaly’ (independence) from the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The Kyiv Patriarchate is one of the three Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the other two being the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

From the perspective of Western Europe, where societies have thoroughly secularized in recent decades, the ecclesiastical feuds of the Christian Orthodox world may seem remote and esoteric. Still, in the East and Southeast of Europe faith stimulates many people, and disputes over the jurisdiction and status of local churches is an important proxy of ethnic, nationalist and political cleavages. The consequences of a potential schism between Constantinople and Moscow will be significant and reverberate throughout Europe.

Contrary to the Catholic world, the Eastern Orthodox Church has no central authority. Τhe Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople ranks as primus inter pares among the heads of 14 Orthodox autocephalous churches, having the authority to call extraordinary synods when needed to deal with ad hoc issues, such as autocephaly rights.

The granting of a Tomos – i.e. independence – to UOC-KP by Constantinople threatens the status of the currently dominant Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) that is under the direct influence and control of the Moscow Patriarchate. As expected, this move was confronted fiercely by Russia, which sees Kyiv as the birthplace of its nation. On 15 October 2018, the Russian Orthodox Church announced angrily that it was breaking off all ties with PoC.

These developments have important religious, economic and geopolitical consequences.

After the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453, and during the emergence of the Russian Empire as a great power in the 18th and 19th century, Moscow tried to supplant Constantinople as the “Third Rome”, the guardian of Orthodox Christianity. Additionally, the rise of nationalism and the creation of national Orthodox churches in the Balkans and elsewhere undermined further the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s position. Nevertheless, against all odds, the latter survived until today as the spiritual beacon of Orthodoxy.

The Russian Orthodox Church never stopped to act as the long-arm of the Russian political establishment, even during the Soviet era. In other words, the Russian state, be it Czarist or Soviet, always used its national church and its religious channels as a tool of geopolitical influence and often as a source of pressure within the Orthodox world.

At the same time, UOC-KP’s autocephaly is another episode in the Ukrainian crisis. An autocephalous Ukrainian Church means that the Russian Church is losing not only a big number of adherents – almost 30 million – but also one-third of its total parishes outside Russia. In other words, this development is a great blow to Putin’s idea of a “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) built around ROC’s religious and cultural influence.

Since the beginning of the war in Eastern Ukraine, many of the UOC clergy openly supported the Russian invasion. This had a negative impact on the perception of the UOC by the Ukrainian people. This in turn made UOC-KP’s need for recognition as autocephalous all the more urgent. Given the previous experience of Russian interventionism in Ukraine, one should not exclude provocations and the outbreak of violence when the newly recognised Ukrainian Patriarchate will claim authority over parishes and religious monuments which now are under the control of UOC.

With its extreme decision of excommunicating the PoC, ROC hopes to create a split inside the Orthodox world and to bring other Orthodox churches under its authority. For now, apart from the Patriarchate in Antioch – which toes Damascus’ line of full alignment with Moscow – and the more conservative Patriarchs of Serbia, Georgia and possibly Bulgaria, the rest 9 autocephalous Orthodox churches do not show any intention of endorsing the decision of ROC.

Constantinople’s decision to recognize ROC-KP was a decidedly high-risk move that can spark an all-out confrontation with Moscow. The first target could be the Monastic Community of Mount Athos, an autonomous polity within the Hellenic Republic. The Russian authorities, through heavy financing of the Russian Monastery in Athos, have tried to increase their religious and political presence in the Balkan Peninsula. Another focal point could be Cyprus and Bulgaria, due to strong cultural and historical ties and a strong Russian presence there.

All of the above-mentioned countries and churches are obviously inside the EU. Therefore, it is apparent that Brussels, the Vatican and the US – which for many years has supported the PoC – should strongly endorse and support UOC-KP’s autocephaly. At the same time, their support for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which is in a permanent virtual state of hostage of the Turkish state, should be strengthened both rhetorically and practically. It is almost certain that Russia will use Turkey, with whom it currently enjoys good relations, as its proxy in order to exercise immense economic and political pressure on the PoC.

Ukraine autocephaly looks irreversible at the moment. But Orthodox Christianity will come out of this conflict wounded and weakened. At the same time, this is an opportunity for all other established churches of Christianity to support and rejuvenate the prestige of the Ecumenical Patriarchate that is under threat not only by its Turkish guardians, but now by Russia as well.

This is a mission that perfectly dovetails with the West’s interest in deterring Russia’s use of soft-power through religion that aims to destabilize its neighboring countries. The struggle over Ukraine’s religious communities is part of a much larger confrontation that has only begun.

Photo by zet pap on Unsplash

Panos Tasiopoulos Christian Democracy Eastern Europe EU-Russia Religion

While Ukrainian politicians one year ahead of both presidential and parliamentary elections are thinking about their campaign messages and the West has its eyes on the formation of the Anticorruption court in Kyiv, there’s one item missing from the European headlines. More specifically, the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

Some months before the extension of the OSCE’s mandate in the separatist-controlled territories until March 2019, the question of a United Nations peacekeeping mission to Donbass has again been put on the table.

“Even though they don’t have any control over the fighters, the OSCE are a very important presence on the ground” – stated Mykhailo Pashkov, Deputy Director of the Razumkov Centre – “however the international community should address the question of expansion and overall transformation of its mission to Donbass.”

Since the signature of the Minsk II Agreements in February 2015, little to nothing has changed in Eastern Ukraine. None of the points of the 13-point plan negotiated by the Normandy Format in the Belarusian capital have been implemented, with Ukraine and Russia continuously playing the blame game as to who should take the first step.

The truth is, local elections in the separatist controlled area cannot be held without a ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and even though the West has tied the lifting of economic sanctions on Russia (which have just been renewed for another six months at the recent EU Summit on June 28 and 29) to  the implementation of Minsk II, Putin has done nothing to pressure the separatists, (clearly under his control) to respect point 1 of the Agreement. Would deploying a contingent of UN Blue Helmets possibly be a step in the right direction to untie this deadlock?

Since the signature of the Minsk II Agreements in February 2015, little to nothing has changed in Eastern Ukraine.

According to Minsk II, Ukraine’s homework consists in implementing political aspects of the agreement, meaning granting a special status for the People’s Republic of Donetsk and Luhansk (DPR and LPR) and amending the Constitution of Ukraine, followed immediately by local elections on separatist-controlled territories. But President Poroshenko insists that a political solution to the conflict can only be achieved with a complete ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and weaponry and a stabilization process of Donbass.

Unfortunately for almost every party involved, the so-called “frozen conflict” is getting hotter. The last week of May was the most violent of 2018, with more than 20 deaths, both military and civilian casualties, and over 7000 ceasefire violations, according to Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

The rise of violence  occurred at the time of transition of the command of the war from the “anti-terror operation” (ATO) run by the security forces of Ukraine, SBU, to the country’s armed forces, in accordance with the Donbass Reintegration Law adopted in January this year.The law also designates a role for the military in the peace process, especially with regards the protection of civilians and the creation of conditions for the return of 1.7 million internally displaced people to the occupied territories. However, Ukraine cannot do it alone.

Since 2015, the conflict has created a contact line of 457 km, affected 4.4 million people, injured almost 25.000 and killed above 10.303 civilians and soldiers– numbers that call for international attention and engagement.

A peacekeeping mission to Ukraine would ideally undertake tasks like demilitarisation, mine clearance and return of refugees, complementing the work of the OSCE observers. There are only a few obstacles on the way.

After a meeting of foreign ministers of the Normandy Format last month to discuss the implementation of a ceasefire following the hot month of May in Donbass, Russia and Ukraine agreed in principle on a UN peacekeeping missions, but their ideas about how to implement it seem very much apart.

In order to function, the Blue Helmets need a strong presence and mandate, as suggested by a report commissioned by former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, but their nationality is the first disagreement regarding this operation. Kyiv is against Russian and Belarussian contingents, while the Kremlin opposes NATO countries claiming also that more powerful states are less impartial.

Secondly, Moscow, trying once more to play the card of the “non-involved-party”, insists that all arrangements should be made with the separatists, which would de-facto mean their recognition, a condition which is absolutely unacceptable for the Ukrainian government.

And thirdly, there are disagreements regarding the physical location of the peacekeepers. President Putin wants the mission to be deployed only on the contact line between the territories controlled by Ukraine and DPR and LPR, whereas President Poroshenko insists on the coverage also of the parts of the Russian-Ukrainian border which are now under separatists control.

In any case, Blue Helmets or not, the most important thing is that this war cannot continue being ignored. World leaders have to be constantly reminded, that the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is a result of Russian aggression and violation of territorial integrity, especially in the light of recent softening positions towards the Kremlin of the Italian Prime Minister and US President, who both suggested the reintegration of Russia into the G8, from which the country was expelled following the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The West should keep the Ukrainian conflict high on the agenda by raising the issue with the Kremlin on every occasion, by discussing it in national parliaments and the media and by presenting a unified, rather than a splintered, sceptical approach towards the imposition of sanctions on Russia.

The People of Donbass – those who remained, as well as those who fled – do not expect much, they expect the bare minimum; the end of hostilities. According to Aleksij Mazuka, from Kalmius Group, 60% of the total Ukrainian population support the idea of a UN peacekeeping mission to the Eastern part of the country and wish for a full re-integration of People’s Republic of Donetsk and Luhansk.

Maybe, after the 21 peacekeeping missions that Ukraine contributed to worldwide since its independence, it is time for the international community to show to the 4, 4 million people of Donbass that they have not been forgotten.

Anna Nalyvayko Defence Eastern Europe EU-Russia Security

I guess it’s clear now that Trump and Putin will indeed get along, much as I had predicted immediately after the U.S. Presidential election last November. The personal meeting between the two strongmen had played a groundbreaking role here, as was discussed at the Martens Centre panel on transatlantic relations at the EPP Congress in Malta in March.

Beyond any doubt, Vladimir Putin is the net winner so far, because he hasn’t had to make any concessions during the meeting. However, Donald Trump indeed made some. First, he kept key realist professionals out of the room (H.R. McMaster, Fiona Hill), and he was joined only by Rex Tillerson, perhaps the most comfortable figure for Putin out of all current U.S. foreign policy decision-makers.

Second, whatever the talk was about Putin’s cyber-intrusion into U.S. affairs (parties issue contradictory statements), one thing is clear: the issue hasn’t really gone anywhere and parties quickly moved on to other issues of the day.

Third, Trump didn’t want to hold Putin accountable on his past behaviour – aggression against neighbours, interference in affairs of Western democracies, attacks on the liberal world order, crackdowns on human rights in Russia. Instead, “there was not a lot of litigating the past”, as Rex Tillerson told the media.

Let’s be clear: there’s only one beneficiary of this sort of “move on” attitude – Putin. He wants to default on his past sins and be accepted as a normal guy by Western leaders again. Trump made a huge step in that direction in Hamburg.

But more importantly is the question – what comes next? Technically, I’m convinced that they agreed to hold a fully-fledged bilateral summit at some time soon, but just don’t want to announce it now, to allow flexibility. On the substantial part – few things.

First: much will depend on whether the professionals (H.R. McMaster, Fiona Hill, Kurt Volker) will return to have a say in crafting out future U.S. policy on Russia, or whether everything will continue in a napkin-drawn impromptu mode. The latter is a dangerous option: Putin is tricky and has great skill in selling his side of the story to unprepared and inexperienced people. Many reasonable people whom I know often left Putin’s office with his worldview.

Second: without doubt, Putin now sees Trump not as much as a tool for lifting sanctions against Russia (he sees the difficulties with that, bearing in mind what happens now on the Hill), but rather as a tool to sow further confusion and distrust in Transatlantic relations.

Putin is happy to hear Trump’s bashing of U.S. NATO allies for not spending enough on defence, as well as his other public attacks on the leaders of major Western democracies. It’s obvious that both leaders don’t like Angela Merkel very much, I’m sure part of their dialogue either was, or will be, focused on how to bypass her in important decision-making on major global affairs.

This leads us to the major third point. In the grave current geopolitical crises – Syria, the Korean Peninsula, and the Saudi-Iranian standoff – a United Europe, the key remaining pillar of Western democracy, is often dangerously absent. Trump is working to solve most of these crises together with a bunch of autocratic leaders – and Putin perfectly fits into that profile.

Why treat him so much differently? Technically, there’s still a lot more freedom in Russia than in China or Saudi Arabia (and Turkey is rapidly moving towards the same direction). So, we’re back into some sort of replica of the XIX century reality now – it looks like major international issues are set to be resolved through a number of “deals” between Trump and some autocrats.

Europe, as the major hope and leading force of the free democratic world at a time when the United States has taken (temporary?) leave from that role, should step up and increase its role in important affairs of the world, if we do not want to rely on the unpredictability of Trump. For President Trump, shaping the new world order through a series of deals with autocratic strongmen seems to be a temptation that’s too hard to resist.

He likes doing deals that way – we saw that in Riyadh, and now in Hamburg. But that’s a dangerous road for the future of the democratic world order, and the only way to defend it right now is if Europe amplifies its voice in global affairs. If not, we’ll be rapidly sliding into the XIX century politics, a glimpse of which we saw in Hamburg during the meeting between Putin and Trump.

