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When will the West finally realise and embrace that there is now a second Chinese nation – called Taiwan –, a democratic alternative to the totalitarian model across the Taiwan Street and the trampled hope of Hong Kong? The rather restrained and concerned reaction in many Western countries on the democratic election of the new Taiwanese president, Lai Ching-te, seems strange. Shouldn’t it rather be a source of relief and joy, given the widespread concerns about an unstoppable rise of authoritarianism?

The convincing and clear victory of Lai Ching-te, the ROC’s former Premier and current Vice-President, running for the Democratic Progressive Party, is a remarkable start to the global election marathon in 2024, where the democratic systems of major countries will be put to the test.

How should Europe react? What could a new phase of engagement with Taiwan look like?

It can be predicted that European governments will continue to act too restrained to upgrade their relations substantially. Too many concerns about mainland China’s retaliation keep them from adequately coping with the development within Taiwan. Therefore, it is up to the European Parliament, its national counterparts, and its parties to push for deepening the political exchange with their newly elected counterpart, the Legislative Yuan, in Taipei. The potential for this level of cooperation, which has to be extended to civil society as well, is far from being fully exploited.

For too long, our view on Taiwan has been dominated rather by a functional perspective: the country was seen as a pawn on the Pacific chess board of superpower competition between the United States and Mainland China; and a key player in the global technology race. But much more exciting and unique in the Chinese, even Asian world, is its successful transition from a dictatorship towards the establishment and maturing of a democratic nation. Beijing’s ridiculous reaction to doubt the free will and legitimacy of the Taiwanese people’s vote needs no further comment. Lai’s victory is a clear signal to the world about the confidence of the Taiwanese people in their right to determine their future.

But Taiwan will continue heading into ever more turbulent waters, domestically and internationally. The more interesting part is the problematic coalition formation in the Parliament, with an oppositional majority. It will be interesting to witness a rather new political dynamic, not unknown to mature democracies, but with the danger of creating friction, which Beijing will try to exploit.

In relation to mainland China, Lai Ching-te will follow the lines laid out by the previous administration of President Tsai Ing-wen. In this approach, he has the support of the Taiwanese people who have developed a remarkable capability to live under a permanent threat, while being locked into the narrow corset of a second-class nation. Yet, being aware of the thin path they can walk, they need no external lecturing, least of all from Europe.

As the pressure from across the Taiwan Strait increases, the key to responding to such demonstrative threats with confidence and restraint lies more than ever with the United States. That means further credibly reinforcing the U.S. position, making clear to Beijing that Washington would not tolerate any use of force across the Strait. This position can still go hand in hand with reiterating the United States’ stance on the “one China” principle, which includes refraining both sides from unilaterally changing the status quo.

Yet, after the confirmation of the dominant role of the DPP as an expression of a strong Taiwanese identity, neither side on the Taiwan Strait can continue with old narratives. The 1992 consensus, which acknowledged two political bodies without excluding reunification, is no longer shared within Taiwanese society. And since Xi Jinping achieved unprecedented power in the PRC, he has also clearly denounced this accord against its “historical mission” of reunification.

Regarding its contribution to hard power deterrence, Europe has no real cards to play. Taiwan’s security remains totally in the hands of the United States and its closest regional ally, Japan. But economic integration, a deeper scientific exchange and joint efforts into sustainable transformation are fields of promising cooperation. There is nothing in the concept of a “one-China” policy which prevents Europe from doing more. However, this stepping up of initiatives should not be limited to Taiwan. The whole region around the South China Sea deserves better engagement and upholding of norms of international law by Europe. Linking up with Taiwan’s own initiatives in that region could leverage Europe’s footprint, too.

Peter Hefele China Democracy Elections Foreign Policy

The big announcement finally came. The European Commission will investigate whether China’s electrical vehicles (EV) industry has benefitted from over-generous state support in order to price-cut European competitors. A few days ago, the acting competition commissioner hinted that a similar move might follow on Chinese wind turbines. China’s EV and wind turbine manufacturing sector (similar to battery and photovoltaic production) has followed the same ruthless blueprint on state subsidies, preferential loans and intellectual property theft.

The EU probe on illicit Chinese state subsidies is not only the right move, but is actually long overdue. More importantly, the belated reaction on taming Beijing’s notorious dumping strategy is vital as it goes beyond potential tariffs. This is a much needed wakeup call for the EU to focus on its own long-term competitiveness in key sectors and recognise the shortfalls of its current industrial and climate policy.

China’s Dirty Playbook on Clean Technology  

Since the 2000s, the Chinese Communist leadership has provided massive state support to a number of key sectors in order to upgrade its manufacturing base and shift towards high-tech products. This turned into a selective breeding programme for national champions in telecommunications (Huawei, ZTE), semiconductor manufacturing (SMIC) and advanced lithium-ion batteries (CATL), among others. The generosity in supporting EVs has become obvious – five of the top 10 subsidy recipients in 2023 are electric vehicles or batteries producers. The overall subsidy spending for the whole EV sector is estimated to more than $125bn between 2009 and 2021.

Additionally, numerous state-owned enterprises and favoured companies have received huge indirect benefits. The IMF calculates that at least 3 % of Chinese GDP is allocated for implicit support to China’s valuable industrial offspring. Dozens of ‘private’ companies have received huge tax breaks, free land use or preferential loans from local governments. Protectionist localisation policies also mean that foreign automotive manufacturers could only enter China’s massive market if they form a joint venture with a Chinese company, which in turn has full access to intellectual property (IP) and a strong stake in decision-making.  

The final ingredients to China’s special sauce are the extremely cheap energy prices for industrial manufacturing (usually from dirty coal) and the abundance of natural resources.  International leaders are obsessed with China’s dominance in minerals and rare earths, but many are embarrassingly silent on the tragic but simple fact that Uighur slave labour is a large part of the story.

Tariffs are coming. Then what?

Cutting to the chase, yes, China is massively subsidising its clean tech industry. The EU probe on EVs will most likely confirm this in 2024 and the European Commission will suggest raising existing tariffs on imported cars from China. However, even if the EU doubles its current levies, most of the small-scale Chinese EVs, which currently hover around 20 000 euros, will remain cheaper than all other European brands. Even though there is a sense of media panic about Europe’s auto sector, the situation is far from grim. Close to 90 % of the new cars sold globally remain classic internal combustion engine vehicles or hybrids. European cars continue to be among the best when it comes to the mid and high end of sold vehicles.

The rumours of Europe’s car producers’ death are greatly exaggerated, but the clock is ticking as the EV share is growing. Ironically, the raised EU tariffs will cause more damage to Western brands, rather than Chinese ones. Most of the current European demand for imported EVs is for Shanghai-made Teslas and Sino-European joint ventures, such as the Dacia Spring and BMW iX3. Tariffs also won’t solve the problem of competing with China in third countries, where European manufacturers will also be squeezed on price.

Europe must indeed retaliate against Beijing’s international dumping, but this comes too little, too late. The hard truth is that Chinese-made EVs will remain dominant in the low-mile range, low-cost segment and continue to benefit from an efficient, vertically-integrated strategy which simply produces cars at scale. This is definitely a red flag for many European producers who struggle with legacy costs or their own inability to optimise production.

Greener, Protectionist and Poorer?

The EV scare is just another addition to the EU’s growing list of technological and industrial concerns. Europe is suffering from high labour costs, low digital intensity within enterprises, volatile energy prices and mounting regulatory requirements. Fortunately, the EU (and European car-makers) continue to benefit from a highly specialised workforce in key sectors and is essential to global value chains. However, the tormenting question remains: What will be the EU’s long-term comparative economic advantages?

This conversation is essential, as it will finally push the EU to confront its biggest international competitor on trade. There is still a persistent hangover in Brussels about the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and European angst on the American attempt to attract global clean tech investment in the US. For all the fuss, the IRA remains mostly a programme for corporate and consumer tax incentives. The freshly committed grants and loans sections of the IRA pale in comparison to the galvanising, decades-long effort by the Chinese to subsidise, protect and promote their own industries.

Brussels is slowly beginning to realise that its own recent efforts are mostly about burning money and trying to re-imagine global markets. The billions of Euros committed to green growth through the European budget or the ambitious Recovery and Resilience Fund risk becoming a one-off Keynesian injection to keep European companies liquid, but not provide the much needed breakthroughs and industrial advancement. We are neither decarbonising nor upgrading the European economy at the necessary pace.

The EU needs to urgently recalibrate its Green Deal and industrial focus so it can actually boost European growth and mobilise large-scale private investment. In parallel, we need a viable strategy for economic security and respond to all the investment and trade risks we face in dealing with the Chinese. Not to mention the fact that our astronomical trade deficit with China keeps rising while European companies suffer from lack of market access or discriminatory restrictions.

The upside here is that the EU is finally moving away from its naiveté towards the Asian hegemon and will develop the much needed tools and incentives to solidify its geopolitical standing. Competitiveness, economic clout and deterrence will be the name of the game; not soft power and aspirational international commitments.

Dimitar Lilkov China Environment Trade

A new consensus in Europe and beyond seems to have formed positing that the unipolar moment in geopolitics, following the Cold War, has given way to an emerging 21^st-century order defined by multipolarity: i.e., not only China but also Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey and others—not to mention the EU—represent sometimes cooperating, sometimes competing, but ultimately disparate power centres which increasingly challenge the US and erstwhile US-led global order, and which have at last tipped the balance towards a world in which no particular state or system can any longer presume predominance. Chancellor Scholz has expressed this as clearly as anyone.

Another view, less common, is that the unipolar moment remains: that China, beset by economic malaise and lacking true allies, cannot truly rival the US with a competitive, paradigmatic alternative. Still another, strong among US policy-makers, is that we are entering if not a new cold war then at least a new bipolar framework rendering a new cold war not unlikely, with Washington and Beijing the rival superpowers.   