Vladimir Milov EU-Russia Foreign Policy Transatlantic

2017 marks the 70th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan as well as the centenary of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. For Lithuania, virtually the whole of the 20th century was overshadowed by developments in the East – the Bolshevik revolution, the rise of the Soviet Union and subsequent half-a-century-long Soviet occupation since 1940.

Left on the other side of the Iron Curtain, Lithuania could not enjoy direct benefits from the Marshall Plan. However, because of the Marshall Plan, the EU and NATO were born, and that is what gave us freedom. Both anniversaries provide a good opportunity to look into a broader historical and future perspective.

Why are we drawing parallels between 1947 and 2017? Because nowadays, as back then in 1947, we face the very same problem – Russia/Soviet Union and its development, which is still very much influenced by the events of 1917.

However, because of the Marshall Plan, the EU and NATO were born, and that is what gave us freedom.

In 1947 George Marshall became concerned that Stalin would be able to establish his political dominance in Western Europe, where people were suffering due to the collapse of their economies, destroyed by World War II. It was known that local Communist Parties in France and Italy, following political directives from the Kremlin, were ready to exploit the dissatisfaction of the people to win political domination in those Western European countries.

In 2017 we are concerned that in Ukraine Putin may come back with a re-establishment of political domination over the whole country, where the dissatisfaction of the people is a natural consequence of deep and painful reforms, of weak economic recovery and of prolonged war in the Eastern part of Ukraine, initiated and supported by the Kremlin.

It is not only the future of Ukraine, not only the security of our region, but also the future of Russia itself and the long-term relationship between Russia and Europe that we need to be worried about. We need to remember that in the 20th century Europe suffered because of two tectonic conflicts: the ‘Germany–France’ conflict and the ‘Russia/Soviet Union – continental Europe’ conflict.

The main goals of the Marshall Plan in 1947 were:

• recovery of Western Europe in order to prevent Stalin to succeed in establishing his political domination there
• a solution to  the first European tectonic conflict – the one between Germany and France, with the beginning of European integration and the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community in 1951

The main goals of the Marshall Plan in 2017 should then be:

• recovery of Ukraine in order to prevent Putin to assert his political domination in the country
• a solution to the second European tectonic conflict – the one between Russia and continental Europe.

This can be achieved only if Russia transforms itself into a normal European country. Success in Ukraine is the single instrument available to the Western Community to encourage a positive transformation of Russia. The example of success in Ukraine would have a major impact on the opinion of ordinary Russians. Russia, therefore, should be surrounded by the ‘belt of success’ of the Eastern Partnership region, where Ukraine is the most important country.

Putin is fighting against the success of Ukraine, because it endangers his regime. He anticipates that painful reforms in Ukraine will overwhelm the Ukrainian people with dissatisfaction. In democratic elections, such frustration would bring into power political forces, which would abandon the implementation of necessary reforms. That would be a strategic victory for Putin, one which we cannot allow to happen.

How did we, in the Baltics, achiev our success without any kind of Marshall Plan? We were lucky, because soon after regaining our independence at the beginning of the 1990s, we were promised membership in the EU, conditional on implementing complex reforms. A clear membership perspective helped us to reach a national political consensus in Lithuania and kept alive our motivation for reforms. That is how our success was created.

Since World War II the Western Community has invented only two effective geopolitical instruments, which prevented Russia/Soviet Union from expanding its political influence on countries suffering immense economic challenges of recovery or transformation: it was the Marshall Plan in 1947 and the EU enlargement in the 1990s. For the time being, Ukraine cannot expect an invitation to join the EU. That is why we need a Marshall Plan for Ukraine.

We need to bring back the inspiration and wisdom of 1947.

The Marshall Plan for Ukraine would be a package of investment funds into the real economy of Ukraine, conditional on implementing reforms. Following the institutional example of the Marshall Plan 1947 – the European Reconstruction Agency – a similar agency should be created for Ukraine. Five billion USD annually are needed to bring the growth of GDP up to 6 – 8% in Ukraine. The EU External Investment Plan provides a real possibility for financing schemes of the Marshall Plan for Ukraine – it entails 88 billion USD until 2020.

A big part of this money from the External Investment Plan will be used to implement what the German Government calls ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’. We support this initiative and we hope that the similar idea of a ‘Marshall Plan for/with Ukraine’ will be supported by other countries. Our initiative gathers momentum, as the European People’s Party (EPP) in its Malta Congress expressed support for the Marshall Plan for Ukraine. Together with Ukrainians, we have already brought this initiative to Washington, and we shall go to Berlin and Brussels.

1947 and 2017 – a lot of similarities and similar challenges. We need to bring back the inspiration and wisdom of 1947: George F. Kennan’s deep understanding of why a ‘Russia Containment Strategy’ is needed; George Marshall’s boldness to propose a successful geopolitical initiative; the courage of Harry S. Truman and the leaders of Western Europe to take responsibility and confront Stalin with the Marshall Plan and defend Berlin during the blockade.

The same type of leadership and behavior is needed now – for the sake of lasting peace and stability in Europe through support of Ukraine in order to inspire transformation of Russia.

Andrius Kubilius Baltic Democracy Eastern Europe EU-Russia

On June 7th the European Commission will put forward its proposals to enhance European military cooperation, framed as ‘The Future of the European Defence’. These proposals are very timely and necessary and will hopefully be embraced by all EU Member states. However, it is important that we don’t fall into a trap when we speak about European defence, because what is possible in the future is vastly different to the realities of European defence today.

The conclusion reached in various EU member states is that under US President Donald Trump, we can no longer rely on NATO as much as we did before, especially considering the increased aggressiveness of Putin-led Russia. Therefore, as a backup plan, we will need to boost European defence cooperation and increase our independent military capabilities. It is possible for this to happen within the NATO framework rather than contradicting or overlapping with it.

The logic is solid, but there is a danger in underestimating the urgency of the situation. The security that NATO provides cannot be replaced by any European defence cooperation in the near future. The fact is that, since 1990, European real military capabilities have decreased dramatically.

In many countries, real operation units have fallen to one third of what they were at their peak in the 90s, and even then they were operationally dependent on US support. When we examine the figures, we can see that they paint a stark picture for the EU’s military capabilities without the help of the US.

Within the NATO framework, the US spends 3 times more on its military than the combined total of the EU member states. And this ratio has not been not improving: from 2007 to 2015, the US increased their defence spending by an average of 3.1%, whilst the EU28 decreased their military spending by an average of 14.5%.

Figure 1: Changes in Western European Combat Battalions (1990-2015)

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2016

The combat battalion figures of EU member states are also in sharp decline. Germany, for example, has decreased its total battalion count of 215 battalions in 1990 to just 34 in 2015. In key military equipment, the EU28 have collectively decreased their total stock of battle tanks by 70%, helicopters by 38%, and patrol and combat boats by 54%.

Across the board, there is one trend we can see in relation to EU defence spending and that trend is decline. Europeans still cannot and could not confront a large-scale military intervention from Russia effectively without the help of the United States.

Crucially, major military upgrades take years if not decades to complete. A good example is Russia, which started a major reform of its military after the war in Georgia in 2008, when they realised that they had a large, but ineffective army.

The reforms came with unquestionable political and financial support from Putin, who even cut domestic budgets such as social welfare and healthcare in order to pay for this military reform (a move which would be extremely unpopular in Western European states). However, even though Russia has invested massively in its military since 2008, Russia’s military reform is still far from complete. 

When we talk about the future of the common European Defence without the US, we need to realise that we as Europeans have for decades been totally reliant on the support of the Unites States. The argument for a strong European defence also assumes that European military spending would be greatly increased and that enhanced military cooperation would turn to some form of integration.

It is also necessary to point out that if Europe is to build a military force which is capable of facing a worst-case scenario, then we need to speak about European nuclear weapon capabilities.

The Commission’s proposals for enhanced military cooperation are very welcome, we need more initiatives like them, and we need to embrace them. Investing in the future of European military cooperation is the only solution to independently maintain the integrity of the EU in the long term. However, in the short term, this goal is not possible without the support of the United States.

We can be disappointed by what President Trump did or did not say during his last European visit, but we should not neglect or fail to give credit to the fact that operationally the US continues to invest in Europe as it did before.

Just look for example at the US troops in the Baltics or the US bilateral defence cooperation agreement with Estonia. When we evaluate our investment in our transatlantic relationship with the United States, we need to take into account that so far nothing has changed in US-EU defence cooperation.

Whilst taking steps to enhancing European military cooperation and common capabilities, the EU member states need to continue the modernisation of their military and increase their independent capabilities. To achieve a genuine European Defence Union, this Union needs to be built on the modern and fully operative units of the EU Member states.

Tomi Huhtanen Defence EU Member States EU-Russia Security Transatlantic

Massive anti-corruption protests on March 26th have effectively ended the sleepy landscape of the Russian politics that have existed for the past three years since the annexation of Crimea, a period dominated by the notion of “unchallengeable” sky-high approval ratings of Putin. The country is visibly fed up with Putin’s cronyism, obscene corruption and inequality, which were the prime targets of the protests.

There are a few remarkable things about Sunday’s rallies. First, about 100 cities were affected, including such names as Komsomolsk-na-Amure, Saransk, Novokuznetsk, Nizhny Tagil – provincial towns which are normally unheard of in regular Russian political life. In regional capitals, up to several thousand were attending, setting records of participation in many cases. Second, this is the first time when most of such rallies were forbidden by authorities – but people turned out regardless. Beforehand, opposition was only able to mobilize big masses of protesters on the condition that rallies were officially approved; non-sanctioned rallies normally scared off most people and were down to a narrow number of dedicated oppositioners.

 This time, it was all different – people across the country have shown no fear despite arrests and heavy police pressure. This is a sharp contrast with anything we’ve seen before. There are clear signs that people in Russia are fed up with the rule of the same faces who have been in power for almost two decades now for the benefit of enriching themselves. Dominating young faces also suggest that the younger generation sees no opportunity for a decent future within Putin’s system, which largely provides benefits and social lifts to insiders, and excludes everyone else.

You can get a glimpse of people’s resolve to stand against pressure in my short video which I’ve captured right at the heart of the events at Pushkinskaya square in Moscow on Sunday – people chanting “Russia against Putin”. All right, I could have been wrong predicting last year that you may see such mass demonstrations of discontent with Putin’s regime at the September 2016 Parliamentary elections – but in fact this demonstration turned out just to be delayed for six more months. Elderly opposition figures at the Duma elections failed to impress Russians who want change, but a younger and much more energetic Alexey Navalny have finally managed to ignite people. Navalny has been remarkably successful in finding a common cause and building a wide network of support across the country and his regional visits gather huge crowds of supporters, something also unseen in many years, as a lot of opposition forces were, unfortunately, too Moscow-centric.

Together with Navalny’s ongoing Presidential campaign, further rallies like that would build more and more pressure against Putin and his regime in the coming months. Arrests won’t stop the momentum. The resolve of protesters on Sunday is a stark contrast with passiveness and fatigue of bleak pro-Putin demonstrations marking the anniversary of the Crimean demonstration just a week before. On March 26th, no one ever showed up on the streets in Putin’s defence, except heavily armed police and troops — supposedly existent “armies” of Putin’s diehard fans are nowhere to be seen. It seems that the tale of “universal 90% support for Putin in Russia” has effectively ended right in front of our eyes.

Mass arrests and exceptional armed police defence, however, clearly suggest that Putin doesn’t want to easily let go. But for the first time, this was confronted by real mass resolve to protest despite personal risks, and current pressure, arrests and insane accusations against protesters on state TV which only make people angrier. The bad news is that serious confrontation sometime in the future seems inevitable, as protest rallies have only just begun and Russians are passionate to turn to the streets once again. Youth forums are now filled with anger, particularly after Putin’s spokesman’s remarks that youngsters who attended rallies were “paid” to protest. It is very likely that things may turn violent soon if Putin doesn’t back down with his repression machine.

The good news is that Russia is back: our people have remembered who they really are, and demanded freedom and respect of their rights with energy previously unseen. Sunday was really a turning point.

Vladimir Milov Democracy EU-Russia Values Youth

Russian officials have had to contain their glee in monitoring recent political events in America and Europe. They appear to think their days in the cold may soon be over. Much has been made of President-elect Donald Trump’s wish to improve relations with Moscow, but the last news out of France appears even more auspicious to Moscow.

The far-right candidate, Marine Le Pen, is known for her pro-Putin sympathies. Now, with François Fillon’s nomination as the center-right candidate, both major contenders in next year’s French presidential election are favorably disposed toward Russia.

These warmer feelings towards Russia are based, mainly, on changing threat perceptions in the West. Since the emergence of the Islamic State and the proliferation of terrorist attacks in Europe and America, many Europeans and Americans appear to view Moscow’s aggression against its neighbors, such as Ukraine and Georgia, as an increasingly esoteric problem.

Particularly after Russia’s intervention in Syria, even on the right many now view Russia not as a threat to the West but as a natural ally in defeating the jihadi threat.

These warmer feelings towards Russia are based, mainly, on changing threat perceptions in the West.

While this notion is gaining popularity, it is at best the triumph of hope over experience, and at worst a dangerous delusion. Russia’s interaction with radical Islam over two decades shows that it is part of the problem, not the solution. In fact, leaders in Moscow have a track record of manipulating radical Islam whenever that has suited their purposes – including systematic collusion with Islamic extremists. A few examples illustrate this policy.

Exhibit one is the twenty-year insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus. In this conflict, the forces fighting for independence from Russia were divided between secular nationalists and Islamic radicals. Because the secular nationalists enjoyed considerable legitimacy both in the West and among the local population, Moscow actively encouraged the growth of the jihadi elements, which were disliked locally and anathema to the West.

Moscow worked hard to kill off the leaders of Chechnya’s secular nationalists. By contrast, there is compelling evidence of collusion between Russia’s secret services and the region’s most notorious radicals, such as Shamil Basayev and Arbi Barayev, and of systematic Russian infiltration of the radical Islamic groups from the North Caucasus.

As Russia imposed a brutal proxy regime in Chechnya, it sought to leave Chechens and foreigners alike with a binary choice: tolerate the brutal Kadyrov regime, or side with the jihadis.

Russia’s interaction with radical Islam over two decades shows that it is part of the problem, not the solution.

Exhibit two is the case of Russia’s foreign fighters in Syria. Ahead of the 2014 Sochi winter Olympics, held next to the North Caucasus, Moscow in spite of its infiltration of jihadi networks faced an acute risk of terrorist attacks. So, as Novaya Gazeta’s Elena Milashina has showed, Russia’s Federal Security Service organized a “pipeline” to facilitate the export of North Caucasian radicals to fight in Syria. Would-be fighters were provided passports and safe passage; some were recruited by Russian intelligence services.

Indeed, foreign fighters from Russia have reached higher in the hierarchy of the Islamic State than any other foreign fighters, and work alongside Saddam Hussein’s former Baathist officers who – similarly – have deep connections to Moscow dating to the Soviet period. Is this a coincidence? The exact nature of these relationships is by nature murky, but the level of state infiltration of the jihadi circles in Russia at the very least raises serious questions about Moscow’s links to the Islamic State.

But, critics may counter, has not Russia’s intervention in Syria served to wipe out these jihadis? Again, while this is the Russian rhetoric, the record shows otherwise. Never mind that Russia has tried, falsely, to take credit for the American drone strikes that have decimated the Islamic State leadership.

By now, it is widely established that Russian airstrikes have not primarily targeted the Islamic State at all, but other rebel groups fighting the Assad regime, as in Aleppo. In reality, Moscow is taking a page from the playbook in Chechnya: by eliminating the rebel groups, it strives to mold a situation that presents a binary choice, and where the only alternative to the Assad regime is the Islamic State.

Exhibit three is Afghanistan, where Moscow since last year established contacts with the Taliban insurgency, which is responsible for the deaths of thousands of American soldiers. Citing the need to fight the Islamic State franchise in the country, Moscow began intelligence sharing programs with the Taliban, and provided this jihadi group with international legitimacy.

Even Russia’s claims to be a bulwark against Islamic radicalization in nearby Central Asia fails to hold up to scrutiny. In fact, it is by now established that most Central Asians fighting in Syria or Iraq are not radicalized in their home countries, where governments have a solid track record of countering radicalization.

In fact, the large majority of Central Asian recruits to Islamic radical movements have been radicalized while toiling as temporary and often illegal workers in Russia itself. Far from being a bulwark against extremism, Russia is domestically an incubator of radical Islam.

This bleak picture raises the question: if Russia is not fighting Islamic extremism, then what are its real goals? The answer is twofold. First, in places a different as Chechnya and Syria, Russia actively tries to shape the actors on the battlefield to leave a binary choice between Islamic extremists and brutal strongmen dependent on Moscow.

Second, in theaters as diverse as Afghanistan and Syria, Russia’s focus is squarely to undermine the national security interests of the United States. In Afghanistan, Russia is supporting the Taliban against Islamic State; while in Syria it claims to fight ISIS, but in fact ignores it and instead targets other rebel groups. The common denominator? Russia alternatively bolsters America’s main enemy, or actively targets its local allies.

The notion that Russia is, or could be, an ally against the threat of radical Islam is a dangerous delusion. Russia’s record makes it clear that it sees America, not Islamic extremism, as its main enemy. So long as Vladimir Putin runs Russia, Russia will remain part of the problem, not the solution.

Svante Cornell Defence EU-Russia Foreign Policy

Immediately after Donald Trump was elected 45th President of the United States, many commentators have suggested that his policies toward Russia will not be as accommodating as his campaign rhetoric on Vladimir Putin, and that Trump may eventually become a difficult counterpart for the current Russian leadership. Arguments for that theory include, among others, persistent fundamental differences on certain issues, Putin’s unreliability and unpredictability, Trump’s focus on ‘America First’, pressure from certain anti-Putin forces in the GOP establishment, etc.

However, all these arguments consider only the bilateral U.S.-Russia dimension as if it existed in a vacuum. But if you put Trump-Russia relations in the broader global context that is about to emerge because of Trump’s presidency, all these differences and problems don’t stand a chance to outweigh a perfect global match between the common interests of both Putin and Trump.

Trump’s foreign policy is largely uncharted waters, but one thing is very clear – he will be involved in many important global conflicts. Rearranging NAFTA and other trade agreements, dealing with China as a rising power, loads of issues in the Middle East (Syria and the potential scrapping of the Iranian nuclear deal to begin with, but there’s always so much more in that particular region).

What do you do when you’re about to engage in many tough battles of global significance, and want to cover your flanks and back? One of the first things – you look for important players with whom you can reach a solid ‘ceasefire’ to untie your hands for bigger things. This is what Turkish President Erdogan did a few months ago, almost simultaneously reaching out for a thaw with Russia and Israel, relations with both of whom were quite difficult recently, to untie his hands for multiple other ventures both at home and abroad.

In Trump’s case, Putin’s Russia dangerously fits into this fundamental logic. There are clear signs in Moscow that Putin has been carefully preparing for ways to approach Trump. He’ll appeal to his business logic (the flip side of which is his complete lack of experience in public governance and international affairs) and offer him a “deal” – the term so dear to the newly elected U.S. leader: Give me back some of the minor stuff which stands in the way of our relationship (Ukraine, human rights in Russia, financial sanctions) – and I’ll support you in your bigger global efforts.

Given Putin’s skills in psychology and recruitment inherited from his earlier profession – which were so brilliantly used initially with George W. Bush, for whom just one look into Putin’s “soul” seems to have overshadowed all Russian authoritarian trends in the beginning of Putin’s rule – that looks quite achievable.

Yes, on the other hand, there are established Republicans demanding sanctions for human rights violations – but Trump would easily answer by keeping in place the personal sanctions lists against Russian officials, such as the Magnitsky list, which, in fact, is not too much of a problem for Putin. The key problem for him are the financial sanctions imposed by the Obama administration – and here, there are huge U.S. corporate interests behind lifting those.

Lifting financial sanctions and keeping the window-dressing lists of Russian human-rights abusers banned from entry into the U.S.: Putin will be happy with that. What he wants most is to return to major borrowing in the Western financial markets, not allowing his prosecutors and judges to freely travel to Miami (in fact, Putin himself had recently prohibited all these people from travelling abroad).

Ukraine? Putin may even offer a real de-escalation in Donbass in return for a more general U.S. withdrawal from political and financial support for the current Ukrainian government. This would also give an opportunity to Trump to say ‘See, I’ve achieved what Obama couldn’t – real peace in Eastern Ukraine’.

This is how a big Trump-Putin deal might look like – and nothing serious seems to stand in its way, given Trump’s priorities focused on other things, and Putin’s apparent readiness  to propose and psychologically ‘sell’ this new U.S.-Russia non-aggression pact.

Vladimir Milov EU-Russia EU-US Foreign Policy Transatlantic Values

“We don’t understand one another, we don’t trust each other, but we are at least able to meet.”

This was one of the most memorable quotes from last week’s meeting of the Normandy group consisting of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia. The group was established almost two years ago with the sole purpose to achieve a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine.

The result of this initiative has been the Minsk II agreement replacing its younger predecessor, Minsk I, which had failed to stop the war. Unfortunately, there are sporadic mentions so far of its implementation. It is also a “known secret” that this agreement is considered to be more or less dead.

The main justification for this is the fact that Russia expects Ukraine to fulfil its part of the deal first: autonomy for Donbas under Ukrainian law, legitimisation of the local elections and transferring social security payments to rebel authorities.

The Kyiv government in turn rightfully points out that this can only happen after Russia has militarily withdrawn from Ukraine and government control of the border with Russia has been fully restored.

But even if the latter did happen, it looks unlikely that Russia is going to reciprocate. To make things worse, the reality on the ground is that of an open conflict which has so far claimed more than 10,000 victims and caused 2 million Ukrainians to be displaced.

Putin now enjoys a position he could not even dream of four years ago.

On one hand, any diplomatic initiative that could lead to the cessation of the armed conflict and the suffering of civilians should be praised. On the other hand, the time has come for a reckoning: should Russia be treated as a conflict party in the Normandy group (just like Ukraine and the rebels are) rather than an arbiter? In my and other experts’ opinion, Russia is an aggressor who triggered these clashes to 1. Prevent Ukraine from freely deciding to belong to the West and 2. To fuel unrest in Europe.

The outcome of the recent meeting and the adoption of the framework peace plan cannot give Ukrainians much cause for optimism. The adoption of the peace roadmap will essentially only replace the already adopted Minsk agreements. This means that the original process will be replaced with another one that will apparently have a similar format and cycle.

Notwithstanding speculation, it is still too early to evaluate the roadmap to be presented by November. Anyway, it is hard to imagine that the new format of negotiations will ensure peace in Donbas.

If anybody was satisfied leaving the Normandy group meeting, this was clearly Putin. He has again gained time by tying the resolution of the problem to a process that needs to start anew. Incidentally, it is noteworthy to mention that Putin now enjoys a position he could not even dream of four years ago: through his aggression against Ukraine, he has brought back the Cold War; from a fragile strategic partnership, Russia is once again a security challenge for Europe.

Furthermore, the migration crisis is helping Putin to forge stronger alliances with the far right in Europe, which is thriving on the issue. In Syria and elsewhere too, Russia keeps strengthening its military presence by supporting dictatorial regimes. Last, but not least, Putin has managed to intricate himself even in the US presidential campaign.

As for the EU and Ukraine, the situation will only get increasingly complex and confusing. It is thus high time for the EU to toughen up its policy towards Russia. Once and for all, Putin´s margin for manoeuvring in Europe must be curbed, and the problem must be passed on to his home field.

Putin´s margin for manoeuvring in Europe must be curbed.

This can only be achieved by taking a clear and unified stance, namely in the form of large-scale economic sanctions. Perhaps also the cutting of gas and oil deliveries from Russia should at least be debated. But many member states still shy away from this, particularly those which are the most affected by either the EU’s or Russia’s sanctions to date.

In my opinion, it is necessary to make Putin occupy his time with his own domestic problems which are bound to arise from such sanctions. This would make it more difficult for him to carry out his subversive activities on the different external fronts. As for Ukraine, civil war notwithstanding, the country needs to accelerate the reform process.

Also against the background of these developments, the recent EU summit was expected to take a stronger stance against Russia. Regrettably, EU leaders have only managed to express their concerns over the events in Syria and the growing Russian propaganda efforts throughout Europe. In a world ridden with war, at a time when the EU has a hard time figuring out which problems to solve first, this is simply not enough.

The fact that the summit was not able to adopt clearer conclusions demanding extensions of the sanctions demonstrates a serious lack of EU unity, an inability to close ranks especially after Brexit.

Meanwhile, Putin is pursuing his own efforts: the influence he has been exerting over certain European countries is beginning to bear fruit in the form of their vague positions on sanctions. These countries prefer to defend their economic interests instead of taking difficult strategic positions.

They should do it not only for the sake of Ukraine, of the residents of Aleppo, but also for the sake of the future of the EU.

Viktória Jančošeková Eastern Europe EU-Russia Security

Yesterday Russia had an election that yet again disappointed hopes for a functional and reasonable parliament instead of “the mad printer” (that adopted all inhumane and reactionary laws given to it by presidential administration), as the previous Duma was commonly known.

Taking a deeper look at the prospects of the Russian business community raising a political voice, or at least a whisper, some myths, popular among certain western policy makers, are revealed: a) there is a possible split of business elites and b) some private businessmen will surely want to defend themselves from crazy Kremlin adventures abroad.

The harsh reality is that an overwhelming majority of Russian business – from oligarchs and large corporations to small and medium entrepreneurs – remain politically loyal to the Kremlin and are therefore self-censored.

Oligarchs depend on contracts and favours from the State and have such a long and compromising history of engagement with the Kremlin’s criminalised bureaucracy that not a single one of them has dared to protest against Putin in the last decade. The bravest they can afford to do is to mildly criticise the puppet government of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on its economic policies.

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have shown a bit more protest activity. Disparate regional movements of farmers, truckers and owners of small kiosks in the cities have protested against arbitrary use of power by regional authorities and they also went on hunger strikes and marches to Moscow.

But they have never properly – as a movement – dared to criticise Putin or the Kremlin administration or raised any significant political demands. In fact, many of them tried to appeal to a kind Tsar (to be read President). Owners of kiosks even put up portraits of Putin next to icons in shop windows, only to be demolished anyway if those in power decide so one day.