Arguments for multipolarity seem to rely in large part on contrasting our current moment with that of the Cold War. China is so much bigger economically than the USSR ever was, it is argued, and the US and China so much more interdependent than were the Americans and Soviets. President Xi is not pushing a coherent, expansive narrative of international communism like Lenin, Stalin and their successors. Nuclear proliferation has changed the game. And still so much of the world remains unconvinced by either the American or Chinese models, with bickering even between Western democracies and mistrust rife among autocrats.      

And yet we perhaps forget how strong the Soviet economy often looked to Western observers (to say nothing of missile gaps); how much of the world remained nonaligned post-1945 and post-colonisation, a field of ideological competition and sometimes proxy war; or how big the disagreements often were in either camp. France withdrew from NATO; the Suez Crisis was a debacle for the West; not only US nuclear arms in West Germany, but West Germany’s Ostpolitik, were highly controversial. For their part, the USSR and China actually went to war, as did China and Vietnam. Tito always resisted Moscow.      

The recent BRICS expansion certainly gives pause to the notion that the world can be again demarcated, more or less, per countries’ alignment with either of two principal superpowers. India, most of all and most importantly, remains as nonaligned as ever. Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are hard to pin down, too, and purposely so.  

The BRICS agenda ostensibly intends a more balanced world order, as President Ramaphosa stated in Johannesburg. In the long run, however, such a big-tent program, accommodating (among others) anti-Western, post-colonialist, strongman and communist ideologies, seems likely to privilege primarily the interests of China, as by far the strongest actor: undermining the American-led order ultimately in pursuit neither of fragmentation nor true state-based egalitarianism but rather of a Sino-centric order based on values core to the ruling Chinese Communist Party. China’s 4 February 2022 Joint Statement with Russia lays out the principles of a new systemic paradigm whereby states, and not individuals, hold essential and indissoluble rights. China’s ongoing support for Russia’s war in Ukraine makes all too clear the consequences, and the stakes, of such a vision.  

Perhaps most telling of all, indeed, as recently reported by Mark Leonard of the European Council on Foreign Relations (who has argued for the multipolar analysis), Chinese policy-makers themselves seem to believe what we are witnessing in Ukraine is a proxy war not between the US and Russia but between the US and China. American policy-makers, for their part, have generally argued domestically that Ukraine must be defended in order to prevent a much bigger conflict: by deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Whatever else we may say, therefore, about the merits of a bipolar reading, it seems the leaders of the two biggest economies and likely most powerful conventional militaries believe among themselves—whatever they may tell others—they are confronting not just a disparate array of competing global interests and power centres but fundamentally a single peer antagonist buttressed by stronger or weaker partnerships. From the US perspective, this makes clear not only the September 2021 AUKUS announcement but also the reinvigoration of the Quad, the G7 and NATO; the spring 2023 defence agreements with the Philippines and South Korea; the unprecedented trilateral agreement in mid-August with South Korea and Japan; and the renewed push now to broker a peace deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In each theatre, the US hopes to contain China and its growing influence.

The Cold War was a contest of superpowers as well as ideologies. But if China is not the USSR—i.e., is not the flag-bearer of an expansionary communist ideology—then along what lines should Washington’s and Beijing’s respective axes be understood? President Biden has spoken of a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. And indeed, an ideology promoting a global democracy of states, rather than a system of states—and ideally democratic states—representing individuals possessing inherent rights, inclines to authoritarian government.    

But perhaps a more helpful paradigm is not democracy vs authoritarianism but pro- vs anti-order—specifically, the post-World-War-Two order which has survived and largely thrived for so many decades. Such a framework would make sense still of the role which China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, has in leading a revisionist bloc—alongside revanchist neo-fascist states like Russia, communistic North Korea and Cuba, and the reactionary theocracy of Iran—in opposing the basic tenets of the UN Convention of Human Rights. It would also make better sense of the concerns of many even democratic countries which push back in frustration against a post-War order they view as both too rigid and at times rigged.    

What the US and its allies must therefore do is to recognise, first—and this has become less obvious to voters—the need to defend the post-War order as something inherently worth preserving; but, second, to see as well the urgent need to adapt and expand that order, in keeping with its foundational democratic ideals, to achieve greater inclusiveness, responsiveness and legitimacy. For though we may hope core values of liberty and justice, seen from the arc of history, trump mere economic and political efficiency, people in the end also want the goods of security and stability alongside personal and market freedoms. If they cannot get the former, they may come to choose or tolerate alternatives to the latter promising more deliverable trade-offs.    

The EU of course has a vital role to play: as the world’s third largest economy, a respected voice for international rule of law and cutting-edge leader in ensuring new technologies protect, rather than encroach on, democratic norms and human rights. We have seen welcome transatlantic re-alignment under the Biden administration, perhaps most especially in supporting Ukraine since Russia’s February 2022 invasion. Europe’s emerging de-risking strategy vis-à-vis China, key theme to the broader economic security strategy adumbrated by the European Commission in June, is another example.

But it may be time to put to rest the pursuit of an independent security and defence policy in contradistinction to that of the US, and to expand instead the framework of transatlantic burden-sharing. For if indeed it is China which will define and lead a systemic challenge to the post-War order, then the US will be focused increasingly on the Indo-Pacific; and the EU and Europe’s NATO members will need to take more responsibility for security in their own neighbourhood. This test may come sooner than later, given the political headwinds facing US presidential candidates advocating robust ongoing support for Ukraine.     

Among the costs for the EU of a misleading, because incomplete, narrative of multipolarity is not only greater vulnerability to regional crises but wasted opportunity costs, as with Germany’s belated recognition of the threat posed by the Chinese government to Germany’s next-generation telecoms infrastructure. Such a framework, moreover, serves ultimately a Chinese Communist Party narrative of a new order of fairness for all, with China as arbiter and guarantor, to replace America’s neo-colonial, exploitative—and inherently hypocritical—erstwhile hegemony.

If and when a state of multipolarity ever does obtain (sustainably and foreseeably: that is, assuming in particular the continuity of China’s current system), the US, EU and their partners and allies should neither retreat into isolationism nor celebrate a putative shift towards greater equity, but should rather do all they can, and as fast as they can, to re-establish a winning—including deeper and wider—global consensus around the market norms, democratic ideals, and values of personal freedom and responsibility which have undergirded for so many decades the most peaceful and prosperous period humans have ever known. The alternatives to that order advanced thus far are neither agnostic nor benign; they are unlikely, historically and intrinsically, to yield better outcomes. In the context of the sharp contest of paradigms currently underway, we abandon to our peril—and this goes for Americans too—our commitment to reinvigorating a pro-democratic, American-led answer.

Nathan Shepura China Foreign Policy Leadership Transatlantic

This blogpost is an edited excerpt from the Martens Centre’s recent policy brief on ‘Evaluating China’s energy outlook’. The full paper can be found here.

‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’ is one of Mao Zedong’s most famous quotations. What is often omitted is the rest of the statement and thus the full implication of the Communist despot’s words: ‘Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.’ This concept is one of the keys to a basic understanding of Chinese political life, which often remains a black box. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the country’s sovereign, has the monopoly on violence and is the ultimate conduit of state power. The CCP is the nucleus around which society and the economy revolve and this design permeates everyday policymaking. The party, ardent nationalism and pragmatic self-interest have been the defining features of the Chinese Communist credo, and have shaped most of the country’s domestic and foreign policy.

China’s energy policy is no exception to this blueprint. Given the energy sector’s massive socio-economic impact, its design is much more than a product of technocratic deliberations: it is a vital tool for the CCP to pursue its long-term goals. After all, the CCP draws its legitimacy from the promise of continuous economic growth and social stability. Concerns about CO₂ emissions, international pledges or climate diplomacy count for next to nothing for the CCP, when societal interest is at stake. The Communist leadership is acutely aware that only an effective energy policy can provide the necessary basis for China’s long-term growth. China is the world’s biggest energy consumer and its industrial sector provides one-third of its overall GDP. The COVID-19 lockdowns, disruption to global energy markets and the severe electricity shortages within China have had a negative impact on industrial production and living conditions. All of these factors have prompted Xi Jinping and his inner circle to chart a course for energy self-sufficiency.

‘Energy security’ is a key term that permeates many relevant state documents and official positions. The Party work report for the 20^th National Party Congress of the CCP refers at length to the importance of energy security and improved self-reliance. The issue is elaborated in more technical detail within the recent 14th Five Year Plan for a Modern Energy System, which warns that the coming years will be critical for China’s energy security, given the overlap of old and new risks. This has been aptly summarised by Xi Jinping himself: ‘Our energy rice bowl must be held in our own hands’. This priority resonates not only with the recent domestic power shortages and industrial needs, but touches on the very essence of the Chinese people’s struggle towards a better life.

The current energy outlook hints that the Chinese energy sector will aim for forceful expansion in the next five to seven years, in a final push in the quest for economic growth and industrial development. The promised goal of the Communist leadership to ‘peak carbon emissions by 2030’ is more an admission that China will likely reach its economic limits by then. Worsening demography, property market bubbles and financial sector volatility will markedly complicate the outlook for the Chinese economy. The country’s emissions will peak due to pure economic slowdown, not a revolutionary decarbonisation effort. Until then, China will be poised to diversify its energy deliveries in an attempt to secure its energy security via an expanded portfolio of energy importers, emergency oil stockpiling and expanded LNG infrastructure. After all, the better prepared and more energy resilient China is, the better its chances during an active conflict in the Indo-Pacific over Taiwan (Republic of China).