Western sanctions are quite superficial: they merely send the signal that the West is not continuing business as usual.

Western policy-makers should face an inconvenient truth that is difficult to accept: there is not going to be a split of elites. The monopolistic model of the state economy had already been in deep crisis long before Western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine started and oil prices collapsed.

However, the Russian government and businesses are reluctant to publicly admit this and they find ways to get by. Western sanctions are quite superficial: they merely send the signal that the West is not continuing business as usual (which would be outright appeasement) and they warn Russia of what more may come if the Kremlin continues to advance in Ukraine.

However, less than ten cronies of Putin feature on the US and EU sanctions lists: that is not enough to seriously change Russia’s aggressive foreign policy or lead to a split of elites. The superficial sanctions can reduce the Kremlin’s ability to execute its policies, but not change its overall course. The West has a choice to expand the individual sanction list to include hundreds of individuals, or introduce large-scale sector-wide sanctions (e.g. a ban on Russian oil and gas exports to Europe, as was with Iran).

However, in doing so, the West would risk seriously escalating the conflict with Russia, and Western policy-makers are currently incapable of this. Instead, it appears that the West is betting on the long-term game of patience and the slow strangling effect of mild sanctions—that are unlikely to bring about a change in the regime’s policies until several years have passed, and perhaps even a decade.

Hence, if stronger sanctions are not an option, then at least the current ones should be maintained for a long time to come.

Ilya Zaslavsky Business Elections EU-Russia

One of the questions frequently raised after the devastating Brexit vote is on the consequences for the relations between the West and Russia. Vladimir Putin must clearly benefit from the loosening ties between Western powers and the disarray now evident in Europe’s own house.

The situation, however, is not as simple as it may seem, and this new dawn delivers new opportunities for the united European project, which were previously unheard of.

First of all, something that’s evident for most, except the 17 million British who voted “Leave”, Britain will face dire economic consequences. The nation’s trade deficit is at a record high, and about two thirds of it comes from trade with the EU. UK businesses face huge losses from changes in trade rules. 

Apart from economics, there’s politics: let’s not rush to make judgments as to whether Scotland, Northern Ireland or Gibraltar may really leave the UK, but there are clear cracks emerging in the British empire with the EU acting as a major center of gravity. It’s quite clear that the “Leave” camp has problems both with its leadership and with viable agenda going forward. The ruling UK conservative party is divided on the Brexit issue. By the time the Conservative party chooses a new Prime Minister in October, the country may well have spiralled into a political mess.

The EU should waste no time in utilising this as a case in point for all the Eurosceptics: a sort of ‘look what happens when you quit’. This is where you’re heading.. The alternative: an incomparably successful project that brought so much freedom, prosperity, market integration and opportunities to its people. The European Union.

As a pro-European outsider, I can’t help but express my regret that EU is so “undersold” globally as a success story. The EU is always portrayed as a bunch of boring bureaucrats who “were never elected” but always want to regulate everything. As a matter of fact, it’s the contrary: EU leaders are elected directly by the European Parliament in a more democratic manner that a lot of European Governments are.

In recent years, the EU has undertaken a globally unprecedented effort to create a common space of freedom, market integration and liberalisation. Contrary to claims by those who label Eurocrats as people thirsty to regulate everything, it was Brussels which pushed forward liberalisation, meeting resistance from national governments and elites (The third energy package is just one example, and it works.). However, Brussels clearly has an image problem, which has been played against itself in the UK campaign, and which should be fixed.

If a United Europe succeeds in seizing the momentum of this opportunity that has opened after the UK referendum, then it has a chance to strengthen the joint European project and take it to new heights. And this challenge in itself is good: Europe rested long enough on the comfortable remains of the Berlin Wall, which is already history – new times are coming.

However, if the EU fails, and the momentum is seized by Eurosceptics – that’s when the global retrograde movement represented by Vladimir Putin and others will truly win. Make no mistake: Putin leads a systemic anti-European revisionist project (and he has a name for it: Eurasianism) whose aim is to dismantle democratic institutions and market freedoms wherever possible. These have already been dismantled in Eurasia, territory under Putin’s influence, and Ukraine, in this case, is just one of the battlegrounds, where people stood against being trampled under Putin’s feet.

If the EU weakens as a result of the UK referendum, Putin will have a much greater space in which to operate – diminished Western unity against Putin’s neo-autocratic offensive at Europe’s Eastern frontiers, emerging “illiberal democracies” replacing yesterday’s democratic states, divided nations, markets, etc. – all left for the taking by that rising non-democratic force in the East.

Despite Putin gaining tactical success, this now lies in the hands of Europe – it shall reassure those who want to resist the advance of resurgent authoritarianism and XIX century politics. Brexit, in this regard, is not only a challenge – it also offers a lot of opportunity to strengthen the united European project and push back Euroscepticism. It will require good leadership and a great deal of saving face, but let’s not waste this opportunity.

Vladimir Milov Brexit EU-Russia Euroscepticism

Ukraine is currently undergoing one of the most decisive phases since its independence. It has to both contain the Russian aggression in Donbas and deal with the consequences of the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula.

This requires substantial effort and resources, which Ukraine is lacking. At the same time, it is also undergoing a deep and comprehensive transformation process in order to have a chance of firmly standing on its own feet. The struggle for security (survival) and the future (development) is continuing in parallel.

The article argues that the Minsk II agreements are unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future due to the political calculations of Russia, which is playing the blame game with Ukraine. The article also reasons that Ukraine has a unique window of opportunity to focus on reforms, thus building the pillars of its future strength, as it has been able to avoid the deterioration of the security situation in the east.

Read the full articlein the June 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Robert Golanski Eastern Europe EU-Russia Security

In the post-Soviet space as well as the Middle East, Western leaders have largely failed to heed ample evidence that the goals of the Russian leadership are fundamentally opposed to those of the EU and the US. Whereas Moscow seeks to counter Western influence and roll back the US’s role in the world, the West has proposed a win–win approach, seeking to convince Moscow that its ‘true’ interests should lead it to cooperate with the West.

When this has not worked, Western leaders have ‘compartmentalised’, isolating areas of agreement from areas of disagreement. This approach has come to the end of the road because the assumptions that undergird it are false. So long as Western powers fail to understand the fundamental incompatibility of their interests with the deeply anti-Western interests of the current power brokers in the Kremlin, they are unlikely to develop policies that achieve success.

Read the full articlein the June 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Svante Cornell EU-Russia Foreign Policy Middle East Security

Over the last 10 years, Russia under Putin has turned into an illiberal empire that is determined to weaken the West as a precondition for its own survival. This fact is still not fully appreciated by those Western leaders who believe that a return to cooperation with Russia is both necessary and possible.

Germany’s Social Democrats are particularly prominent among these leaders. They intend to use Germany’s 2016 presidency of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to lay the groundwork for a step-by-step confidence-building effort, eventually leading to a new European security architecture. Such hopes are utterly futile. They are based on old illusions about détente and Ostpolitik.

Moreover, they are understood by the Kremlin to be signs of weakness and appeasement. Instead of answering every Russian act of aggression with new offers for talks, the West should prepare for a long confrontation with Russia, maintain unity, and strengthen defence and deterrence.

Read the full articlein the June 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Roland Freudenstein Defence EU-Russia Security

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime has taken control of the traditional media in Russia: TV, radio and newspapers. As Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated, the Kremlin sees the mass media as a ‘weapon’.

Now Russia’s leadership is trying to take control of social media too, and for this massive operation a new information warfare tool has been mobilised—an army of fake social media Putin-fans, known as ‘trolls’.

My investigation has discovered that coordinated social media propaganda writers are twisting and manipulating the public debate in Finland, too. Trolls and bots distribute vast amounts of false information in various languages, and target individual citizens for aggressive operations.

Aggressive trolls have created a feeling of fear among some of my interviewees, causing them to stop making Russia-related comments online. Trolling has had a serious impact on freedom of speech, even outside Russia.

Thus, it should be viewed as a national security threat that needs to be addressed accordingly. The question is: how should the Kremlin’s trolls and disinformation be countered?

Read the full articlein the June 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Jessikka Aro Defence EU-Russia Internet Security Technology

Calls for the permanent deployment of substantial combat forces in Eastern European NATO states, primarily in the Baltics and Poland, have been part of the debates on strategy among the member states for years. In the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, the defence capabilities of the Eastern European allies must undoubtedly be strengthened.

However, in light of the yet-to-be-implemented measures that the allies decided upon at the Wales Summit, a more general shift of international security challenges towards ‘hybrid’ warfare scenarios, Russia’s centrality in the Middle East peace process and the long-term viability of the Alliance, permanently deploying substantial combat forces in Eastern Europe would not strengthen the security of Europe and the coherence of NATO.

Read the full articlein the June 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Roderich Kiesewetter Ingmar Zielke Defence EU-Russia Foreign Policy Security

What have we learned and what are the implications for Putin and for relations between Russia and the West from the ‘Panama Papers’ scandal? Here’s what we know so far.

Substantial evidence of Putin’s involvement  

The owner of two Russia-linked offshore companies with an alleged turnover around $2 billion, cellist Sergey Roldugin, has no record of major involvement in business and nothing in Roldugin’s experience or career suggests that he is worth this much. In a 2014 interview with The New York Times , he said ‘I’m not a businessman, I don’t have millions’, a claim which is supported by the lack of evidence of meaningful business activity on his behalf.

Is there any reason major Russian businesses would pay billions through highly controversial deals to a cellist with no practical business experience and no value as a business partner?

Oh, wait, let’s not forget one important thing: the cellist is the closest personal friend of the Russian President. The money transfer schemes involved are mostly obscene in terms of full lack of commercial sense: unreasonably huge penalties for wittingly breached deals, generous buy-offs of publicly traded shares just days after they were sold to Roldugin’s firms at but a fraction of the future buy-off price, etc. All these deals will be subject to thorough money-laundering investigation because this is what bribes normally look like in the modern world.

What implications for Russia?

Most commentators agree that the publication of the ‘Panama Papers’ will have little public effect on the Russian society. There are a number of reasons for this: Russia’s state media almost completely silenced the revelation about the papers, Russians are used to it and, to a large extent, tolerate large-scale corruption. Some people would buy arguments that ‘it’s the Western plot to discredit Putin’ and that ‘Putin’s personal signature is not in the register = no proof’.

However, among the Russian elites, this publication will undoubtedly have a great psychological effect. Alongside Roldugin, many Russian officials and businessmen have been exposed in the papers as owners of offshore companies. And many of them have already had too much to deal with in previous years – Western sanctions, the international credit blockade, difficulties moving money back and forth across the borders, dealing with Western authorities and financial institutions. They thought that Putin’s system would offer them protection once they’ve been loyal to the Czar—but now it seems that the Czar is mostly busy covering his own deals, and the protection has vanished. On top of this, the additional sanctions and growing difficulty in cross-border business as a result of the Czar’s policies likely make them question if it is worth it supporting Putin and his system any longer?

I do not believe that an ‘elite revolt’ against Putin will occur in Russia any time soon—Putin has effectively managed to suppress the quality of the Russian elites, expel the most outstanding persons from power, and breed only loyal depoliticised technocrats around him, who are also under 24/7 surveillance by the security services. But the ‘Panama Papers’ are an important milestone in creating a situation where, there will be few who would stand to defend him, as, unlike previous years, a lot of influential people have had enough.

As for Russia’s relations with the West, clearly the issue of the alleged link between President Putin and the Panama offshore money will be investigated much more in-depth. There is enough evidence that a link possibly exists, so it is not enough to rely just on independent investigative journalists—it is time for governments to step in if they are serious in their rhetoric about combating corruption and money laundering.

Vladimir Milov Economy EU-Russia Foreign Policy

What have we learned and what are the implications for Putin and for relations between Russia and the West from the ‘Panama Papers’ scandal? Here’s what we know so far.

Substantial evidence of Putin’s involvement  

The owner of two Russia-linked offshore companies with an alleged turnover around $2 billion, cellist Sergey Roldugin, has no record of major involvement in business and nothing in Roldugin’s experience or career suggests that he is worth this much. In a 2014 interview with The New York Times , he said ‘I’m not a businessman, I don’t have millions’, a claim which is supported by the lack of evidence of meaningful business activity on his behalf.

Is there any reason major Russian businesses would pay billions through highly controversial deals to a cellist with no practical business experience and no value as a business partner?

Oh, wait, let’s not forget one important thing: the cellist is the closest personal friend of the Russian President. The money transfer schemes involved are mostly obscene in terms of full lack of commercial sense: unreasonably huge penalties for wittingly breached deals, generous buy-offs of publicly traded shares just days after they were sold to Roldugin’s firms at but a fraction of the future buy-off price, etc. All these deals will be subject to thorough money-laundering investigation because this is what bribes normally look like in the modern world.

What implications for Russia?

Most commentators agree that the publication of the ‘Panama Papers’ will have little public effect on the Russian society. There are a number of reasons for this: Russia’s state media almost completely silenced the revelation about the papers, Russians are used to it and, to a large extent, tolerate large-scale corruption. Some people would buy arguments that ‘it’s the Western plot to discredit Putin’ and that ‘Putin’s personal signature is not in the register = no proof’.

However, among the Russian elites, this publication will undoubtedly have a great psychological effect. Alongside Roldugin, many Russian officials and businessmen have been exposed in the papers as owners of offshore companies. And many of them have already had too much to deal with in previous years – Western sanctions, the international credit blockade, difficulties moving money back and forth across the borders, dealing with Western authorities and financial institutions. They thought that Putin’s system would offer them protection once they’ve been loyal to the Czar—but now it seems that the Czar is mostly busy covering his own deals, and the protection has vanished. On top of this, the additional sanctions and growing difficulty in cross-border business as a result of the Czar’s policies likely make them question if it is worth it supporting Putin and his system any longer?

I do not believe that an ‘elite revolt’ against Putin will occur in Russia any time soon—Putin has effectively managed to suppress the quality of the Russian elites, expel the most outstanding persons from power, and breed only loyal depoliticised technocrats around him, who are also under 24/7 surveillance by the security services. But the ‘Panama Papers’ are an important milestone in creating a situation where, there will be few who would stand to defend him, as, unlike previous years, a lot of influential people have had enough.

As for Russia’s relations with the West, clearly the issue of the alleged link between President Putin and the Panama offshore money will be investigated much more in-depth. There is enough evidence that a link possibly exists, so it is not enough to rely just on independent investigative journalists—it is time for governments to step in if they are serious in their rhetoric about combating corruption and money laundering.

Vladimir Milov Economy EU-Russia Foreign Policy

Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, there is no viable alternative on the horizon to NATO’s security umbrella over an expanded Europe. The idea floated a quarter of a century ago that Europe could scale down its defences and even dismantle the North Atlantic Alliance exposed a flawed fixation on an ‘end of history’ scenario that has never materialised. In practice, the forces of state nationalism and imperialist revisionism in Russia have proved stronger than those of liberalism and international cooperation with the West.

In many respects, a ‘return of history’ scenario has become more evident in and around Europe, with Russia re-emerging as a revanchist power and threatening Europe’s entire eastern flank. In addition, the EU itself faces existential problems, from the financial and institutional to the demographic and political. In a potentially unstable and fracturing continent, NATO is the sole remaining institution that upholds international security. And it may become the sole multinational organisation that can provide Europe with a measure of coherence. Moreover, NATO is the binding glue of the transatlantic link with Washington.

Read the full article in the June 2016 issue of the European View, the Martens Centre policy journal.

Janusz Bugajski Defence EU-Russia Security Transatlantic

Last week at the Munich Security Conference, the Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev once again threatened the West with a “new Cold War” and repeated the old blame-game approach to relations with the West. There’s one problem: a growing call from ordinary Russians to reconcile with the West, and normalize relations.

According to recent polls as conducted by FOM, a polling agency which is traditionally loyal to the Kremlin, 60% and 62% of Russians say that Russian leaders “must aim to improve relations” with the United States and Europe respectively. These numbers match those of an independent polling centre, Levada, which claims that 54% of Russians believe that Russia should “strengthen its ties with the West” (up from 40% a year ago).

This is not to say that the viewpoint of Russian citizens to the West has changed for the better. All pollsters show that more than two-thirds of Russians view the U.S. and the E.U. in a negative light (which is no surprise, given the tireless 24-hour brainwashing by propaganda machines, which claim that Russia is “under attack” by the West and that they “aim to overthrow the legitimate government” and “exploit Russian resources”). However, given all that negativity, it’s also quite clear that this is not backed by some kind of deep-rooted aggression within Russian society. 

Russian people have visibly grown tired over the past several years of confrontation, and are not truly interested in the Kremlin’s foreign policy-related mobilization efforts. For instance, according to Levada, only 18% of Russians follow Russian military campaign in Syria attentively (half a year ago, the maximum number of people interested was only 25%), whereas over 80% show limited interest in the subject. The same thing has happened in relation to events around Ukraine: Levada has shown a recent surge in public indifference to those, with the number of people who do not truly follow these events or not follow them at all reaching almost 70%.

All these developments are hardly surprising, given the severity of the developing economic situation in Russia. I have described the nature of this crisis, hitting the consumer purchasing power of Russians the hardest since 1990s, in more detail in December; since then, retail sales in Russia have fallen further by 15.3% year on year in December and by another 7.3% in January, and real wages – by 10% and 6.1% respectively. Notably, in January 2016 sharp declines continued contrary to the “low base effect” that optimists hoped for (in January 2015, the decline had already commenced, and optimistic outlooks were based on the assumption that the population’s purchasing power will level off compared to last year’s weak numbers).

It’s quite clear that Russians are unhappy with these developments, and demand that the Russian Government devote more effort to domestic economic policies so as to solve these problems and to reconcile with the West.

Given Medvedev’s Munich speech, Russian leaders seem to be totally ignorant of that demand from the Russian society by simply continuing with the old confrontational style. This is worth remembering for any Western politician talking to them further: The Kremlin’s international tough talk is not really backed by solid public support anymore.

Vladimir Milov Crisis Economy EU-Russia

Ukraine is on the brink of financial collapse. It is not able to meet interest payments it is due to make this week. Its GDP fell by 6.8% last year and is liable to fall by an even greater extent this year. Meanwhile, it is having to defend itself against a neighbour which guaranteed its frontiers as recently as 1994.

Instead of stepping forward to help Ukraine financially, the EU and the United States are both leaving the job to the IMF. The IMF is offering Ukraine $40 billion, whereas the EU says it can only manage $2 billion. The European Union has already extended forty times as much credit to Greece as it has given to Ukraine, whose population is four times that of Greece. If this ratio reflects the EU’s real priority, it is unbalanced.

GDP per head in Greece is, after all, about three times that of Ukraine. Like Greece, Ukraine has a lot to do to create a functioning and efficient legal and administrative system, stamp out corruption, and collect taxes fully and fairly. But Ukraine is having to do this while  recovering  from the effects of a Communist system which was imposed on it from outside since 1919, whereas Greece has been the democratic shaper of its own policies for many years.

Greece is, of course, in the EU and the eurozone, while Ukraine is not. However, both are in Europe and both aspire to a democratic European future.

Furthermore, Ukraine had it borders guaranteed in the Budapest declaration of 1994 by EU countries, including Britain and France, and by Russia and the US,  in return for Ukraine giving up nuclear weapons. Despite this, Ukraine was invaded and a portion of its territory annexed by one of its guarantors, Russia, because Ukraine wanted to make a modest cooperation agreement with the EU.

Notwithstanding that, the EU is now being stingy in helping Ukraine in its financial crisis, and is fixated instead on the drama in Athens.

Ukrainians believe they have a European destiny, and are prepared to die for it.

The Russian leadership, on the other hand, believes that Ukraine, with its Russian speaking minority, is in their sphere of influence, and sees a link up of Ukraine with the EU as a form of foreign interference in their backyard. One would have to respond that this view is not in accord with Russia’s guarantee to Ukraine of 1994, nor with international law.

The entire post World War Two European security order rests on the acceptance of international law. Similarly, any prospect of voluntary nuclear disarmament in future must depend on solemn obligations, like the Budapest commitment given to Ukraine in 1994 being seen to be honoured.

In Ukraine’s case, all the EU is expected to do is provide financial help. But if Ukraine falls, the Russian threat may move on to other countries, with Russian speaking minorities, like Latvia and Estonia, which are NATO members  and  to whom most EU countries (not Ireland) have a solemn, Treaty-based obligation to provide military help if their  territory is threatened.

Meanwhile, the Greek government, while looking for new loans and debt write-offs from the EU, is ostentatiously aligning itself to the very country that has invaded Ukraine, Russia. It is looking for more credit from the EU, without implementing reforms that would generate long term growth, which would enable those loans to be repaid.

In contrast, the new Ukrainian government is implementing painful reforms to increase the growth potential of its economy, for example by eliminating inefficient consumption subsidies, which have quadrupled gas prices paid by Ukrainian households. Parts of its reform programme are being delayed in its parliament by opposition figures like Julia Timoshenko, once the darling of the Western media and still part of the EPP family to which Fine Gael and the German CDU belong.

Ukraine’s financial situation is now so critical that President Putin believes that all he has to do is sit and wait, and Ukraine will collapse back into Russian control simply because, in the absence of large western credits, it will run out of money.

If this happens, and if the EU continues to do little or nothing to stop it beyond talk, that will deal a huge blow of confidence in the EU’s ability to defend its values and help its friends.  Other countries on Russia’s perimeter will they too feel that they have to make a deal with Putin rather than rely on the EU.

In Ukraine’s case, European countries do not have a Treaty obligation to give military help. But, in their own interest, they should give generous financial help to ensure that a success in Ukraine does not embolden Russia to undermine countries like Latvia and Estonia, which also have Russian speaking minorities (but where most European countries do have a Treaty based military obligations to help).

When questioned in a recent Pew poll as to whether they would be willing to use force to defend another neighbouring NATO country that found itself in conflict with Russia, 51% of Italians, 53% of French and 58% of Germans answered that they would not.

If that frightful dilemma is to be avoided, it would be wise for Europeans to draw the line in Ukraine now by providing the country with enough financial help to build a properly functioning state that can pay its way and look after itself, as well as be capable on its own to resist intimidation from its big neighbour.

John Bruton Crisis Defence Eastern Europe EU-Russia

This week, Europe gears up for the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Sure enough, Russian propaganda does everything to use the narrative of Russia the liberator – then and now – for their purpose of whipping up patriotic fervour. At the same time, the Central Europeans from the Baltics to Bulgaria have a different view: The Soviet victory of 1945 brought them from one catastrophe to another one. And today, Putin’s Russia is a clear and present danger to their freedom, and their ambitions to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in the Eastern Neighbourhood. So there is a clear alternative to Russia’s narrative about war and about its own place in history.

But there is another war we should think and talk about: Russia’s blatant aggression against Ukraine. The West should not have been as surprised as it was, back in March 2014. The writing had been on the wall since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 – and its ongoing violation of the ceasefire agreement afterwards. The Kremlin is waging war against Russia’s neighbours because it sees successful democracies in the region as a threat to its own power. It needs the narrative of the alleged past humiliation at the hands of the West in order to justify its aggression.  It needs the confrontation with the West in order to distract attention from the failure of the economy. In the words of Ed Lucas, the West’s reaction to this war has been mixed, at best.  It is true, we have managed to maintain unity on sanctions – so far. And yes, NATO has reacted robustly by beefing up its capacities to come to the rescue of Balts and others threatened by Russian aggression. Despite this, the assessments among Europeans of the significance of Russia’s breach of basic norms have not converged. And, no, the danger of an unravelling of EU and NATO solidarity is not over.

This brings us to the war that Russia is now threatening to bring upon the West every day in its media. In March, 2014, Kremlin media mogul Dmitri Kisilyov stated that Russia was ‘the only country in the world really capable of turning the United States into radioactive ash’. Ever since then, the Kremlin has hammered the message home to Russians that war with the West is looming. This is accompanied by the narrative that the ‘decadent’ West will roll over if you only threaten it firmly enough. Look at the ending of the infamous ruski okupant video and you know what we have to react to now.

Si vis pacem, para bellum – if you want peace, prepare for war. This apparent paradox is at the core of what has come to be called military deterrence in modern times, but in reality is a principle of conflict as old as mankind itself. In order to keep your adversary from attacking you, you have to prepare your defences, including counter-attack, precisely because you don’t want to have to use your weapons. So we must re-learn deterrence. We have forgotten about it in the last 25 years, as articulated by Anne Applebaum last year. Some of the members of our political classes have also been traumatised by the ‘peace movement’ of the 1980s which was essentially directed against the principle of possessing nuclear weapons.

However if we want to prevail in this confrontation, further spread democracy and the rule of law eastward, and live in peace, we cannot avoid relearning a couple of simple truths. Most importantly, is the truth concerning deterrence. If it is to be credible, it must be based on three pillars: The capacity to defend yourself, the willingness to do so, and the communication of both to the opponent. At this point in time, the West must  shape up in all three categories. That presupposes, first and foremost, a frank public debate about the military threat we are facing: conventional, hybrid and nuclear. It includes the insight that we can only live in freedom today because the United States has been, and ultimately still is, risking thermonuclear war for us – remember the Cold War? And it also means that we – political parties, leaders, think tanks and NGOs, need to start a frank and rational debate about all of this.

So do mention the war: the one that ended 70 years ago and about which Europe still has to find a narrative that lives up to our values. The one that Russia has started against Ukraine, and to which the West is still struggling to find a consistent, determined and sustainable answer. And the big one between Russia and the West, which will hopefully never happen but which we have to be ready to wage if we want to prevent it.

Roland Freudenstein Defence Democracy EU-Russia Values

The spa city of Carlsbad (Karlovy Vary) in Western Bohemia, counting 50 000 inhabitants. You might be surprised by sign posts written in Cyrillic alphabet and daily flights to several Russian cities. All this is thanks to the large Russian minority that came here in the 90s.