It is important to reiterate that China remains an oppressive, authoritarian state with a heavily centralised economy. Beijing continues to be troubled by some of the problems facing a still-developing nation—a lack of basic infrastructure, food supplies and access to clean water remain a challenge in some regions. The country is plagued by widespread corruption, administrative inadequacy and the burdensome centralisation of power. Furthermore, we are yet to witness the unintended consequences of the decade-long aggressive state subsidy of the renewable sector, the oversupply of obsolete infrastructure and energy grid inefficiencies. Neither China’s long-term leadership in clean energy technologies nor its accomplishment of a balanced energy mix are guaranteed; far from it.

For these reasons, China will not bind its own feet and limit the use of fossil fuels in its energy mix. The abundant supply of affordable energy remains the paramount goal. Beijing will continue to weave a promising narrative about its clean energy achievements in a Janus-like attempt to improve its international image for a Western audience, while fully siding with the concerns of the developing world. China’s ‘decarbonisation agenda’ is a pragmatic state-led effort to improve air quality and environmental conditions, while keeping its industrial advantages and maximising economic output.

This uniquely Chinese energy policy is, first and foremost, concerned with energy self-sufficiency and economic dominance. In the minds of Chinese policymakers, the Middle Kingdom needs to shine bright and project power, not be preoccupied with its carbon footprint.

Dimitar Lilkov China Energy

In recent decades, never has a country been isolated faster than Russia as a consequence of its war on Ukraine. But there is another case of a nation whose continuous closing-off from the world in many fields (mainly the Western world) is of much bigger concern: the People’s Republic of China. Scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, city partnerships – all these “people-to-people” exchanges are now just a shadow of what they had been ten years ago. This development stands in sharp contrast to an unwavering and remarkable increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade exchange with the country, which has grown despite COVID-19. On the other side, perhaps paradoxically, the number of foreigners in China (in particular from OECD countries) is in steady decline and they are nearly invisible in Chinese society. China itself has actively contributed to this “decoupling”, by the ideologically-driven promotion of its development model, as well as through its concept of a “dual circulation economy”. The “reform and opening policy” which began in the 1980s has, at least for the foreseeable future, come to an end – and with it many hopes and illusions in the West on what to achieve in China and how to engage with the country.

This deterioration of mutual exchange, both in quantity and in quality, began long before the current COVID-19 pandemic, which has almost completely closed off China from the rest of the world. This “sealing off” happened intentionally and in many ways: by localising management positions in international companies; by censoring and massively shutting down academic exchange programmes; by tightly controlling financial flows; and not least by the notorious and now almost impenetrable “great firewall” which led to total information control within the country.

These developments will have a substantial, detrimental impact on our relations with China: it will shape mutual perceptions; shrink opportunities for joint efforts on global challenges; and decrease the comparative advantages of international trade. It is not difficult to predict that Sino-European relations will not change for the better. Even economic ties might get looser as voices for a stronger decoupling in key technologies get louder and China’s positioning in the current Ukraine war sows further distrust.

Over the last years, most of the Western-style democracies have developed, sharpened, and specified their concepts and instruments in dealing with China. The European Union has revised its China strategy several times over the last years. The current concept from September 2021, which some refer to as the “trinity”, considers China as a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. It sounds prima facie a pragmatic and flexible approach towards the rising “Middle Kingdom”. But what are some concrete fields where it is worth putting effort on further cooperation to break through the “Great Wall” and once again open windows and doors for exchange?

• Future value-creation is largely knowledge-based. It is almost impossible not to cooperate with China given the tremendous progress Research and Development (R&D) has made over the last decade in the People`s Republic. But this requires a stable regulatory framework, especially in the field of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) to adequately share the benefits.
• The existing framework of World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations haven’t kept up with recent developments, i.e., in the data economy. There is an urgent need to adjust the existing regulatory framework. Europe should align with other regions, such as Southeast Asia, to convince China to join common efforts and prevent further fragmentation of international rules.
• For the time being at least, China is still interested in the EU’s massive common market, and Europe is stepping up its efforts to become the third global digital power. But the benefits from this can only be reaped when both partners stick to the principle of reciprocity and fair access to markets is guaranteed.

Europe must be aware that future exchange with China will happen under completely different circumstances than it did over the last thirty years. The following requirements should be met as the “Age of Innocence” is over:

• Europe must prevent the growing knowledge gap about China. The body of expertise on China in Europe is substantial and strong but also fragmented, and influence on policymaking is below its potential. Better coordination and exchange of China-related research and policy consulting must be fostered. The new Horizon Europe programme has acknowledged this deficit and supports the creation of independent knowledge networks. Europe must protect our intellectual core infrastructure from any pressure or dependency on Chinese funding. Keeping independent and free spaces of scientific and intellectual debate is key and the litmus test in any further engagement with Chinese institutions. There is still a need for higher awareness in our academic institutions as well as in political consulting and media.
• Authoritarian regimes such as China (but also Russia) are actively seeking to inject their definition of democracy into the international political discourse. Europe must resolutely defend its political concept and semantics against any attempts to redefine and blur the political core of our identity, such as democracy or our understanding of citizenship. The recent EU guidelines on foreign interference in research has long been overdue.
• Europe is not actively aiming at fundamental regime change in China. But we should not simply buy into the official Chinese narrative that there is only one – communist – way for China’s future. We must broaden our exchange with Chinese thinkers and voices others than those of the Chinese Communist Party. As strange as it might appear these days and difficult as it is, we must better understand long-term trends and be prepared for alternative developments in China.

To continue the dialogue with China is necessary, despite many discouraging experiences in the last years. But clear conditions have to be set from the European side – so as to not just be an exercise and end for itself.

Peter Hefele China Technology Trade

The excitement of in-person diplomacy ahead of the G20 summit in Rome (30-31 October) may put geopolitical tensions, epitomised by the US–China clash, on hold. However, a few days later (8 November), things may be different at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.

In order to understand the reasons for this guess, let us make an overview of this intergovernmental forum that, though many miles from rond-point Schuman, is relevant for the Old Continent.

The majority of countries bordering the Pacific Ocean meet regularly at the APEC since 1989, with the aim to ease trade in the region. APEC countries, of which there are currently 21, represent nearly 62% of world GDP thanks to the participation of heavy-weights like the United States, China, Japan, and Canada, which together represent 80% of APEC’s economy.

The efficacy of APEC is attested to by the decisions made during the COVID-19 emergency (e.g., members pledged to facilitate trade of vaccines and other essential medical devices), but also by the progress achieved towards reaching broader agreements.

In November 2020, 15 countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), with China as the reference country. The RCEP was born in response to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the agreement endorsed by President Barack Obama to stem Beijing’s economic growth and political influence. The TPP was then abandoned by Obama’s successor, Donald Trump, but relaunched by Japan and enriched with the must-have adjectives “Comprehensive” and “Progressive”, to become CPTPP in March 2018.

The two agreements – RCEP and CPTPP – share the objective of liberalising trade in the region; six APEC members are signatories to both (see Table 1). The RCEP is larger than the CPTPP (Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar participate in the agreement alongside 11 APEC countries) and is the first regional agreement that includes China, Japan, and South Korea. Compared to the RCEP, the CPTTP is more ambitious on tariffs and investments, on State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), especially with regard to public subsidies, on workers’ rights, on privacy, and on data transfer between member countries.

The UK, China, and Taiwan all recently applied to join the CPTPP. Existing members of the agreement decided to open negotiations with the UK, for whom ‘Pacific’ is the manifestation of a certain post-Brexit horror vacui regarding trade agreements. Taiwan applied on 22 September, six days after China did, probably hoping to join the partnership before Beijing, thus avoiding its likely veto as a member.

China’s candidacy to the CPTPP raised some eyebrows as the country remains far from the agreement’s objectives, such as in the field of SOEs and state interventionism. It is unlikely that CPTPP members will welcome China, as the nation was welcomed 20 years ago when it joined the World Trade Organization: the expected transition to a market economy has proven to have been wishful thinking.

China being granted membership is rendered even more unlikely considering the position of some CPTPP members, especially Australia. The already tense relations between those countries have certainly not improved after the AUKUS agreement (where collaboration with the UK and US will equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines), after President Xi Jinping’s commitment to a reunification with Taiwan, and after the test of a Chinese nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. The US, even if it is not a member of the CPTTP, can exert its anti-China influence in the Pacific area. However, American influence in the Pacific as it existed in 2008, when the TPP was launched, is now fading as Pacific countries have intensified economic relations with China, conversely reducing links with the United States.

Table 1: APEC members and their participation in CPTPP and RCEP

How might the APEC summit turn sour?

The rich agenda of the forthcoming APEC summit, to be discussed across eleven time zones, may cool American and Chinese hearts. In addition to issues directly related to the COVID-19 pandemic, it will actually be necessary to discuss how to strengthen value chains and how to make trade more sustainable.

However, unlike the G20 in Rome, the APEC summit will see the empathy of in-person meetings replaced by physical distancing: being in one’s stronghold, connected through high-quality video, may increase one’s ease to lift the drawbridge in case of a clash. Moreover, since physical geography cannot be altered, European countries won’t participate to the APEC summit.

The EU has found itself equidistant between China and the US and could have stood in the way of a direct confrontation. The EU and China reciprocated bilateral sanctions after a European Parliament resolution condemning China’s policy in Xinjiang and in Hong Kong, thus freezing the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. As far as transatlantic relations are concerned, President Joe Biden has barely improved the legacy of his outspoken predecessor, as demonstrated by the nominal progress on tariffs on EU steel and aluminium and the AUKUS agreement. It is an odd coincidence that, after months of patience, the Commission and the High Representative publish the new strategy for the Indo-Pacific the day after the announcement of the AUKUS agreement, which does not include any EU nation.

Stefano Riela China Trade Transatlantic relations

AUKUS was an agreement high on symbolism but low on substance.