When the European Council was deciding on another round of Russian sanctions at the end of August, three Central European countries – Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – showed reluctance to agree to the measures. For some, this might be surprising, taking into account the Soviet occupation of those countries. However, the communist period is paradoxically one of the reasons why Russians are still so influential in this region thanks to their links which I’ll show with the example of the Czech Republic. Poland is an outlier in this regard with a foreign policy marked by intense wariness in its relationship to Russia. This can probably be ascribed to Poland’s bad historical experiences with Russia during the partitions of Poland and World War II including the Katyn massacre).

DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS

It is well known that much of central Europe is highly dependent on Russia for their energy supplies, there is no need to go into detail. The following figures tell all: Hungary and Slovakia are about 80 % dependent on Russian gas, Czech Republic about 57 %. However, although statistics suggest that the Czech Republic is less dependent than Hungary and Slovakia and it has an advantage in the possibility of gas reverse flow from Germany, there is a more interesting and less known fact: the Czech Republic is the first EU country where the major Russian energy company Gazprom started directly selling gas through a company called Vemex headed by Russian businessman Vladimir Ermakov nicknamed ‘Czech Mr Gazprom’. Vemex controls 20 % of the Czech gas market and has already expanded to Slovakia. Over 50 % of its shares belong to Gazprom Germania, a subsidiary of Gazprom and another 33 % of shares belong to Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG which is believed to be a Gazprom front company.

Apart from gas Russian influence is also apparent in the Czech nuclear sector. Both Czech nuclear plants Temelín and Dukovany were built by Soviet construction plans (Temelín has a Westinghouse control system from the 90s though). When, in the past few years, the biggest Czech energy company, the state-owned ČEZ opened a debate about building another two blocks in Temelín, a Czech-Russian consortium MIR.1200 was the leading construction candidate in the competition against French Areva and American Westinghouse. The consortium consists of Russian companies Gidropress and Atomstrojexport and a Czech company Škoda JS/Škoda Steel. However, this Czech company is actually also in Russian hands – it was bought by a Russian company OMZ aka United Heavy Machinery. And who owns OMZ? Gazprom again…

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE THROUGH BUSINESS

There are also other Russian key players in the Czech energy sector – Russian oil company Lukoil Aviation Czech gave a major donation to the political campaign of the current Czech president Miloš Zeman. Lukoil Head of Office Martin Nejedlý is now working as a Presidential advisor. Also Zeman’s former collaborator Miroslav Šlouf worked as a lobbyist for Lukoil. Is it then so surprising that the Czech president seems quite fond of Russia?

He showed his kindness to Moscow at a conference called Dialog of civilizations that was organized this September on the Greek island Rhodos by Russian oligarch Vladimir Jakunin, head of the state-owned Russian railways and a close associate of Putin who features on the US black list. At this conference Zeman compared the Ukrainian conflict to ‘something like a flu‘ and pleaded against the sanctions.

Gazprom and Lukoil are big names but there are also many smaller Russian companies. Russians own over 17 000 companies in the Czech republic which puts them on the top of foreign investors in terms of the number of companies (in terms of capital the Germans and Dutch are bigger investors). The problem of Russian companies is that they are sometimes used to peddle Russian influence in local administration and for espionage, as stated by the Czech secret service (BIS) report. The 2013 report moreover warns that those spies are supported  by official Russian diplomatic services and also warns against infiltration of Czech media by pro-Russian journalists.

Russian companies are often non-transparent and some of them fail to conform to legal standards (for instance they often do not file yearly balance lists). One example of such a‘sleeping company‘  was company Albion CZ that belonged to Alexander Babakov, member of the Russian Duma and one of Putin’s men who figures on the EU black list. He recently liquidated this company, however, there are other companies that haven’t been dissolved yet (that do not fulfill their legal obligations.These companies should be automatically dissolved by Czech courts.

CULTURAL TIES…

Russians still profit from their ties established during the Communist regime. Many former Czech communist apparatchiks secured themselves influential posts in various companies and institutions thanks to their contacts and language abilities that ordinary people who could not travel easily during the communist era often lacked. There was (and still is) a lustration law that limited the access of high communist functionaries and communist secret service collaborators to certain high positions in the state administration, state businesses, academic and judiciary positions. But this did not apply to all positions and there was often a problem with a lack of evidence of collaboration, because some documents were discarded right after the Velvet Revolution.

Václav Petříček, the head of the Chamber of Commerce of the the Commonwealth of Independent States (essentially the former Soviet Union), worked in the State planning commission before 1989. In the 90s he worked at the Ministry of Industry and now he is a strong opponent of sanctioning Russia, fear mongering that if we apply sanctions it will ruin our trust and connections with Russia. However Czech exports to Russia don’t even reach 4 % of Czech exports in comparison to 31% of exports to Germany alone. Russian companies and their Czech supporters stress our cultural ties and the magnamity of Czechs towards Russians. When the discussion about Temelin’s extension began MIR.1200 claimed that they will employ Czech employees and Czech managers unlike the ‘Westerners‘ who will bring their own people.

…AND LIES

There is also a substantial Russian communication influence. Russian media try to use the fact that some Czechs tend to be suspicious of the European Union, the United States and the West in general, sometimes even resorting to conspiracy theories. Those conspiracy theories are then brought to the Czech Republic by various ‘outsider media‘ and blogs of former politicians like the former president Václav Klaus‘ advisor Petr Hájek (who writes a blog called Countercurrent) or the former senator, MP and judge Jiří Vyvadil whose blog states a motto: ‘And what if everything is otherwise/different?‘

In Slovakia, where religion is more important, the Russian propaganda often targets conservative religious people who point out the ‘decline of values Western values‘ (usually directed at gender or feminist issues). Russia is sometimes seen as the protector of ’these conservative values where a man behaves like a ‘real man‘ and a women’s role is to be a good wife and mother. However,  those admirers of Russian conservative values often tend to overlook facts like that the abortion rate in Russia is multiple times higher than in western European countries. 

Vladka Vojtiskova EU Member States EU-Russia

This week’s developments regarding the allegations of fraud and money laundering against Lukoil’s operations in Romania are an excellent case-study of EU politicians’ positions towards Russia. It highlights the difference between the EPP-affiliated, pro-European President Traian Basescu, and the Socialist, pro-Russian Prime Minister, Victor Ponta. We now see who walks the walk and who just talks the talk. It also shows a powerful Russian company trying to threaten and blackmail an EU member state; it just happens that in this case, the company’s position is very weak.

On 6 October 2014 Romanian prosecutors seized assets of a Lukoil refinery in Romania for allegations of fraud and money laundering amounting to 230 mil EUR. The Russian oil giant reacted by threatening to close down its operations in Romania and lay off 3500 people. Centre-left Prime Minister Ponta reacted by threatening prosecutors for jeopardizing the Romanian economy.

Centre-right President Traian Basescu explained in clear words that the Russian company has to respect Romanian laws and EU standards, if it wants to operate in Romania. He said that “Putin-style laws” do not apply in Romania; the Russian company should leave for Moscow, if it wants to operate according to “Putin-style laws”. “Leave the country, if you are not ready to obey Romanian law”, he said.

The behaviour of the Russian company and the positioning of the two Romanian leaders is highly relevant for EU’s attitude towards Russia: Traian Basescu, a second term president not seeking re-election in November’s presidential election, is known for his pro-European course and tough stance on Russia.  Centre-left Prime Minister Ponta, affiliated with the European Socialists, is running in November’s Presidential elections seeking to become the country’s first Socialist President in a decade. Mr Ponta’s priority is to keep social peace ahead of the presidential elections. Any social unrest triggered by eventual lay-offs would jeopardize his campaign. Mr Ponta is ready to jeopardise the independence of the judiciary in order to keep social peace and to satisfy the interests of a Russian company suspected of having broken Romanian laws.

Lukoil painted a dark picture for its employees and for the Romanian consumers, in case it will have to close down its operations: closing down the refinery would lead to 3500 redundancies. This number is exaggerated, given that Lukoil employs only a total of 1100 people in the foreseen subsidiaries. This did not keep Prime Minister Ponta from adoptingtheir exaggerated number. Not being able to process its crude oil in the Romanian refinery would lead to fuel price increases at Lukoil’s gas stations, Lukoil claims.

Coincidence or not, on Thursday, Gazprom reduced by 15% the gas deliveries to Romania – this being just one of many similar measures taken lately. We are all familiar with Russian price blackmails, but in this case it will not work: Lukoil has a market share of just 20% on the fuel markets in Romania; this is far from a monopoly. If prices at Lukoil’s gas stations increase, every single consumer would just buy his or her fuel at any other European station across the street: An opportunity for every citizen to turn to European companies and to judge politicians on their behaviour in real crisis situations.

Siegfried Mureşan Business Eastern Europe Energy EU Member States EU-Russia

The abduction of Estonian Secret Service Official Eston Kohver was an extraordinary event, even by the standards of the Cold War. It was yet another episode in the series of moves which Russia has been making recently to put pressure on NATO. Russian nuclear bombers have made incursions into US and Canadian air defence identification zones, Russia has seized the Lithuanian flagship vessel in international waters and Russian aircrafts have been violating NATO airspace with an increased frequency.

This is why Kohver is neither an Estonian-Russian problem, nor an isolated incident in a security operation gone off track. It is part of Russia’s attempt to undermine the system of Euro-Atlantic security.

Russia is pushing NATO to its extremes, testing its unity. In a run-up to the latest NATO Summit, a number of NATO members worried that Moscow would view NATO’s resolve to strengthen security and defence capabilities on its Eastern frontiers as a provocation. The Russians now are making it clear that they do. If the Kremlin has its way, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will enjoy NATO’s collective defence guarantees only formally, without having the needed military capabilities. If there are attempts to change this, there will be costs. The abduction of Kohver, for instance.

By attacking NATO on its own territory, Russia is also trying to put a final bullet into NATO’s enlargement agenda. Attacks on NATO’s security will divert attention to the challenges within the current borders. As NATO is regrouping to defend its existing members, any talk about extending security guarantees to Georgia, with 20% of its territory under Russian occupation, or to Ukraine, with an open economic, political and military confrontation with Moscow, becomes obsolete.

Vladimir Putin aspires for a resurrected Empire as his legacy. Getting back Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, is not an option. Even Putin must understand that. By launching an offensive on NATO members, however, Moscow is pushing the line of defence further away from Ukraine, away from Georgia. Moscow empowers those who oppose enlargement and assert that accepting the Baltic countries to NATO was a mistake. It is part of Russia’s well-orchestrated plan to impose on the West a new ‘Munich’ agreement. This would imply abandoning any plans to bring democracy to Georgia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, thus forcing them to become the vassals of Moscow, once again.

Therefore, Kohver is a prisoner of war, a war which Putin has declared on the West. The fact that we have not found a name for this war yet, does not make his abduction in a foggy Baltic forest any less sinister. 

Salome Samadashvili Baltic Defence Eastern Europe EU-Russia Security

As Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine finalise association and free trade (DCFTA) agreements with Europe today (27 June), these Eastern Partners, together with the EU, are proving that while geography is destiny, history does not have to be so.

The EU’s Eastern Partnership policy is the bridge which connects Europe to countries which were left out of the cycle of peaceful development brought to post-WWII by the European project.

Even as the voice of increased scepticism towards the EU rang loud and clear in the latest European elections, the citizens of these advanced Eastern partners still believe the European project offers them the best way forward.

They have proven ready to pay a heavy price for their European choice, in the knowledge that no sacrifice is too great for the sake of freedom.

The EU and its three Eastern Partners have come to this point against all odds. Russia failed to force these countries, considered to belong to its “privileged sphere of influence,” to give up on Europe in favour of joining the Eurasian Economic Union.

Neither political and economic pressure, nor direct military intervention, have managed to compete with Europe’s soft power.

While the agreements signed today will not automatically force open the doors to European accession, they are paving a way towards it. The road ahead, however, is a difficult one.

The immediate challenges will be to implement the agreements and to withstand continued Russian pressure.

The Kremlin is unlikely to bury the hatchet. The warnings from Russia have been crystal clear all along, most recently with Russiaan foreign minister Sergei Lavrov declaring that his country will take the necessary “countermeasures” in response to the EU accords.

If history is any point of reference, the Russian response might defy both the letter and the spirit of international law.

Additional Russian economic pressure can still have an impact on the economies of all three Eastern partners. Our voters have high expectations for the benefits of the agreements, but the positive socio-economic impact of the DCFTAs will not come immediately.

Knowing full well the value of predictability and stability for the international investors which these DCFTAs ought to attract to the signatory countries, Russia is unlikely to abandon its chosen policy of exporting instability.

As European integration will not deliver immediate prosperity, the Kremlin’s likely tactic is to foster growing disappointment of the public in its European choice.

The role of the Church

By offering to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine the way forward towards a more democratic, secure and prosperous future, the EU still has a much stronger hold on the hearts and minds of their citizens than Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

But the future support of our voters cannot be taken for granted. Further success of the Eastern Partnership will depend on securing continued support for democracy, as well as for the European choice of the public in these countries.

In the short term, helping Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to cope with the implementation of the DCFTAs the and speedy introduction of visa-free travel for Georgia and Ukraine will be instrumental.

As the prospect of Nato membership looks less and less likely for any of the Eastern partners, enhancing the framework of co-operation between them and the EU in terms of security will be another important challenge.

A broad engagement with the citizens, supporting democracy and building solid constituencies for Europe, reaching out to the most influential opinion-makers in these countries, will also be key to success.

In some cases, the potential opinion-makers might be outside of the regular realm of civil society and include influential religious organisations or figures. Religion has started playing an increasingly important role in Russia’s current confrontation with the West. The authority wielded by the religious establishment in some Eastern partners is a sign of weak civil society and needs to be addressed in a medium and long term prospective.

In the immediate future, the Church will continue playing an important role in determining the public attitudes in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The EU needs to find ways to engage with the relevant players to counter Russian influence.

The successful transformation of the three advanced Eastern Partners can be managed only through a European policy which has clearly defined objectives.

Next year, the Riga Eastern Partnership Summit should offer concrete deliverables for each of these countries, aiming at enhanced contractual relations with the EU. Most importantly, it should deliver a membership prospective in the long term and the chance to join a Common Economic Area in the immediate future.

Today marks yet another important achievement of the EU’s transformative power, but Europe needs to be ready for the challenges ahead.

Injecting a new momentum into the Eastern Partnership Initiative, building on today’s success, will rectify the historical injustice which deprived the people of the Eastern Partnership countries of the chance to develop as democratic and prosperous societies for almost a century.

But it will also send an important message to the increasingly sceptical European voters about the magnetic pull of the European project for those, who, so far, have been left out of it.

[Originally published as a guest editorial in EUobserver: http://euobserver.com/opinion/124781 ]

Salome Samadashvili Democracy Eastern Europe Enlargement EU-Russia Foreign Policy

Russia’s tactics in annexing Crimea and destabilising Ukraine have torn up the assumptions, on which the relationship between the West and Russia had been based since the end of the Second World War.

Forcible annexations of neighbouring territory, a reality in the 1930’s, are now a reality again, thanks to what has happened in Crimea.

Power politics, and spheres of influence of great power, have replaced international law and respect for sovereignty, as the motive forces of European security.

As recently as 1994, EU countries, including Britain and France, reached an international agreement with Russia guaranteeing Ukraine’s frontiers, in return for the non trivial matter of Ukraine abandoning its nuclear weapons, and thereby weakening its deterrent security capacity in an important way. With the annexation of Crimea, that agreement has now been put in the bin.

Already, the EU is visibly divided on how to respond, even though international law on this matter is clear.

On the 1 August 1975, the then Irish Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave was one of the signatories of the Helsinki Final act governing relations between European states. He signed along the United States, all other European countries (except Albania), and the USSR, which at the time encompassed both Russia and Ukraine.

Article one of the Helsinki Final Act said that the signatory states would “respect each other’s sovereign equality, juridical equality and territorial integrity”, and that they would refrain from the “use of force or the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”.

As a small militarily neutral European state, Ireland has a greater interest, even than has a state which enjoys the comfort of a military alliance, in ensuring that these clear interstate principles are respected.

As Taoiseach, I happened to have been invited to address the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the very day the Assembly was voting to admit the Russian Federation to membership of the Council. I spoke in favour of Russian accession. Russia became a member on 28 February 1996. The Council of Europe is the source of a dense and comprehensive network of treaties on many topics, including human rights. The Council of Europe, and its Treaties, only have meaning to the extent that its members are willing to abide by international law.

The European Union also rests on the foundation of respect for international law. The EU only EXISTS because there is an assumption that international Treaties will be respected in ALL circumstances. The EU has no force to govern its own members beyond the force of international law in the form of EU Treaties. The European Court of Justice interprets these Treaties and its rulings are accepted by all EU states.

Dividing the EU has been a long standing Russian goal, and President Putin’s aggressive tactics appear to be succeeding in the goal of dividing the EU, in a way that previous Russian efforts have failed. At one end of the spectrum, countries like Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy and Hungary are relatively accommodative towards what Russia is doing, while others, like Lithuania, Poland, Estonia and Latvia are alarmed and looking for resolute action. The bigger EU states are, painfully and unsuccessfully, trying to balance commercial interests against professed principles

The talks in Geneva yesterday have had two important tactical outcomes, the fact that Russia appeared to do business with the new Ukrainian authorities at all, and that it agreed to a request to all armed groups to desist from forcibly occupying official buildings. This will presumably apply equally to the Maidan protesters in Kiev as to the pro Russian protesters in eastern Ukraine. But as Russia does not accept any responsibility for the pro Russian protesters inside Ukraine, Russia will be able to wash its hands of responsibility if the occupations continue.

The key test will be whether the Presidential elections take place peaceably and fairly in May, and whether outside election observers are allowed to do their work.

Putin has shown that he is capable of moving fast, and of changing direction unexpectedly to suit the needs of the moment, while Europe is still laboriously scratching its head.

As 28 nations, the EU will never be able to move with the dexterity of an autocracy like Russia, but if it is not to have its policies dictated in the Kremlin, as a result Russian pressure on energy supplies, it needs to make a radical change in its own energy policies. It needs to build a proper energy union in Europe, independent of Russia, with complete inter connection of its energy distribution grids. That will require a lot of investment, and the diversion of funds from current consumption. But a long term decision like this would create a new momentum with which Russia could not ignore.

John Bruton EU-Russia Foreign Policy Security

Adolf Hitler’s 1938 threats to, and eventual occupation of, Czechoslovakia bore some similarities to what is now happening between President Putin and Ukraine.

In 1938,Hitler exaggerated, and stirred up, grievances over language rights in the German speaking part of Czechoslovakia. He directed the local German speaking leaders inside Czechoslovakia to ensure that they did not reach any settlement with the Czech Government. He used the lack of an internal settlement as a basis for seeking to incorporate these areas in Germany, under the pretext of protecting the rights of the German speakers.

Western leaders tried to mediate and negotiate without success, culminating in the showdown at Munich, where Chamberlain abandoned Czechoslovakia in return for piece of paper signed by Hitler and himself in which both agreed on “the desire of our two peoples never to go to war again.”

Eventually, when Hitler broke his word and occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, trust broke down completely.

Hitler tried the same game with Poland in August 1939, possibly thinking he would get away with it again and the British and French would again huff and puff but do nothing. If that was his calculation, he was mistaken.

The crisis over the Sudetenland in 1938 played out more slowly than the one over Crimea. Putin has acted with much greater speed. In the former case, there was even time for a British Commission of Enquiry, the Runciman Commission, to spend a few weeks studying the situation on the ground in the Sudetenland and reporting back to London.

There is another important difference between the situation of Ukraine and that of Czechoslovakia. France had a Treaty of Mutual (military) Assistance with Czechoslovakia, which had been signed in 1925, guaranteeing Czech borders. Britain had no such Treaty but was drawn in because of its strategic commitment to France. That is why the Czechs feel, to this day, a particular grievance about France’s lack of action in 1938.

In contrast, Ukraine does not have a military alliance with any western country. It is not a member of NATO, and has no Treaty based military guarantees of its borders.

But, since 1994, Ukraine does have a general guarantee of its borders from Russia, the US, and Britain, given in return for giving up its nuclear weapons arsenal. According to this so called Budapest memorandum, Russia, the U.S., and the UK confirmed, in recognition of Ukraine becoming a member of the nuclear non proliferation Treaty and in effect abandoning its nuclear arsenal to Russia, that they would,

+ respect Ukrainian independence and sovereignty within its existing borders,
+ refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine, and
+ refrain from using economic pressure on Ukraine in order to influence its politics.

This is hugely important, and creates a major moral obligation because one of the goals of global policy is to get countries with military nuclear capacity to give it up in return for guarantees. If such guarantees can be unilaterally abandoned without consequence, this strategy for opposing nuclear proliferation breaks down.

President Putin may feel that Russia should not have agreed to that memorandum in 1994. But it did. Hitler certainly felt the then German Government should not have signed the Versailles Treaty. But it did. Indeed, German negotiators had much less choice, in signing the Versailles Treaty in 1919, than Russian negotiators had in 1994 in signing the Budapest Memorandum. There was no duress in 1994.

What is happening to Ukraine, and in a different way what happened to Libya, will make it more difficult to get nuclear armed regimes to give up weapons in return for guarantees, however solemn. This is not just a matter of international law. It is one of practical politics and global security, for everybody including militarily neutral countries, like Ireland.

Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia, which also have Russian speaking minorities, are members of NATO and do have military alliance guarantees.

It will be the existential test for NATO, if Russia makes or carries out threats on Latvia or Estonia, similar to the ones it has carried out on Ukraine.

John Bruton Democracy Eastern Europe EU-Russia

Not far south of Brussels is the village of Waterloo. In the museum of the battle there is one painting that should touch the heart of even the most cynical Eurosceptic. It depicts the French cavalry attacking one of the diamond-shaped British infantry positions. The field in front of the diamond is so thickly covered with bodies that the horses are unwilling to charge, refusing to step on the corpses.

The historic achievement of the European Union is that it brought lasting peace, prosperity, democracy and respect of human rights to a continent whose nations waged wars with each other for centuries. Only in the last two centuries blood was shed in the Napoleonic wars, Franco-German wars, Balkan wars, and Crimean war, not to mention the massacres of the First and Second World Wars. Since 1945 most Europeans have been enjoying the longest period of peace in its history.

In a sense the European Union put an end to a thousand year old problem on how to divide the Lotharingia part of the Charlemagne legacy for which France and Germany have been fighting ever after. It made partners out of former competitors for colonial power and brought former parts of empires as independent states under the same roof again.

But not all of Europe enjoyed the peace and not all the European nations are enjoying the end of history. The peace in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia, looks fragile, but with a clear European perspective for all major players in the region, the situation appears defused.

On the other hand, even today the citizens of Ukraine are struggling to obtain what is taken for granted by the rest of Europe. It looks like one of those “us” vs. “them” conflicts where the players on the geopolitical chessboard are moving pieces to win positions. The people of Ukraine are just pawns in this match. The people of Belarus or Moldova could find themselves in a similar predicament. It is exactly the board that has been replaced – for western and central European countries – by negotiation tables around the Schuman roundabout in Brussels.

Russia has been an increasingly important player in European affairs over the last 500 years. It decidedly chose to become European with Peter the Great in the early 18th century. The Russian empire took European center stage during the Napoleonic wars and became one of the three key elements of the Holy Alliance that the Russian, Prussian and Austrian empires set up to maintain “justice, love and peace” after the defeat of Napoleon. Wars for the lands between Russia and Germany or Turkey resembled the wars for the lands between Germany and France. The latter conflict was made obsolete with the creation of the European Union.

In 2008 the European Council set up a Reflection Group to think about the future of Europe. One of the questions it was expected to answer was about where the borders of European Union should lie. The group, led by the former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, concluded that “the EU must stay open to potential new members from Europe, assessing every candidacy on its own merits and compliance with the membership criteria.” Compliance with membership criteria, it claimed, were “in fact the true limits of Europe.”

The recent events in Ukraine are a reminder that the European project is not finished. Historical experience in the European West and parallels to the European East challenge the introverted Europeans to think the unthinkable.

Russia should be encouraged to comply with EU membership criteria, with the principles of democracy, market economy and human rights on which the European Union is built. Since Peter the Great, Russia has had European ambitions. The European Union should make it clear that these ambitions are realistic and that potentially the true limits of the European Union could be on the Russian Pacific coast. Not tomorrow. Another former superpower, Great Britain, became EU member half a century after it lost its superpower status.

Europe must immediately do whatever it takes to stop the violence in Ukraine. On the longer term, however, the issue is not whether Ukraine should be in the Russian or European sphere of influence. The issue are the European perspectives of Russia, and all the countries at its western borders.

[Originally published in www.neurope.eu]

Žiga Turk Eastern Europe EU-Russia

With world attention fixed on Ukraine, the referendum on Sunday (2 February) in Gagauzia, a part of Moldova which few people have heard of, did not get much attention.

The Gagauz – some 150,000 people, who are Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians – voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining Russia’s Customs Union instead of EU integration.

EU neighbourhood commissioner Stefan Fuele had recently visited the region. He spoke of the potential benefits of closer EU-Moldova ties, highlighting prospects for EU visa-free travel. His intervention did nothing to change the outcome, however. As Gagauz envoys explained on a visit to Brussels last week, they want easier access to the Russian labour market instead.

Sunday’s referendum also had a question about Gagauzia’s right to declare independence from Moldova. Again, an overwhelming majority wanted the right to secede. The referendum has no legal consequences because Moldovan courts have ruled it illegal. But it does have the potential to revive recent protests against Moldova’s plan to sign an EU association and free trade treaty. More dangerously, it has the potential to enflame separatist tendencies.

Moldova already has one breakaway region, which has become a de facto state and a source of long-term instability: Transniestria. The business interests of the Transniestrian elite are becoming increasingly tied to the EU, however. The region has no border with Russia, and it is does not depend on Russian markets or subsidies to the same extent as other breakaway entities in the former Soviet territories.

If Moldova-Transniestria relations mend, the Gagauzia referendum is an alternative source of instability. Some pro-Russian politicians in Chisianu are already calling for similar votes in other parts of Moldova.

As a former Georgian ambassador, I can tell you that these processes can, in the worst case scenario, spiral into armed confrontation. This is what happened in Georgia in the 1990s. Our civil wars began with autonomous regions deciding, via referendums, to stay in the USSR.