It symbolised the continuity of the “Pivot to Asia” policy through three successive Presidencies, from Obama, to Trump, to Biden. In terms of strategic substance, however, it did not add much to existent collective security arrangements. The US and Australia were already formally bound together, along with New Zealand in a tripartite collective defense agreement (ANZUS). The signatories of AUKUS are also members of other security arrangements, such as the “Five Eyes” agreement on sharing intelligence, that includes Canada and New Zealand.

Furthermore, AUKUS is not an alliance in the strict sense of the term, in that it does not include a collective defence commitment like NATO’s Article 5 does. Accordingly, it does not provide for automatic collective action in the event, let us say, of a Chinese provocation in Taiwan. All this may have amounted, in strategic terms, to a storm in a teacup, if the Biden administration had not infuriated the French and annoyed the Europeans with the way it handled the whole issue.  

The French were infuriated because the largest arms export deal in French history (roughly 56 billion euros) was “stolen” from them, and to add insult to injury to Macron, it happened less than a year from the French elections. The deal was struck in secrecy, with the Americans and the Australians failing to inform the French that they were involved in parallel negotiations. This is not supposed to happen among allies and friends, and the French struck back accusing the parties involved of lies, duplicity, and a major breach of trust. The agreement was also a real blow to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, meticulously developed over the last several years, along the Paris-New Delhi-Canberra axis.

Finally, there was the ghost of Nassau. The French felt, once again in their history, slighted by the Anglo-Saxons. In December 1962, it was the Kennedy administration that tried to appease the Macmillan government over the cancellation of the Skybolt missile project that was supposed to provide the basis of the UK’s independent nuclear deterrence. In order to appease the British, the Kennedy administration conceded to provide them with the Polaris missiles that represented a much more technologically advanced missile system. De Gaulle became outraged over the special treatment of the British by the Americans and the fact that a similar deal wasn’t extended to the French. He castigated this “Anglo-Saxon collusion” and, months later, blocked Britain’s entry into the EEC. It would be the beginning of de Gaulle’s independent foreign policy. The force de frappe, the “all azimuth strategy”, and the eventual French withdrawal from NATO’s military structure would become de Gaulle’s heretical actions within the Western camp during the apex of the Cold War.

The AUKUS agreement felt like déjà vu to the French political elite. It was no accident that the French opposition revived the Gaullist rhetoric, while the official French communiqué talked about “the need to raise loud and clear the issue of European strategic autonomy”.

If the French felt betrayed by AUKUS, the Europeans felt that the honeymoon between the European Union and the Biden administration came to an abrupt end. First, it was America’s hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan that did not give the Europeans enough time to withdraw their own people. Second, it was the troubling aspect of AUKUS that included Britain at the expense of a European member state, giving Brexiters the pretext to boast that they have delivered on their promises on a post-Brexit “Global Britain”.

AUKUS reminded Europeans that Europe’s geopolitical significance to American policymakers has declined after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rise of China. More importantly, it was a sad reminder that Europe is not viewed by the US as a global power with whom America needs to deepen cooperation to face common challenges.

Suddenly, Europeans realised that Trump might be gone, but his policies remain, and Biden’s comforting words on the value of transatlantic ties did not amount to much more than words. It is no coincidence that besides the offended French, the Germans, the staunchest transatlanticists of the continent, argued that AUKUS “ought to be a wake-up call for all Europeans”.

No one in Europe would argue against America’s urgent priority to focus on China’s rise and the need to deal with the challenges of China’s global agenda. The “Pivot to Asia”, however, together with the American withdrawal from other regions, send the wrong signals to other revisionist authoritarian powers such as Russia. They signal that America is receding from its role as a global hegemon, abdicating its global responsibilities. Furthermore, while America may be pivoting to Asia, China is pivoting everywhere, as its globally ambitious “Belt and Road” strategy suggests. Whereas China is emerging as a global power, America is perceived to be posturing as a regional Pacific power.

The United States needs to address the rising Chinese challenge across the globe and in every relevant policy area. In this effort, “Pivoting to Asia” will not suffice. To effectively meet the Chinese challenge, America will need to resume its global reach. Doing so will require the cooperation of the European Union, and the unity of the Transatlantic Alliance. A united West “Pivoting to Eurasia” is a much more geopolitically sensible strategy to effectively counter China’s growing challenge.

Constantine Arvanitopoulos China NATO Transatlantic relations

Common festivities cancelled, French ambassadors recalled from Washington and Canberra, and an EU-Australia trade deal on ice: France’s righteous wrath is understandable, but only partly justified. Moreover, coming on the heels of the Transatlantic spat over the Afghanistan withdrawal, this latest crisis among allies not only reconfirms the urgent question many Europeans asked themselves after the last US election: What if the Republicans return to power in 2024? It actually produces an even more urgent question: How Trumpist is Joe Biden? And is this the final wake-up call for the EU’s strategic autonomy?

The art of (cancelling) the deal

The submarine deal was fraught with problems from its beginning in 2016. That refers not only to the predictable delays and cost blowouts on the side of the French contractor, Naval Group, but also to changing strategic requirements in the Indo-Pacific, and above all, the French inability to come to grips with the propulsion system – on top of data hacks on their side. The problem (and the ineptitude in Washington) was that the announcement of the cancellation came together with the formation of AUKUS, the Australia-UK-US cooperation agreement on sharing state-of-the-art military technology (including on submarines, replacing the French contract) and strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – vis-à-vis an increasingly aggressive China, of course. (By the way, to call this a military alliance is a bit of an exaggeration. NATO is an alliance; this here is a cooperation agreement with geopolitical implications). The fact that France, like other European allies of the US, had not known about this agreement in the making in past months, was the real ‘stab in the back’, to use French Foreign Minister Le Drian’s words. To unnecessarily alienate an ally with ambitions and presence in the Indo-Pacific is indeed counterproductive, especially if the priority of priorities for the US, and one of the last remaining bipartisan points of consensus along the Potomac, is countering the rising Chinese influence.  

When US strategic disinterest meets with European strategic ineptitude

The picture would, however, be incomplete without the Biden administration’s frustration, actually a bipartisan exasperation, with European allies who keep postulating their ‘strategic autonomy’ from the US while still bringing very little to the table in terms of real military capabilities. A strategic autonomy that so far mainly manifests itself in pushing projects such as Nord Stream 2 and telling the world that Europe refuses to ‘take sides’ in the ‘Cold War 2.0’ between the US and China. And to underscore this, the EU concluded an investment deal with China without even consulting with the US, despite Washington’s very kind request to do so before signing. This is happening in a situation in which the Biden administration clearly and repeatedly said that the overriding conflict of the future is the one between liberal democracy and a new authoritarianism, whose cheerleader is now the Chinese Communist Party. American strategic disinterest in Europe meets with European strategic impotence and irresponsibility: Two mutually reinforcing trends. And a toxic combination for the West, and for democrats worldwide.

Breaking the vicious circle

Ending the Transatlantic vicious circle begins with European strategic responsibility, not autonomy. The latter is not on the cards, full stop. To spell it out: Even if we had an ‘entry force’ and several battlegroups combat-ready for interventions in emergencies like the one in Kabul, or contingencies in the neighbourhood (which is a worthy goal), there is no way such a Europe without the US could defend itself, or deter an aggressive authoritarian power such as Russia on all levels, from hybrid to conventional, to tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear. Rather than strategic autonomy, which is anathema to Eastern flank countries in EU and NATO, strategic responsibility should be our ambition. And that means spending more on defence, developing intervention capacities in the EU’s neighbourhood, strengthening the European pillar in NATO, and ceasing to ostentatiously sit on the fence between China and the US. Instead, while recognising that EU and US approaches to China will never be identical, we need to seek common ground and identify areas of strategic consensus, for example on supply chains, export of key technologies, a common pushback against Beijing’s abuse of our open markets, its political blackmail and human rights violations, as well as a concerted effort to support democratic governments and movements across the world. Some willingness to compromise with the US on trade and technology would also help.

If the EU is to demonstrate real added value to the US as allies, two nations in particular have to grow up on this side of the Pond: France needs to let go of delusions of grandeur, and Germany needs to get real about contributing to Europe’s security with more hard power – which is always necessary for soft power to work.

Roland Freudenstein China Defence EU-US Foreign Policy

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech has become an established news item, resonating across European media. The 2021 speech had a strong focus on recovery and the last remaining steps to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic.

Structurally, her State of the Union speech was very similar to last year’s, starting with a short reference to the ‘Big Picture’, followed by a list of various Commission initiatives, often with the promise of creating new tools, with budgetary backing. This year’s speech even ended on a similar note as last year, with a ‘human dimension story’. 2020 referenced young girls playing tennis in Liguria, while this year it was an Italian Paralympic gold medallist.

Rather than a speech on the State of the Union, the EU, its long-term vision and its upcoming challenges, the speech became an opportunity for the Commission President to market ongoing initiatives and launch new ones, focusing on the EU’s internal policies.

But although the speech’s focus was mostly internal, it reflects a desire for the European Union to become (yes, really) a true global player.

Since external strength comes from within, and no doubt driven by the momentum created by the situation in Afghanistan, von der Leyen logically followed up by underlining the importance of being ambitious in security and defence cooperation, discussing the plan to convene a Summit on European Defence under the French EU Council Presidency.

However, there is currently no lack of different cooperation mechanisms in the area of security. Instead, the challenge is a lack of motivation on the part of EU member states to engage and invest in their own defence capacity, without even thinking about cooperation at the European level. On the one hand, replacing existing progress by launching a new process with fresh expectations to be fulfilled can be counterproductive. Still, a Summit can create political momentum for further development.

Another initiative mentioned in the State of the Union speech, although perhaps surprising, is the idea of a Global Gateway strategy, a kind of response to China’s New Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The strategy seeks to create partnerships with countries around the world, creating investments in quality infrastructure, connecting goods, peoples, and services around the world to build a worldwide brand. It sounds big and ambitious, but the obvious question is, where is the money?

China’s BRI is estimated to involve around $2.5 trillion at the moment. Undoubtedly, the EU will aim to use similar financial leverage as with the ‘Juncker Plan’, but securing funding for massive global infrastructure projects outside the EU’s territory and matching China will prove to be a challenge. However, a key difference between both projects is that the EU’s Global Gateway effort should be based on important EU values and aim to build genuine, mutually beneficial partnerships, as opposed to China’s strategy of debt trapping and subsequent diplomatic coercion, which are the backbone of the New Silk Road.

Currently, the EU’s external force leans heavily on its economic force and its trade ties. The “Brussels effect” makes the EU a leading regulatory force, and the current woes of the US and China put the EU in a unique position to become a promoter of global trade. It is therefore almost surprising that the State of the Union speech did not allow room for a more elaborate discussion on the EU’s role within the global economic patterns and EU trade.

Naturally, one could claim that due to COVID-19, global trade is still shellshocked. However, global trade and business are recovering much faster than expected. During the COVID crisis, the prognosis was that supply chains would be radically changed after the pandemic. As it turns out, we’ve instead witnessed increasing demand and prices, with many companies basically returning to the same production models. Globalisation as a trend will bounce back.

The European Union will not be able to project its power in the same way as big, global sovereign states. It originated in multilateralism and cooperation, holding weaknesses other global entities do not – but also possessing strengths others are lacking.

While the defence and security pillars are essential for a strong EU in the future, development is slow, and thus its primary strength remains centred on its economy. As we wait for next year’s State of the Union speech and its own human story ending, there are equal expectations on how the EU will aim to claim its place and, through its multilateral dimensions, shape the future of the global economy and trade.

Photo Credits: EPP Group in the European Parliament

Tomi Huhtanen China Defence European Union Globalisation

Though bound by a strong relationship and a shared history, New Zealand (NZ) and Australia are demonstrating a different approach towards a critical economic partner. Australia and China have recently reached high levels of diplomatic friction. In April 2020 came the casus belli: the Australian Foreign Minister calling for an international investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and China’s handling of the initial Wuhan outbreak.

The response came a few weeks after when Chinese authorities imposed tariffs on Australian barley, meat, and wine. In the following months, the list of products affected extended to cotton, coal, sugar, lobster, copper, and lumber. In addition to anti-dumping duties, the Chinese tools also included non-tariff barriers and calls to boycott Australian products. Adding to commercial retaliation, some Australian journalists were expelled from China, another journalist was placed under house arrest on espionage charges, and a tweet by a China’s Foreign Minister’s spokesperson showed a forged photo of an Australian soldier with a pointed knife to an Afghan child’s throat.

Even before the request for the COVID investigation, relations between the two countries turned sour soon after the declaration of friendship by China’s President Xi Jinping to the Parliament in Canberra in 2014. Australia, in fact, expressed mounting concerns about Chinese authorities’ interference in the both political and academic institutions, and about risks posed by Huawei’s and ZTE’s 5G and Victoria State’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative. These are some of the 14 grievances against Australia drawn up last November by China’s ambassador in Canberra. And this list can be updated to include the revision, by the Australian government, of the concession given in 2015 to the Chinese company Shandong Landbridge Group for the management of the port of Darwin.

Not short of having demonstrated its fearlessness, Australia has nevertheless preferred not to escalate the confrontation by labelling as ‘genocide’ the discrimination against Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region, as done previously by other strategic partner of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance.

Even NZ has been wary of including ‘genocide’ in its official documents when referring to Uyghurs in China. On 5 May 2021, the Parliament in Wellington approved a motion “concerning the serious violations of human rights taking place against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in the autonomous region of Xinjiang” and, during the debate, the Foreign Minister recalled that NZ had not previously made an independent determination of genocide, since only international courts can prove a genocide is taking place following a rigorous assessment. China rejected the allegations as unfounded and – in Pavlovian style – threatened, but did not adopt, sanctions. NZ, in fact, is less vocal in criticising China’s authorities. The Foreign Minister herself explained that NZ is not willing to give up an independent foreign policy, and wants to develop a more mature relationship with China.

Notwithstanding the ability of Australian exporters to find alternative markets to a now-harder-to-penetrate China (except for a few products such as the hard-hit  wine), the resentment against New Zealanders has become palpable. NZ is accused of going soft on China to avoid retaliations and to profit from relatively better economic relations. For both Oceanian countries, in fact, China is a significant partner for the export of products, but also for the export of non-tradable services such as tourism and education.

This trans-Tasman clash is the subject of an Australian documentary titled “Dollars VS Decency: Is China taking over New Zealand?”, released on the day Australia’s Prime Minister met New Zealand’s peer (30 May 2021). The summit was meant to reaffirm the solidity of the alliance with a joint statement expressing serious concern over developments in the South China Sea, in Hong Kong, and in the Xinjiang region.

In November, NZ will sit China’s and Australia’s leaders down around the same (virtual) table, during its Presidency of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Bilateral economic links are too strong to be handled in a tug-of-war game. China is the largest trading partner for both Australia and NZ; however, even the gigantic China is not self-sufficient, as shown by its insatiable appetite for Australian iron ore, a key ingredient for steel, at the base of many planned infrastructures.

Considering the outcome of the last G7 and NATO summits – where China has been regarded as a challenge to the rules-based international order – Australia and NZ cannot be left alone in playing what looks like a ‘good cop / bad cop’ strategy. The European Union can help the two like-minded countries by speeding up the negotiations of EU-Australia and EU-NZ free trade agreements launched in 2018. If Australia and NZ develop stronger economic ties with the EU that, among others, offer a potential diversification of trade, they may reduce their unilateral dependency with China and gain bargaining power in a negotiation whose repercussion will go beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

Stefano Riela China Globalisation Trade

It is by now conventional wisdom that the question of relations with Russia is a major obstacle to the unification of the ‘democratic Right’ that Viktor Orbán, Matteo Salvini, and Mateusz Morawiecki like to talk about as of late. Indeed, Russia is one of the main issues making Germany’s AfD, Austria’s FPÖ, and France’s Rassemblement National unlikely partners for a larger right-wing formation. Moreover, even the tripartite alliance between Italy’s Lega, Hungary’s Fidesz, and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS), which might soon end up in a joint group in the European Parliament, has already experienced stormy conflicts over Russia. And although the previously notoriously pro-Putin Lega has made efforts to distance themselves from the Kremlin, the varying responses from Warsaw and Budapest to recent Kremlin aggression is certainly one of the stumbling blocks.

But those differences may well pale next to the foreseeable infighting over China. This has several roots. For one thing, Russia in its current state is obviously on the losing side of history, and is hopelessly lagging behind the West and China, both economically and technologically. China, in contrast, is set to become the world’s premier economic power within the current decade. Technologically, it will likely overtake the West in a number of fields, such as artificial intelligence. As its power has grown, so have its interests across the globe, so much so that there is now a ‘China angle’ to most policy questions worldwide, and an imperative for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to support or obstruct domestic forces in most countries around the world, depending on whether they are considered helpful or not to its interests.

In fact, the stances of the European illiberal right on China are even more amorphous and fickle than those on Russia. Their differing attitudes towards Moscow can at least be traced to their respective nation-state’s historical experiences and strategic culture towards Russia. Put simply, it is as normal for a Polish or an Estonian nationalist to oppose Russia as it is for a French or a German one to court it.

China is both a much more important long-term issue than Russia and a topic that populists have few existing cues to draw on to make sense of. Contrary to Russia, with China, the economic dimension complicates political and ideological calculations. Should China be seen as a welcome Eurasian partner in creating an illiberal counterweight to Euro-Atlantic liberalism, as Viktor Orbán seems to bet on? Or does it represent the mortal danger of de-industrialisation of the nation’s ‘heartlands’, as Marine Le Pen seems to think, following Trump’s ideas? Is Beijing an alternative partner that can be a leverage against Brussels, an idea PiS appeared to entertain in its first months in office? Or is it a Soviet-style adversary to a Christian West, which is the Polish government’s current stance?

No one has faced these dilemmas more than Matteo Salvini. The populist coalition of his Lega party with the Five Star Movement created waves when it decided to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, making Italy the first European country to do so. Yet Salvini declined to attend his government’s meeting with Xi Jinping, knowing that Lega’s core electorate of Northern Italian small businesses is very suspicious of Chinese ‘state capitalist’ competition.

We know that, in their foreign policy thinking, populists value sovereignty first and foremost, even more so those on the right, who are also strongly nationalistic. Yet the lack of a deeper ideological bond between them means that this basic agreement is the source of division rather than unity. Without a deeper elaboration of what ‘sovereignty’ means in the modern world, beyond knee-jerk Euroscepticism, anti-Americanism, and fear of globalisation, it is impossible to come up with a common, fairly consistent position on a strategic challenge like China.

To be sure, the established European party families such as the centre-right EPP have their own share of internal divisions over Russia and, now, China. But the EPP knows that these different viewpoints can only be reconciled, and European citizens can only enjoy the right balance of economic gains through engagement with China and protection from Beijing’s increasingly hostile practices, within a partly supranational EU and in the framework of liberal democracy.

The pro-European, rule-of-law based centre-right departs from a positive vision of European unity, which helps it make sense of the Chinese problem in all its complexity. The illiberal sovereignist right embarks from a negative vision of national sovereignty that does not resolve, but instead strengthens, the contradictions which the Chinese question poses to Europe.

Roland Freudenstein Angelos Chryssogelos China EU-Russia Values

In early 2020, the EU was criticised for lagging behind in providing COVID-related support, while China and Russia were delivering medical aid equipment and masks to EU Member States. We still remember the “From Russia with Love” COVID aid operation to Italy in March 2020, or the plane full of medical supplies from China. A year later, both countries are promoting their vaccines in the Eastern Partnership region (EaP). This time however, the EU is part of the action as well. Through its contributions to the World Health Organization’s COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) and extra financial support earmarked for deployment of COVID-19 vaccines to the region, it is important for the EU to show its support and reliability to its Eastern neighbours and position itself as a respectable player in the Russian and Chinese game of bilateral vaccine diplomacy. In the age of disinformation and fake news, it is also extremely important for Europe to better communicate its work and not allow its efforts to go unnoticed.