The Gagauz development clearly serves Russian interests. There are rumours the referendum was funded by Russian oligarchs of Gagauz origin. Some low-level Russian MPs frequented the region recently and Russian media have increased pro-Customs-Union content in Moldova. But there is no hard evidence of a Russian destabilisation campaign.

Whether or not the Gagauz vote was a spontaneous event, the EU needs to maintain a watchful eye. It should step up its public diplomacy in Moldova, with high-visibility economic projects that benefit local people and more high-level visits, including to local municipalities. It should speed up preparations to sign the association and free trade pact. It should also start a dialogue with Russia to avert the kind of crisis which unfolded in Ukraine.

Russia, which knows the nooks and crannies of its former empire better than EU diplomats do, also knows how to make pro-EU reforms falter. It would be great if the Kremlin understood that the spread of stability, democracy, rule of law, and the prosperity they bring, are in Russia’s own interests. But it seems we are still a long way from reaching this point.

[Originally published by EUobserver on 04.02.2014: http://euobserver.com/opinion/123000]

Salome Samadashvili Democracy Eastern Europe Enlargement EU-Russia

The battlefield for defending European values has shifted to the East, to the streets of Kiev, Tbilisi and other Eastern neighbours. While these regions are willing to take full responsibility for this push for freedom, this is not only their battle and the European Union should signal this loudly and clearly in its dialogue with Russia, writes Salome Samadashvili.

As the events in Kiev have taken on a truly dramatic, violent and bloody turn, Brussels is preparing for yet another EU-Russia summit. Russia’s Ambassador to the EU has declared that this summit will not be about Ukraine. His boss, Foreign Minister Lavrov, using the terms of ‘strategic rivalry’, reminiscent of the days of the Cold War, has asserted that Russia will not allow foreign powers to break-up Ukraine. Meanwhile the EU continues to talk about ’strategic partnership’ with Russia and has not, publicly at least, pointed a finger at Moscow as the party responsible for turning Ukraine into a virtual war-zone.

The Cold War has ended without a peace treaty which would settle the terms of the outcome of this decades long standoff between the West and Russia. It was assumed that the constituent parts of the former USSR, Russia included, as well as its former satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe would venture on to become full democracies. The ‘end of history’ would bring stability and peace to the European continent. While in a long term this assumption might still be true, believing that the strategic rivalry between Russia and the West has already become a distant history, will be of the most tragic consequences for us, people living in the former Soviet republics. It can will also certainly be damaging to the long term interests of Europe.

Let’s have no doubts – what we witness in Ukraine today is the Kremlin’s attempt to impose on the world its own terms of the end of the Cold War. The settlement is written not in ink, but blood, shed in the streets of Ukraine today and my own country, Georgia, five years earlier. So at the highest political forum of the EU-Russia cooperation, it would be both timely and necessary to ask, what does “strategic partnership” with the current Kremlin administration mean? If it means a shared vision for the future and cooperation around common objectives, than the EU-Russia summit indeed cannot be only about Ukraine, it has to be about even bigger questions, which should define the EU’s policy towards Russia in the years to come.

It would be helpful if Russia got a clear signal that it cannot aspire to remain a “strategic partner” of Europe, or be part of the club of nations consisting of the wealthy democracies, for example G8 or OECD, as long as in addition to disregard for democracy in its own country, the Kremlin continues to support instability and non-democratic regimes in its neighborhood. Russia needs to know that its vital interests – such as cooperation in the field of energy, will suffer due to its choice to undermine democratic transformation and modernization of the nations in its former Empire. Freedom to travel to Europe, both for the citizens of the Russian Federation and for the elites with diplomatic passports, is another point of influence at the EU’s hands. The EU can signal its readiness to use measures such as the Magnitski Act to make clear that it does not view the current Russian government as a partner with whom it can do business as usual.

While the options, which the EU has at its disposal are not numerous, the leverage which Europe has over Moscow is much stronger, than the EU has so far been willing to acknowledge. Russia cannot continue its economic development without access to the EU markets, technological know-how or investment. Europe can make it clear that these cannot be taken for granted. Using its leverage on Russia now rather than later is in Europe’s own strategic interests. While the economic interests of the European countries in cooperation with Russia are self-evident, in a long-term perspective, an increasingly assertive, non-democratic and aggressive Russia will also hurt the EU’s economic and business ventures in the region.

“No new Munich” has been the modus operandi of the past 20 years – the West has assured the newly independent states of the former USSR, over and over again, that there would be no more agreements on spheres of influence at the expanse of the small, formerly captive nations. The fact that this continues to be true, I hope, will also be made clear at the Summit. In the coming months this should also be proven not only through words, but by demonstrating a clear commitment of the EU for greater reengagement with our countries, focused on broad support for democratization and economic growth.

Yes, we live in an increasingly complex world and the EU needs the Russian cooperation on many fronts, not least on the Middle East and Iran. But the challenges posed by the recent economic crises notwithstanding, we also live in an increasingly prosperous world, secured by advancement of democracy and freedom. We see what EU integration has brought to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and we aspire to the same for our nations. Freedom, security, prosperity and the right to make independent choices about the future: That is what we hope for. The fact that the current Russian regime, which denies those same rights to its own people, sees this as a threat to its security, does not make our choice any less wise or legitimate. Undermining these freedoms is not a “legitimate” interest of the Russian Federation with respect to its neighbors. Which I hope will also be made clear at this Summit.

In competition of different visions for the best value system for the advancement of humanity, the battlefield for defending European values has shifted to the East, to the streets of Kiev, Tbilisi and other Eastern neighbors. While we are willing to take full responsibility in this strife for freedom, this is not only our battle. I hope the European Union will signal this loudly and clearly in its dialogue with Russia.

[Editorial published by EurActiv on 28 January 2014]

Salome Samadashvili Democracy Eastern Europe EU-Russia Values

A decade has passed since the colour revolutions ushered in a new wave of democratisation into some countries of the former USSR.

Later this week the capital of another former Soviet republic, Lithuania, an inspirational model for the other Newly Independent States emerging from the ruins of the “evil empire,” will host what was hoped to be a historical summit of the Eastern Partnership Initiative. The Initiative encompasses six former Soviet republics with the overarching goal of strengthening the political and economic ties between them and the EU. An ambitious action-plan, or “Roadmap to Vilnius,” envisioned cementing the European future of the most advanced eastern partners at this milestone event.

Sadly the outcome of Vilnius summit will be falling short of these high expectations. Following the decision of Armenia to abandon the path towards the European integration and consider joining the Russian led Eurasian Customs Union, another partner, Ukraine has also refused to sign the association and free trade agreements in Vilnius, leading to mass public protests and deepened political confrontation in the country, the outcome of which is yet to be seen.

Georgia and Moldova are now set to be the “stars” of the Vilnius summit, initialing association and free trade agreements with the EU. This will be an important step forward for both countries. However, the game is far from over.

The declining economic performance of Georgia under its new government, as well as the concerns about selective justice it applies against political opponents, rampant corruption and the volatile domestic political scene in Moldova, alongside the ongoing security challenges posed by unresolved conflicts, all create a fertile ground for impeding the progress of the two champions of the Eastern Partnership in the nearest future.

Four years since the inception of the Eastern Partnership initiative it is both timely as well as necessary to ask, why has this EU policy managed to deliver more in some partner countries than in the others?

Looking at the political, economic and security factors, it is clear that the level of democratic development, the degree of economic dependency on Russia and the nature of the security concerns facing individual partners, all have played their pivotal role in determining respective successes and failures achieved by the Eastern Partnership Initiative vis-a-vis them.

As witnessed most recently in my own country, Georgia, free and fair elections which resulted in the first democratic transfer of power, were largely made possible due to the commitment of the governing elites to the European future of the country. The elections, so far, have not altered the fiercely pro-Western foreign policy orientation molded by the government led by former president Mikhail Saakashvili. As long as democracy and the commitment of the Georgian voters to the European choice survive, it seems that the country will remain safely on the EU path.

A messy, but still democratic process in Moldova, for reasons similar to the ones in Georgia, has also managed to take the country forward towards Europe.

The entrenched political interests of the governing elites in Belarus, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, however, despite the respective differences in the quality of the democratic development of these countries, have been the decisive factor for failure of the Eastern Partnership Initiative to achieve the desired progress there.

As the examples of Armenia and Ukraine also clearly show, strong economic ties with Russia pose a serious threat to the European choice of both the governing elites and the voters amongst the Eastern partners, as do the concerns with respect to the potential security threats and dependency on Russian military assistance.

In this light, what does the future of the Eastern Partnership look like following Vilnius?

The Russian pressure on these countries is likely to increase – as of spring of next year, Russia’s current vanity project, the Sochi Olympics – will be a thing of the past. It is therefore probable that the second, strategically even more important and ambitious project – the Eurasian Union – will be given full attention by the Russian leadership. While the viability of this project still remains uncertain, its potential for undermining the EU’s interests in the region, in light of the recent developments, can no longer be ignored. In the months and years to come, Russian policy towards the countries in its shared neighborhood with the EU will be multifaceted.

Russia will try to agree on deals behind the closed doors with the leadership of those countries where lack of democracy makes it possible to ignore the voters. In the countries where a still nascent but functioning democratic process makes it difficult to discount public opinion, such as Georgia for example, Russia will continue wielding economic and soft power tools to thwart support of voters away from the European future. Russia will also likely deepen security concerns where it can by supporting instability.

What will be the response of the European Union to this increasingly assertive role of Russia? Will it stand up for its strategic interests in the region or will it retreat? Clearly, if the EU is serious about its commitment to the region, after Vilnius it will need to devote substantial intellectual and financial resources to rethinking the policies directed at supporting democracy, economic development and security of its Eastern neighbors.

Five years ago, the disastrous war between my country and Russia served as an impetus for some serious policy thinking in Brussels and other European capitals on the way to stabilise the EU’s eastern neighborhood. This has resulted in the creation of the Eastern Partnership initiative, which despite its limitations, was an important step forward in securing the democratic and European future of our countries.

Let the recent setbacks serve in a similar role, as catalysts for renewing the commitment of the EU to its eastern neighbors.

The strategic interests of the European Union in creating a stable and prosperous neighborhood around its borders, access to the human and natural resources of the Eastern partners and the benefits from the common economic space with them, all are self-evident.

However, strategic interests aside, the people who braved to confront the authorities in the streets of Tbilisi and Kiev some 10 years ago demanding their freedom, who, despite all the disappointments of the decade following the colour revolutions, have not lost their faith in democracy and are willing to go back to the Maidan to defend their European choice, count on the European Union.

Europe must not disappoint us.

[Originally published on euobserver.com: http://ces.tc/1iZpsPD]

Salome Samadashvili Defence Democracy EU-Russia Foreign Policy

It has been five years since the banking crisis erupted in the United States. If, instead of boasting of having the most robust financial system in the world, the Spanish Government had immediately begun the process of restructuring its financial system, Spain would not have needed European aid to complete this arduous task. However, we should not cry over spilt milk. The important thing right now is to ensure that this type of crisis will never be repeated.

One year ago the Spanish savings banks finally acknowledged that they had serious problems after making excessive loans to the construction sector. Months later, problems with the saving banks turned into a government crisis: after injecting money into the financial system in order to save the banks, they continued to experience problems with financing because of the lack of trust of investors. This problem in countries like Spain and Ireland spread to the rest of the European Union. What started as a banking crisis ended up being a threat to the euro. It created a vicious circle between the banks, the trust in the Member States and the euro.

If we have learned anything from this crisis is that the architecture of the euro was flawed, since we created a monetary union with different economic policies and banking regulations. The result was that the citizens ended up paying for the banking disaster. Now we have the opportunity to change the structures supporting the euro which we were not able to be put in place at the time of its introduction..We are entirely committed to this task.

In order to do this, the European Parliament has been proposing to create a banking union for more than a year. The primary goal of this proposal is to protect taxpayers being forced to pay for the banking crises. Firstly, we need a single supervisor to ensure that all EU banks are supervised and they do not pose a risk to the rest of the banking system. This would guarantee that, for instance, a badly supervised saving banks in Spain or poorly supervised banks in Ireland would not pose a risk to the rest of the countries. This joint monitoring system, along with a Deposit Guarantee Fund and a common crisis resolution mechanism should be the three axes of a reform that will protect the citizens of all euro countries from another banking crisis.

The truth is that progress in the last year has been substantial. However, there is some cause for concern in relation to the speed at which European institutions are responding to the problems posed by the banking crisis. Sometimes it seems that we fail to react until we are on the brink of another crisis. Progress was made last year because Europe felt the pressure of rising bond spreads. With lower spreads, we probably would have not reacted. Therefore, this year we risk failing to take decisive action and creating the banking union that is so urgently needed as bond markets appear more stable.

These days there is a heated debate on a bailout for Cyprus which seems to be breaking the taboo of the deposit insurance fund and its consequences for the fledgling banking Union. It is important to contextualize the measure. A high percentage of deposits in Cypriot banks are foreigners, mostly Russians. This is not the case in other euro zone states. Also, whether we like it or not, we must not forget that Germany faces an election in two months. I tend to be positive and believe that the Cyprus bailout may be the price we have to pay so that the Banking Union becomes a reality.

Pablo Zalba Banking Crisis Economy EU-Russia Eurozone