Unlike with the distribution of Russian and Chinese vaccines, there are no airport press conferences, nor flashy inauguration events to promote the European contribution.

Besides their shared Soviet past, there’s another characteristic that unites the six Eastern Partnership countries at the moment – the high level of scepticism among the population towards COVID-19 vaccines. Many citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova state they do not trust the vaccine, with apprehension towards the jab reaching 41% in Georgia and 53%, one of the highest percentages, in Ukraine.

Despite the third wave of infections hitting most of the EaP counties and forcing their governments to impose lockdowns of varying strictness, the respect for anti-COVID measures remains low, leading to a rise in positive cases. Adding this to a general mistrust towards vaccines does not look promising for achieving herd immunity anytime soon.

The reasons for scepticism are multifold. Populations in many post-Soviet republics are traditionally wary of vaccines, fearing side effects from poor quality drugs. The mistrust has also been  amplified by allegations from politicians about low-quality vaccines, corruption scandals, and misinformation spread through social media. Even worse, in some countries like Ukraine, the reluctance to get vaccinated appears even among medical workers.

The low levels of confidence in vaccination campaigns have been fuelled by political struggles and information wars. Conspiracy theories and misinformation over social media have also contributed to creating a massive distrust within society. However, the principal cause of scepticism remains distrust towards state institutions and the quality of purchased vaccines.

Most of the six countries started the vaccine rollout between January and March 2021, unfortunately with quite scarce results. Azerbaijan kicked off its vaccination program on January 18, making it the first country in the Caucasus or Central Asia to do so. Belarus began its vaccination drive by distributing the country’s first round of the Sputnik jab already in December 2020. Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova caught up with the first vaccines in February and March. But where are the vaccines coming from?

All of the EaP States, besides Belarus, joined the COVAX scheme, which aims to ensure parity in distribution and access to the vaccine for all interested countries. However, the waiting list is quite a long one. Belarus took a different path, becoming the first country outside Russia to approve Sputnik V and has recently received a batch of vaccines from China, providing a gesture of good strategic partnership between the two countries.

On the contrary, when offered Sputnik V, Ukrainian president Zelensky refused it. The country received its first shipment of AstraZeneca doses produced by India’s Serum Institute and signed a contract with the Chinese Sinovac. Azerbaijan has also been relying on the Chinese CoronaVac vaccine and, similarly to Georgia and Armenia, is on the list to receive the British-Swedish AstraZeneca-Oxford vaccine through COVAX.

On 11 February, the European Union, in partnership with the WHO, launched a new regional programme of over €40 million, aimed at providing critical assistance to ensure local readiness and preparedness for safe and effective vaccination of the population in each of the six Eastern Partnership countries. Commissioner OlivérVárhelyi, responsible for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, stated, “With this new programme that we launch today in partnership with the WHO, the EU shows that it delivers on its commitment to support our Eastern Partners to fight the health crisis.” This extra support could not be more timely.

Let’s not forget that vaccination campaigns in these countries are being carried out amidst internal political instabilities, such as anti-government protests in Belarus, slow-paced reforms in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in Donbass, a crackdown on the opposition in Georgia, a recent armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and a fierce but difficult fight against corruption in Moldova led by its President Maia Sandu.  

Through its contribution to the COVAX programme and the recent approval of over €40 million of aid, the EU has been providing much support and assistance to deliver the vaccines. However, unlike with the distribution of Russian and Chinese vaccines, there are no airport press conferences, nor flashy inauguration events to promote the European contribution. A better communication of the EU’s support to supplying vaccines to the region along with firm commitments to the EaP countries are strongly needed, as especially now, the EU’s assistance is, quite literally, vital.

Anna Nalyvayko China COVID-19 Eastern Europe EU-Russia

In mid-2020, a lethal clash occurred between Indian and Chinese troops in the border region of Ladakh. Soon after, India opened fire on the digital front by banning dozens of Chinese mobile applications and declaring them harmful to Indian sovereignty and security. In a similar fashion, the US digital hawk brought its gaze on a technological prey. On national security grounds, the Trump administration initiated a crusade against the likes of TikTok, WeChat and Alipay.

The US’ handling of the TikTok saga has been a messy affair, with the new presidential administration appearing to backtrack on the ban. There are legitimate concerns that foreign businesses shouldn’t be in the crosshairs of politicians, nor should users be collateral damage in the technological rivalry between the US and China.

The national security rationale applied by India and the US in this digital skirmish might appear overblown, but there is an important case to be made. How should our governments respond to online businesses acting in a nefarious way? How should our institutions treat digital platforms which can be conduits for authoritarian influence?

Let’s quickly look under the hood of two of the most popular Chinese platforms. The ‘super-app’ WeChat offers a bundle of services, with more than a billion active users and around 100 million downloads outside of China. WeChat is not only heavily surveilled within China, but also monitored abroad, with strong political censorship of user conversations. The Chinese Communist Party has been using this platform to target the Chinese diaspora in other countries, apply information control, and spread disinformation.

International superstar TikTok also favours content moderation and applies censorship to politically sensitive topics. Both WeChat and TikTok have been embroiled in controversies about the storage and transfer of personal data. Don’t forget that these businesses have to comply with draconian Chinese legislation that requires companies to support national intelligence work.

Some readers might consider such alarm about cute videos or chat platforms a bit premature. But this is just the tip of the iceberg and the problem is not limited to apps. Cheap Chinese Internet of Things (IoT) devices are quickly expanding their share of European markets where standards for such technology are still wobbly. Interconnected home speakers or smart devices remain extremely vulnerable to cybersecurity breaches and are likely to leak user data. It is a matter of time before Chinese AI-driven hardware and software starts raising serious ethical, cybersecurity, and espionage concerns.

The EU must develop stringent standards for the access of advanced digital hardware and software from third countries.

While all of this unfolds, the European dove sits and waits. Much of the EU’s recent efforts have been aimed at Silicon Valley companies and their dirty business when it comes to monopolistic behaviour, monetisation of personal data, and stifling competition. This is a laudable effort but the EU should not underestimate the threats coming from the digital juggernauts to the East. European commitment to online privacy should not be our only line of defence against the ongoing onslaught from China. This is no longer solely a question about bureaucratic personal data management, it’s a question of national security.

The EU must develop stringent standards for the access of advanced digital hardware and software from third countries. The same way we have common rules for consumer goods safety or health requirements for imported foods. The same way we blocked the entry of cheaper Chinese cars which didn`t cover European safety requirements a decade ago.

This should come in parallel with other comprehensive measures to boost our defensive digital capabilities in cyber security and the protection of critical infrastructure, not to mention the need to decisively boost our export controls on selling advanced technology to countries with appalling human rights records. The EU has imposed an arms embargo on China since 1989, but why are we still supplying them with surveillance and dual-use technologies?

Our commitment to free trade and global supply chains don’t mean that we provide unconditional access to our markets and networks. It is unnerving that we are debating whether it’s fair to scrutinise the market access of Chinese digital platforms, while Beijing unscrupulously maintains a wide-ranging ban on hundreds of US and European apps and digital services. In a similar act of techno-nationalism, Russia is trying to limit the exposure of its population to Western digital platforms by obligating phone providers to pre-load all new smartphones with specific Russian-made social networks, payment apps, and voice assistants.

There is the optimistic tale that the Internet will always remain open and that international actors will inevitably embrace the digital domain as a tool for empowerment and joint cooperation. This belief is as noble as it is erroneous. The global system of Internet governance resembles the characteristics of the ‘analogue’ international system – ruthlessly competitive, and prone to regionalisation and conflict. We must finally acknowledge that the likes of China and Russia are not benign actors – Europe is dealing with aggressive authoritarian regimes both online and offline.

The US President Theodore Roosevelt liked to recite the West African proverb: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick’. On the digital front, Europe speaks softly but often comes empty-handed.

This needs to change.

Dimitar Lilkov China Digital

“The day we stop believing democracy can work is the day we lose it” said Queen Jamilia as the Galactic Republic faced enemies both internal and external during the Clone Wars. Today, democracies face populist and authoritarian challenges both domestically and globally. Among the latter, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasingly positioning itself as the leading revisionist force, seeking to change international norms and values and the current world order to become a global hegemon. It is promoting an alternative autocratic model to Western democracies and views them as adversaries and existential threats. Benefitting from economic difficulties and Western disunity, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic, China under the CCP has seized the opportunity to challenge Western powers, amongst them the European Union (EU), in a power competition in which values are at the heart of the conflict.

This competition is taking place in the economic, information, technological, political and diplomatic arenas. The Chinese government is leading disinformation campaigns and does not hesitate to bully countries into submission. This political interference is combined with intensive cyber-attacks and large-scale technological espionage, restricted market access, and aggressive investments in national industries, infrastructures, and resources. As a result of its economic and political interests, the CCP is challenging international rules, institutions, and political norms, including human rights – all of which it has committed to in international agreements. The COVID-19 pandemic has increased awareness of the threat the Chinese government poses and of the EU’s dependency on China, both as a provider of goods but also as a market. This has been reflected in public opinion polls that show largely negative views of China in EU countries, especially in Western and Northern European states.

With this growing awareness, the 2019 Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative highlighted the mounting tensions and competition between the EU and China. It offered a compartmentalised model of the EU-China relationship in different policy areas, from “cooperation partner” and “negotiation partner” in domains where interests can be aligned or balanced, to “economic competitor” and “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”.  

The differentiated approach adopted by the EU might maintain economically fruitful relations on both sides but is unlikely to incite China to end its political, economic, informational, and technological attacks, affecting the national security of EU member states.

Subsequently, in December 2020, China and the EU agreed in principle on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. China committed to ensure a “greater level of market access for the EU”, “fair treatment for EU companies”, and “ambitious provisions on sustainable development, including commitments on forced labour and the ratification of the relevant ILO fundamental Conventions”. This agreement would be an important step in obtaining equitable treatment and access for EU companies and businesses; however, it solely focuses on market access, leaving a number of other issues such as human rights abuses and investment protection to negotiate at a later stage. In addition, this agreement will still not open the Chinese market on a reciprocal level. Finally, the EU side-tracked the United States on this negotiation despite an open call from the then incoming Biden administration to consult and cooperate on this “common concern”. This plays directly into the hands of the CCP and its divide and rule strategy, and is a missed opportunity for the EU to have a reinforced bargaining position with a like-minded power (the US) to obtain stronger commitments.

Furthermore, the CCP has demonstrated a lack of respect for rules, and employs tools and strategies to increase its dominance, leading to political instability and risks for EU countries. This calls for stronger engagement against the CCP’s disrupting behaviour on all fronts, in order to protect European interests, values, and political independence. As China’s second largest trading partner, the EU has leverage to negotiate stronger commitments and concessions. The differentiated approach adopted by the EU might maintain economically fruitful relations on both sides but is unlikely to incite China to end its political, economic, informational, and technological attacks, affecting the national security of EU member states.

In addition, the Union should develop stronger ties with countries who view China under the CCP as a mounting threat in the Asia region, such as Australia and Japan, and especially the United States. The Biden administration intends to maintain the  country’s hard stance on China; however, it aims to do so in close cooperation with its allies and partners. Despite a decrease of Europe’s trust in the United States this past decade as the relationship became more competitive, critical, and less reliable, they closely share essential values as well as political and economic interests. This is a unique opportunity for the EU to have a stronger bargaining position in negotiations with China. It must seize it and identify how the transatlantic partners can cooperate on China.

All this does not mean Europe should decouple from China, or that there are no remaining paths for cooperation. But the old juxtaposition of nouns – partner, competitor, rival – should be replaced by a hierarchy of a noun and verbs: China is a systemic rival with whom we should compete and cooperate with a balanced inclusive approach incorporating relevant fields, depending on the respective behaviour of the CCP. This difference in syntax precisely indicates that the systemic rivalry is the framework, and competition and cooperation are the variables within it.

The defence of liberal values and democratic principles is essential to the health of our democracies. To protect them from the influence of authoritarianism, the EU has to ensure its actions meet all the challenges ahead, because believing democracy can work is the first step to defending it. The European Union has to be more proactive, resolute, and bold in its relationship with China. We need to become a blue dragon.

Marie-Anne Brouillon Roland Freudenstein China Foreign Policy Values

While the vast majority of developed countries are struggling to manage the COVID-19 epidemic, China has been able to control the situation domestically through strict measures. Today, China’s economy has returned to the path of growth in comparison to other global economic powers. The moment when China will truly become the leading global economic power seems to be closer once again.

But while many predict this century will be dominated by China, it will most likely also be the century of the beginning of China’s relative decline. The reason is that China’s population is ageing rapidly and China’s demographic problem is getting increasingly serious.

China’s population, according to current projections, will peak in 2030, with a shrinking labour force and an elderly population (65+) of 240 million. Only Japan has aged faster than China. But while Japan and other developed countries face similar demographic challenges, “China will become old before it becomes rich.” It also does not enjoy the same structures as a developed country – or the necessary infrastructure to tackle the challenge.

Evidently, one of the main causes of China’s demographic situation is its one-child policy, which has created low replacement rates. So-called ‘4-2-1 families’, 4 grandparents with 2 parents having one child, create a situation where the young generation faces a huge economic burden in a country where the social security system, medical care and pensions are very weak – and the expectation remains that children will take care of their parents in old age.

In many countries, immigrants help the demographic situation, but in China the demographic problem is magnified by emigration out of China.  

As the working-age population will decrease, robust economic growth will be a challenge to maintain.

In addition, urbanisation is emptying the rural areas with young people moving to the cities, leading to regional economic differences and social tensions. A side effect of the one-child policy is that a preference for boys did lead to sex-selective abortions, having created a situation that for every 100 girls, there are 120 boys. It’s estimated that the percentage of men in their late 30’s who have never married will be five times higher by 2030, and obviously these unmarried young men will have an increasingly negative impact on population growth, not to mention the frustration and negative psychological impact for young males.

While in the Western world, demographic change will have a great impact, in China the projected impact is even larger when compared to its share of total global population. For example, the EU-27’s share of global population is projected to decline by 2,1 percentage points, from 5,9 % to 3,8 % between 2018 to 2100. Conversely, China’s share is projected to fall by 8,9 points, from 18,7 % to 9,8 % in the same time period.

Decline of working age population

According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2019) in 2060, China’s elderly population will be 400 million people, while the working age population (20–64) will be around 675 million people. For comparison, the working age population is currently 950 million and the elderly population is 175 million. The ratio of working to elderly will go from 0,18 elderly person per working age person now, to 0,59 elderly person per working age person in 2060. This kind of demographic demands a total reconstruction of the Chinese system and huge investments.

As the working-age population will decrease, robust economic growth will be a challenge to maintain, becoming a problem for Chinese leadership, which has managed to legitimise its position and facilitate societal transition by using the benefits of high economic growth. In addition, Chinese debt levels have been increasing at a worrying rate, and managing the debt will not be any easier in the future.

Limiting births with the one-child policy created a ‘demographic dividend’ and gave more time and mobility for people without children to work. Reversing the policy and asking the working-age population to have more children will slow down economic growth until the new generation reaches working age.

China as awoken to its demographic problem and dropped the one-child policy in 2016, asking couples today to ‘have children for the country’, and discouraging women to delay marriage for their career, and setting controls on abortions. However, trying to change societal behaviour set by decades of the one-child policy and countering declining birth rates are not even close to yielding the necessary results.

China is not the only country in the world to tackle demographic trends. However, in China, the problem is exacerbated by the one child-policy, which has created behavioural, cultural, and social patterns that are difficult to be erased overnight.

As China is ageing rapidly, a large part of its male population will never marry and its ageing population will burden the nation’s very weak pension and healthcare system. China will have a smaller workforce and more fiscal constraints. While China has well defined global ambitions, those aspirations will be severely hampered by its demographic problems.

For Europe’s global strategy, the consequence is that while maintaining its crucial transatlantic relations and focusing on the challenge of China, Europe needs to keep developing its relations with other global actors such as India and African countries, players which today seem less relevant but can have a much stronger global role in the coming decades.

Tomi Huhtanen China Society

The EU is right to boost its relationship with India, who might be the world’s strongest economic power by the end of the century. However, many hurdles remain for India to take on a leading global role.

With the Western world struggling with the COVID-19 pandemic and China strengthening its position, bolstered by a good management of the epidemic, there is a temptation to view the world’s geopolitical future as a game of three players: the United States, China, and the European Union. However, it is clear that in future decades, other continents and countries will increase their role. India especially has the potential to change the global balance in the coming decades.

The ongoing Portuguese EU Council Presidency has set out a priority to enhance EU-India relations, and for good reasons. While India remains in many respects a developing country, it has great potential. Importantly, a strong India can have a stabilising impact in Asia, especially vis-à-vis China. For the West, India’s main attraction comes from its potential future role in the global economy.

For the EU, India can offer great economic opportunities. India has an increasing interest in finding global allies, not least because of China.

While India is fully conscious that China has, for decades, overtaken India in economic and technological development, India has done very well from a global perspective. Though China’s advantage over India is still increasing in many fields, there are factors that strongly play in India’s favour.

India’s advantages over China

Firstly, contrarily to China, India has demographic development on its side. China will peak just below 1.5 billion people in the next decade, before decreasing to 1.3 billion people by 2050. As a result of this development, China’s dependency ratio will challenge the country’s development, similarly to what we’ve seen in Europe and the West more generally. In opposition to this, by 2050, India will be home to an estimated 1.7 billion people, and its dependency ratio is actually declining. While India will remain young, China will become old. Secondly, while India’s infrastructure is much weaker, its potential for growth is greater as a result. Thirdly, despite its political problems, India is a democratic nation, and fostering relationships with the US and Europe will be much easier.

India, however, must deal with several hurdles before truly becoming a global player. India’s domestic political developments are worrying.  India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi overwhelmingly won the May 2019 elections, ensuring control over the country’s future. Modi has been accused of boosting his popularity by implementing Hindu nationalist policies in a multireligious and multicultural country, which already has a history of ethnic conflicts. Moreover, his illiberal inclinations are concerning. Political instability in spite of Modi’s rule is a factor of Indian politics, directing the policy focus inwards.

At the same time, his nationalistic attitude is reflected in India’s approach to foreign relations, and in global governance and the development of global trade. India has high tariffs and a strongly nationalistic industrialisation strategy, and trade negotiations between the EU and India have been delayed several times.

India’s foreign policy has a strong focus on neighbouring countries, especially on China’s rise. Furthermore, India is in many ways still a developing country, with undeniable potential, but far behind China. The demographic advantage India will hold in the future will also serve as a challenge with the increasing environmental problems and pressure on basic infrastructure and agriculture. China’s influence concerns India, limits its agenda, and has a strong impact on India’s self-confidence as a global player.

For the EU, India can offer great economic opportunities. India has an increasing interest in finding global allies, not least because of China. The EU and India have already set a pragmatic agenda to boost EU-India relations in their roadmap to 2025. While India’s future global role is unclear, both the EU and its individual member states have a lot to gain in enhancing cooperation with India and moving Indian relations higher in their political agenda. India might be, in future decades, the “next big thing” after China. Europeans should be ready for it.

Tomi Huhtanen China Foreign Policy India Leadership

You’ve got to hand it to the Chinese authorities – there`s never a dull moment. In late 2020, a lottery was organised in the city of Suzhou for the allocation of thousands of online wallets, each containing 200 digital yuan (25 euro). The lottery was one of the many pilot experiments organised by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) to test how China’s central bank digital currency would perform both online and offline.

On the face of it, this is a noble pursuit by a government providing essential services to its citizens. The World Bank estimates that China has one of the highest number of people who lack access to a bank account. The PBOC wants to provide a state-backed digital equivalent of the yuan which will be fully operational in late 2021 or early 2022. However, the government isn’t actually opening new opportunities – it’s desperately trying to catch up with the private sector.

In the last decade, the Asian country made a silent transition to a near cashless society. Payment systems designed by digital giants Alibaba and Tencent essentially leapfrogged the card-based services and started a revolution in financial transfers and retail. China currently tops the global ranking of financial technology (FinTech) adoption globally, with 87 % of its mobile users having access to innovative services. FinTech refers to all kinds of technology-enabled innovation in the financial sector. Plastic cards are not in vogue anymore – QR codes and FinTech apps make the money go round in China.

     Fig. 1 Source: E&Y | Martens Centre

Widespread mobile applications Alipay and WeChat Pay dominate the mobile payments market in the country, with trillions of euro worth in annual transactions. When it comes to personal data, the reputation of these private apps is murky. In early 2021, the US President signed an executive order banning transactions with eight Chinese software applications (Alipay and We Chat Pay included) due to potential snooping of sensitive data.

The Chinese Communist Party isn’t too happy with the fact that private companies operate the bulk of transactions within the country and that so much money is transferred from traditional banking accounts to electronic wallets. The PBOC is also eager to cut the costs of maintaining traditional banknotes, and also being able to efficiently track money flows within China.

An additional aim for Beijing is increasing the international appeal of its currency. The yuan’s annual share of global payments cleared on SWIFT hovers around 2%, which is meagre compared to the sway of the dollar, euro, and pound sterling. If China is the first country to launch a digital currency, it will make the headlines, but that doesn’t mean the yuan’s inherent problems will go away. Foreign investors are subject to specific financial restrictions, while Chinese authorities have often intervened in capital markets and been criticised for currency manipulation. Global investors are not going to judge a currency only by its shiny new cover. Still, Chinese leadership hopes that in the long run, a digital yuan might pressure the dominance of the US dollar and become the currency of choice for partner countries in Asia.

Fig. 2 Source: SWIFT

USD = US dollar, EUR = Euro, GBP = British pound, JPY = Japanese yen, CNY = Chinese yuan

Interestingly, the biggest prize here may not be the currency’s strength. Recent investigations report that Chinese regulators have persistently bullied Ant Group (parent to the Alipay app) to share their valuable troves of consumer-credit data they have been accumulating from their customers. The recent public disappearance of Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, certainly raises additional eyebrows. A few months ago, Ma publicly stated that traditional Chinese banks operate with a ‘pawn shop’ mentality.

Obviously, Chinese pawnbrokers and their political overlords are in a hurry. The state wants to reduce the dominance of private actors in the digital payment space. Policymakers in Beijing are also concerned that cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin or Ethereum will grow in appeal for Chinese users, who may migrate funds towards decentralised and anonymous digital tokens. In essence, with its digital yuan, the Chinese state aims to develop the perfect anti-thesis to cryptocurrencies – highly centralised and completely prone to state surveillance.

It seems that China’s digital currency would tick all the right boxes – reining in private companies, tracing financial flows, and boosting the international appeal of its national currency.

The mass adoption of the digital yuan will make every transaction in the country potentially transparent and traceable. This would be an additional step in Xi Jinping’s blueprint for societal management through state-backed digital tools. Monitoring of digital financial flows can also be bundled with China’s nascent social credit system as a mechanism for rewarding and penalising individual behaviour. It seems that China’s digital currency would tick all the right boxes – reining in private companies, tracing financial flows, and boosting the international appeal of its national currency. Indeed, Chairman Mao would have been proud.

European policymakers shouldn’t underestimate these developments. Within the EU, Sweden is one of the few experimenting with the creation of a digital currency, while this topic isn’t even on the agenda in many European capitals. The European Central Bank (ECB) has launched a public consultation on the idea of creating a digital euro, but Frankfurt is years behind on an actual project. Europe doesn’t need to race ahead to beat China in creating a digital currency, but we should be wary of yet another domain in which the Chinese are taking the lead.

An in-depth Martens Centre research study shows that the EU is currently lagging behind when it comes to FinTech services and innovative financial products – all the hot developments are happening in Asia or the US. Add in AI research, telecommunications patents, or development of various technological standards internationally, and you’ll see the EU being dwarfed by China in many of these domains.

The EU is best positioned to pioneer a global standard for a secure digital currency, which will be complementary to euro banknotes. The ECB has the resources and technical capacity to develop a privacy-proof digital euro equivalent, which will be a natural next step in the digitalisation of the European economy. An ECB-designed digital euro should not be launched overnight, and should go through rigorous tests for its durability and state of the art privacy design. It could serve as a tool for financial inclusion of citizens who are operating outside conventional banking services and also increase personal convenience when dealing with financial transactions. Moreover, unregulated payment solutions or third-country financial applications are already mushrooming, which creates specific long-term risks and vulnerabilities. Like it or not, fundamental change is coming within retail, e-commerce and finance across Europe, and EU policymakers must be prepared to provide trustworthy alternatives.

In the coming years, we will witness increasing cyber warfare globally and a relentless race for technological leadership. The European Union simply cannot let digital authoritarians from the East dominate technological standards, or become unrivalled to pioneer new tools for monetary policy which carry the stamp of the Chinese Communist Party.

Dimitar Lilkov China Digital Economy

While the world is focused on the aftermath of the US elections and its consequences, China is currently discussing its Five-Year Plan, the most important guiding policy document at national, regional, and local levels, which will define its policies and direction for the foreseeable future.

As a result of the successful containment of the Coronavirus, China will be the only major economy to grow this year, which makes engaging with China very attractive for governments, companies, and their shareholders.

Simultaneously, recent political developments in and around China have taken a heavy toll on China’s image in most European countries. Beijing’s deteriorating image and the lack of reciprocity for market access and intellectual property rights have also hardened positions in Brussels – a planned comprehensive investment agreement might not be achieved this year. So, how and in which areas could the strained EU-China relationship move forward?

Like in any international relationship, cooperation is built on trust, perceptions, and policies.

Perception of the EU and its member states in China

The rapidly deteriorating relationship between the People’s Republic and the United States does not (yet) seem to have had a negative effect on the image of European countries in China. Most EU countries, and the EU itself, seem to have a neutral or positive image within the Chinese population.

An example: a high-ranking Chinese government official pointed out that, while previously the USA, Japan, and Germany were all valued and trusted cooperation partners, Germany has remained the only one. The reasoning is that the current international situation makes cooperation programs with the USA impossible and the relationship with Japan is (again) burdened by history. Meanwhile, Germany and most European countries are seen as neutral and developed countries.

Europe’s generally positive image should be used when dealing with China. Nevertheless, without supporting national Chinese policies, any entity dealing with China will encounter difficulties in cross-border cooperation.

China’s Five-Year Plan is the country’s most important guiding policy document

Anyone who has a political or economic agenda in China attempts to influence the drafting of the Five-Year Plan (FYP). After the next FYP will be formally approved by the Chinese National People’s Congress in the spring of 2021, provincial and local governments, as well as state-owned companies, will follow its guidelines and turn them into concrete projects and cooperation.

The outlines for the next five-year plan were formulated in the fifth plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee in late October 2020. Like its predecessors, the next FYP will focus on increasing innovation and manufacturing, developing a sustainable society, raising the general living standard, and bridging the development gap between the wealthy coastal and the less wealthy rural areas. The most notable new developments will include:

-A long-term vision reaching until 2035, thus also laying the ground for the next three five-year plans;
-A push for higher technological innovation and self-sufficiency, influenced by the deteriorating US-China relationship; and
-The introduction of a new “dual circulation” model that aims to create growth based on domestic consumption, while not cutting ties to international markets.

Next steps in the EU-China relation: focus on reaching global goals and tackling megatrends on commonly agreed terms

Looking from China, Europe is already a battleground for narratives in an increasingly polarised world. The ‘damage control’ tour by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, his first trip abroad after the pandemic began, illustrates the importance of Europe in Beijing’s plans. As the relationship between China and North America deteriorates, China will be looking to other countries for foreign policy successes.

In line with the European Commission’s strategic outlook on relations with China, the EU and its member states should build on their positive image and strengthen cooperation with China in mutually beneficial areas. This does not mean giving in or selling out your own values. As demonstrated by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China in its latest position paper, one can and should be frank while negotiating with China, but this shouldn’t be done through aggressive Twiplomacy, where the negotiating partner risks losing face.

One also cannot expect China to do the EU´s homework. It is up to Europe itself to form and show unity on how it wants to cooperate with China.

In conclusion, looking at the proposed goals of China´s next five-year plan and the EU’s strategic outlook, two cooperation areas seem especially mutually beneficial. Firstly, the implementation of the Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement within an already existing UN framework. Both the EU and China have pledged to become climate neutral by 2050/2060. Both plan to invest billions into green technologies, green finance, and in new solutions promoting sustainability. Cooperation in this area will foster innovation that will benefit both partners and third countries. Secondly, both China and most EU members need to curb megatrends like population aging and the sustainable development of rural areas, with the goal of forming equitable living conditions. In these areas, China and the EU can change best practices and create new solutions that also benefit vulnerable groups.

Janne Leino China Globalisation Innovation